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1 – variation and uncertainty doom proceedings – Singapore and Indonesia prove

Kinne ‘18 – Associate professor of political science at the University of California, Davis whose research explores international networks in the areas of militarized conflict, intergovernmental organization, and bilateral cooperation (Brandon, International Organization, “Defense Cooperation Agreements and the Emergence of a Global Security Network”, August 15, 2018, https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/76662383DB9CA3D26BE4FA883E5C95A2/S0020818318000218a.pdf/defense-cooperation-agreements-and-the-emergence-of-a-global-security-network.pdf )//RG

Coordination problems are also apparent in DCAs. Variations in the institutional characteristics of DCAs partially reflect distributional concerns. Governments worry about asymmetric gains—that is, the possibility that one’s partners will gain more than oneself.47 Further, negotiators know that revealing a preference for particular design features may lead others to increase their demands accordingly. Given these incentives, governments anticipate that their interlocutors may not be fully transparent about their treaty preferences. That uncertainty, in turn, increases the risk of bargaining failure. Given their broad flexibility as framework agreements, DCAs particularly raise concerns about scope, precision, and the degree of reliance on implementing arrangements.

A contentious 2007 negotiation between Singapore and Indonesia offers an illuminating example. In response to Singapore’s request for access to Indonesian waters for training purposes, the resulting DCA included a seemingly benign implementing arrangement that designated an “Area Bravo” southwest of Indonesia’s Natuna Islands.48 Almost immediately upon signature of the DCA, Indonesian politicians accused Singapore of disingenuousness and began speculating on the “broad latitude” that the Singapore military would wield in Area Bravo, involving naval exercises, air support, live fire, and even participation of third parties—all of which, given Singapore’s growing military strength, would likely intensify over time.49 Indonesia’s defense minister, seizing on ambiguities within the agreement, declared that “Singapore still wants rules of their own, without having to negotiate ... on their military training here.”50 He further asserted, “We want clear rules of the game on the frequency and scope of Singapore military training, including how many times Singapore can fire its missiles in our territory.”51 While Singapore’s true preferences remain opaque, the mere perception of duplicity by the Indonesian government was sufficient to doom the proceedings.

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