Strict capabilities aren’t enough for COMPLETE Russian deterrence --- Russia can collapse deterrence by creating openings in NATO disagreements --- Cohesion is the only way to ensure Deterrence
Mierzwa and Tomaszycki ‘21
(Danuta, Faculty of Management, General Tadeusz Kościuszko Military University of Land Forces, Wrocław, Poland, Marek, Faculty of Management, General Tadeusz Kościuszko Military University of Land Forces, Wrocław, Poland, “Imperial policy of the Russian Federation versus cohesion and coherence of NATO’s new strategic concept,” International Politics, pg SpringLink //um-ef)
Chart removed for brevity The direct comparison between the military capabilities of Russia and NATO indicates that there is no real threat in terms of quantitative or qualitative advantage in Russia’s favour. On the contrary, NATO is in the lead, with a huge advantage of both equipment and personnel as well as technology, quality and quantity. However, there are areas in favour of Russia. These include WRE (radio-electronic warfare), aviation and air defence capabilities, radar systems as well as nuclear carriers and weapons. Needless to mention other types of mass destruction weapons which, according to the International Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict (IHL), ought to cease to exist, whereas Russia is highly likely to possess them (chemical weapons were used in counter-terrorism operations and special combat operations). Over the past two decades, the Russian defence industry has developed, researched and introduced dozens of radio-electronic warfare systems capable of disrupting and completely immobilizing most of the forces in the areas of land, air and water. Russian technologies are effective at fighting aircrafts, cruise missiles, radars, conventional missiles and unmanned aircrafts. The latest implemented system is the Palantin system, which has been deployed in the Kaliningrad Oblast and Crimea. This system is able to disrupt the operation of AWACS at a distance of 250 km. Probably, it is also able to disrupt all radio, GPS and mobile systems as well as create the so-called apparent targets that mask the correct flight paths of projectiles fired from the Iskander launcher. Thus, combating and destroying Iskander missiles have become even more difficult. Moreover, the system also functions as a reconnaissance platform (Cranny-Evans 2019; Hodges et al. 2019). The deployment of Iskander and Krasucha (Gawęda 2015), as well as Palantin and aeronautical defence systems in the Kaliningrad Oblast and Crimea, including the S-300 and S-400, create strong Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) nodes with the simultaneous capability to strike by means of airborne and land forces within the depth of their practical impact range (A2/AD nodes). Another threat worth noting, particularly important for NATO Eastern Wall states, is Russia’s conduct of operations which cannot be immediately repelled by the Alliance due to their little scale. They take place in the form of quick, limited or offensive operations giving Russia the advantage of “facts made” and allowing it to join into the peace talks from that position. Figure 4 presents the summary of the estimated military capabilities, presented earlier in individual innovation trends, of the Russian Federation’s Armed Forces in Europe at the end of 2019. It illustrates the deployment of the Strategic Connected Commands, the army and corpses as well as “inaccessible areas” and potential targets to be attacked in the event of a conflict (air bases, airports and radar systems). It is worth noting that almost the entire area of Poland is an anti-access zone (A2/AD) (Gawęda 2018), which means that any allied defence support from the air, at least in the first phase of a conflict, will be very difficult. Operations of the Polish aviation and capability to command them also seem highly problematic. Unfortunately, that confirms the likelihood of limited offensive capabilities as described above. **Chart removed** Russia’s significant asset is also the fact that it constitutes a single entity in contrast to NATO whose forces, which guarantee the security of Central and Eastern European states, are distributed throughout the world (including the US and Canada). Thus, the distance gives Russia a big advantage. The USA, being the major pillar of NATO, have several sensitive security spots and, therefore, have to operate on many levels, not just watching over their own national and NATO’s interests, but also, in particular, European states neighbouring with Russia. Moreover, the distance and response time create problems, while Russia has the freedom to choose the time and space to provoke and attack. However, it is not the military threat that is the most dangerous for NATO. The main threat are the attempts made by Russia to bring individual member states into conflict with each other in order to break down NATO’s cohesion. Success of such attempts could create a space for Russia to undertake possible military actions. The tools provided by the supplemented Gerasimov doctrine entitle Russia to use all methods and measures of combat such as: pre-emptive attacks, impacts on civilians and administration centres (psychological and information operations), as well as the use of nuclear weapons. In other terms, it entitles Russia to wage a total war at a convenient time and place.