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Cybersecurity is a divisive issue – divergent European and American approaches result in intra-alliance tensions.

Burton ’15 -- (Joe Burton, 2015, “NATO’s cyber defence: strategic challenges and institutional adaptation,” Defence Studies, 15:4, 297-319, DOI: 10.1080/14702436.2015.1108108, accessed 6-19-2022) -- nikki

NATO has frequently been beset by intra-alliance tensions and in the cyber security arena there appears to be at least some evidence of a divergence in European and US policy approaches. Recent revelations by former NSA contractor, Edward Snowden, for example, have exposed transatlantic tensions around surveillance, and the alleged NSA hacking of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s cell phone, which led to an angry phone call between Obama and Merkel and the summoning of the US Ambassador to Germany, was a major embarrassment for the US government (Wilder 2013). The US has arguably taken a harder security stance on cyber issues since 9/11 because of its desire to protect the US homeland, and because it faces increased strategic rivalry from rival global power centres. A more aggressive cyber posture can certainly be seen in the establishment of the US Cyber Command, a unified and expanding military command structure tasked with coordinating defensive and offensive cyber operations for all branches of the US military, the deployment of the Stuxnet software against Iranian nuclear centrifuges, the Patriot Act, and the mass surveillance programmes run by the NSA, including the Prism programme. The use of offensive and even pre-emptive operations by the US government has also grown in recent years, with a high number of ICT specialists employed to penetrate foreign networks (Gellman and Nakashima 2013). In 2012, Obama signed Presidential Decision Directive 20, a classified document that gave the US military the authority to conduct more aggressive cyber operations to thwart cyber attacks against US systems (Nakashima 2012). The wealth of cyber resources and capabilities that exist within the US military and associated agencies may be a reason in and of itself why the US approach to managing cyber conflict has been dominated by that branch of the US government. Mary O Connell takes up this line of argument, suggesting that the US government has become “trapped in an ideology of militarism” (O’Connell 2012, p. 191) and claiming that “the US military today has the largest concentration of expertise and legal authority with respect to cyberspace” (O’Connell 2012, p. 187). She further notes that in 2009, following the Estonia attacks, the Russia Georgia war and the release of the Stuxnet virus, the US government “began releasing a number of policies on cyber security that were predominantly military in orientation” (O’Connell 2012, p. 188). This would seem to support the line of argument advanced by this article, that threats from state rather than non-state actors explain the elevation of cyber security as an issue within the transatlantic security community. This hard power approach to cyber security in the US could also be explained by the rhetoric being used to describe cyber attacks in the American context. Former Defence Secretary Leon Panetta’s claim that the US could face a “cyber Pearl Harbour” is a prime example of the securitisation and militarisation of cyber discourse. When there is a propensity at the highest levels of government to adopt Second World War and cold war analogies to characterise cyber conflict, this can shape US policy and doctrine in a certain direction. Shachtman and Singer (2011) argue that clear links can be found between cold war strategic thinking and the formulation of current US policy, especially the idea that cyber attacks might be met with conventional attacks; an idea “lifted” from the 1960s strategy of flexible response. Commercial and political motives might also have led to the US taking a more military-based approach to cyber security issues. They further argue that “there is a massive amount of threat inflation going on in Washington’s discussion of online dangers, most frequently by those with political or profit motives in hyping the threats” Shachtman and Singer (2011). While we should be careful in suggesting that a new “cyber industrial complex” is forming in America, the huge US government spending on cyber protection for the federal government, such as a $1 billion contract awarded to Raytheon by the Department for Homeland Security in 2015, may create incentives for responses to cyber security threats to be militarised. Equally, threat inflation may displace attention from the arguably more pervasive problem of cyber crime. In Europe, at least on the surface, a softer cyber security approach is evident. EU responses to cyber security have typically emphasised criminal and civil procedures for dealing with cyber attacks, reflecting a European preference for soft power over hard power, and there has been a broader reluctance in Europe to militarise cyberspace. The new European Union Cyber Security Strategy, for example, is based on promoting norms in cyberspace, encouraging dialogue between nations, enhancing technical capacity and resilience, and fighting cybercrime (Ashton 2013). The most controversial aspect has been the requirement for businesses in Europe, and particularly critical infrastructure providers, to report cyber attacks to a central authority. Overall though, the strategy is defensively orientated and non-militaristic.

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