Broad strategic concept that doesn’t prioritize certain threats waters down NATO and causes disunity – the 2010 strategic concept proves.
Ringsmose and Rynning 21 [Jens Ringsmose, Dean of the Faculty of Business and Social Sciences at SDU, has been appointed as the new Rector of the University of Southern Denmark from 1 November 2021. Sten Rynning is Professor in the Center for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark.; “NATO’s Next Strategic Concept: Prioritise or Perish”; Survival; September 28, 2021; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396338.2021.1982203]//eleanor
The 2010 Strategic Concept displays all the signs of an Alliance faced with a range of security challenges but no major threats. It was drafted and approved at a time when NATO forces were heavily engaged in a war of choice in Afghanistan, and when the vast majority of allies did not perceive Russia – let alone China – as an adversary, but rather saw it as a potential strategic partner. Certainly, some allies wanted NATO to ‘come home’ and focus its energies on Europe, Russia and collective defence, but most allies, including the United States, preferred NATO to be global in orientation and better prepared for crisis management. Thus, there was little consensus as to what NATO’s key strategic focus should be in an indeterminate security environment.7 Unsurprisingly, the Strategic Concept does not set any clear strategic priorities. It merely identifies three core tasks: collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. Collective defence is catalogued first, but there are no indications that the order in which the tasks are listed is meant to signify a hierarchy of priorities. Several new initiatives and forward-looking schemes are introduced, yet the concept stops short of giving precedence to any core task. Likewise, the potential threats, risks and challenges identified by the concept, most of which are unconventional and transnational in nature, appear to be listed in no particular order. Tellingly, the concept describes the security environment as being characterised by ‘a broad and evolving set of challenges’ that include the proliferation of nuclear weapons, technology-related trends and environmental constraints.8 The 2010 concept’s ambiguity concerning threats and strategic priorities predictably spills over into its (lack of) military guidance. Unlike the 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts, the 2010 version does not include a detailed section on ‘Guidelines for Defence’ that lays out comprehensive directions for military planners. It speaks in generic terms of new defence initiatives and lists aspirations to develop future capabilities, yet it is silent on concrete measures, desired military effects and objectives. Compared with its forerunners, and particularly the Cold War concepts, the 2010 document is thus extraordinarily political in character and oriented towards public diplomacy, and by implication rather disconnected from the military side of NATO. Any bridge linking the Alliance’s political masters to its military authorities, as previously established by the ‘Guidelines for Defence’ in 1991 and 1999, is awkwardly missing.