1NC --- Cyborg Bad
Cyborg theorizing is rooted in ableist and Anti-Black logics that ensure it’s failure.
Knadler 19 - ( Stephen Knadler; Stephen Knadler is an associate professor of English at Spelman College, where he teaches US literature and cultural studies. He has been published in American Literature, American Literary History, American Quarterly, Minnesota Review, and Modern Fiction Studies.; Originally published: August 6, 2019; “Vitality politics : health, debility, and the limits of black emancipation”; http://link.umsl.edu/portal/Vitality-politics--health-debility-and-the/n6SXiAQq3ac) Dōgen
What I am also unwilling to take with the theory of assemblage is the freighted territory of the cyborg: the feminist materialist theory of becoming developed by Donna Haraway that combines human, animal, and machine as a radical political enterprise that ushers in the future both theoretically and practically. I have found it useful as a thought exercise that complicates the relationship of the body to itself and to others and deals with our very real reliance on machines and kinship with animals. Since the cyborg opens up the conversation about futurity—which usually elides madness and Blackness—it also becomes a useful space to consider who we are becoming.60 Certainly, to think through our kinship with machines is apropos for discussions of disability given the medicalization of certain bodies, and remains so given my emphasis on speculative fiction. But the cyborg is an incomplete, politically fraught, and ethically suspicious answer to a series of questions about raced and disabled futurity. Material reality must reckon with what others have pointed out are the lived experiences of the Black and disabled body, what amount to (in this project, at least) the gaps and folds within Black speculative fiction. Read in alignment with Tobin Siebers’s theory of complex embodiment and Alison Kafer’s questioning of spatial, cultural, and temporal logics, the emphasis on the cyborg and the desire to supersede the body has an antagonistic relationship with concerns at the heart of disability studies: pain, fiscal access, and the validity of embodied experience, to name a few.61 What happens when one does not desire cyborgian intervention as cure? What of those for whom material cyborgian realities are more painful than useful or pleasurable? As much as cyborgian futures promise a radical set of possibilities for considering disability, we ought to be wary of them because they are also reliant on a set of middleclass (or rich) realities. I have elsewhere pointed out the way the cyborg’s promise of radical potential hinges on an original white Western subject.62 Leaning on Donna Haraway’s original definition, João Costa Vargas and Joy A. James understand the Black cyborg as a postbellum construction that requires Black degradation: “A Black cyborg: a modified, improved human whose increased ethical, spiritual, and physical capabilities generate unusual strength, omniscience, and boundless love.”63 They invoke Haraway’s understanding of the cyborg as both real and fictive to pinpoint how the Black cyborg relies on a set of interracial dynamics that extend from a history steeped in anti-Blackness. The Black cyborg is required to participate in its own self abnegation since it is built on top of the foundations of American democratic and imperial projects reliant on phobic understandings of Blackness. The Black cyborg, then, in Vargas and James’s formulation, echoes that of the disabled cyborg: neither can escape the desire for normalcy that erases Blackness and madness both. Alison Kafer reads in the gaps of Haraway’s work and its intellectual genealogy to reinsert the oft-overlooked contributions of women of color—among them Octavia E. Butler and Chela Sandoval—to the definition of the cyborg. She pinpoints that the cyborg as transgressive figure has limited potential precisely because of how it has been developed and mobilized in ways that erase women of color and reify the virgule between disabled and able-bodied. Though the cyborg asks for blasphemous interpretation—a promise and proposition Kafer, Vargas, and James readily champion—as part of its political transgression, I question how much the cyborg can map a future of any kind when it relies on a past and path of erasure. What the cyborg ushers in—that I’d prefer to leave aside for this discussion—is an assemblage yoked to anti-Blackness and ableism, a method of becoming that requires theoretical overcoming since the theories rely on but refuse disabled and Black embodiment.
The Aff is an ableist cyborg hoax
Ellcessor 16 (Elizabeth Ellcessor is an associate professor of media studies at the University of Virginia, “Cyborg hoaxes: Disability, deception, and critical studies of digital media”, , 4/19/16, Buck)
Cyborg hoaxes, deceptive forms of identity presentation that articulate gender, disability, and technology, have been persistent but unremarked upon elements of online culture. By identifying, contextualizing, and deconstructing them, this article has highlighted the persistence of an ideology of ability in online culture and in cyberculture and Internet studies. An ideology of ability is at work in the pitiable presentation of a digital sweet innocent and in the excuses offered by cancer. Identifying these themes reveals that online cultures remain closely connected to larger ideologies and norms. Far from offering a “liberation technology” (Coombs, 1991), online spaces may reproduce and amplify the prejudices and normative assumptions of a broader cultural context. These deceptive assemblages deploy disability strategically for an able-bodied audience, taking advantage of existing hierarchies. Yet, they may also challenge the very ideologies upon which they depend. For instance, the prominence of romance and sexuality in these hoaxes counters very real tendencies to desexualize people with disabilities. Such contradictions, and the blurring of identity and technology, are indicative of the “cyborg” component of these hoaxes. While I retained this language in order to highlight the possibility of such provocations, it is in the experiences of people with disabilities using online media that a richer form of cyborg can be found. These experiences reflect a variety of possible linkages of gender and sexuality, disability, and technology. In these formations, people with disabilities can be understood “as cyborgs not because of [their] bodies (e.g. our use of prosthetics, ventilators, or attendants), but because of [their] political practices” (Kafer, 2013: 120). In claiming disability identity and engaging in community formation, by reconfiguring default settings of computer hardware and software, and by speaking back to dominant narratives of disability and gender, these individuals and communities are producing disability technocultures that are seditious and, too often, invisible. Disability is a necessary and theoretically rich addition to the forms of identity, community, and material technology that have dominated critical and cultural studies of digital media. Present since the earliest cyberculture work, but rendered invisible or metaphorical, disability offers important critical resources for the nuanced and complex study of the digital networked media that increasingly permeate daily life. Not a metaphor, and not invisible, but ever-present and meaningful, disability offers a lens through which to examine theoretical assumptions and exclusions and with which to critically interrogate normative forms of digital media and the ideological structures that maintain and challenge them.