1NC --- Progress
The aff’s theory is contingent on institutions and their engagement with language in debate can’t achive any success. Only political engagement can solve.
Brock 22 – Brian Brock holds a personal Chair in Moral and Practical Theology. He joined the University of Aberdeen in 2004, following postdoctoral studies at the Friedrich Alexander University Erlangen-Nurnberg and a doctorate in Christian ethics at King's College London. (Brian Brock, “On the limits of justice as eradicating ‘isms’”, Taylor and Francis Online, 23 Feb 2022, Vol. 22, Issue: 1, pgs. 75-85, ) || PZ
**Edited for language**
Are all biases equal? What is more idolatrous than ableism? Just as racism is a set of cultural attitudes and sociopolitical structures that privilege the dominant race over ethnic minorities, and just as sexism is a similar set of cultural presuppositions and sociopolitical structures that perpetuate male domination over women, so ableism names the discriminatory attitudes, negative stereotypes, and sociopolitical and economic structures and institutions that together function to exclude people with disabilities from full participation in society. Ableism thus identifies the normate bigotry, evaluative chauvinism, and structural injustice that people with disabilities have to endure at the hands of the dominant (read: nondisabled) culture. With this articulation of the injustices suffered by people with disabilities, the Pentecostal disability theologian Amos Yong channels the zeitgeist, a widely shared sensibility about how equality is to be achieved. The contemporary version of this Enlightenment quest to achieve justice – understood as universal equality – takes the form of a hunt to root out all pernicious -isms: not only racism, ableism, evaluative chauvinism but also patriarchalism, heterosexism and gender essentialism. Put in the terms of this special issue, it is almost universally assumed in the modern democratic liberal space that when we (late-modern westerners) ask whether disability is a ‘driving force for change,’ we understand change as a process progressive of eliminating injustices. This paper probes the limits and blind spots of moral change so defined in order to raise one theological note of caution. Understanding moral change in progressivist terms carries a momentum – psychological and linguistically embedded – that that can carry the moral drive for justice into a superficial and so problematic policing of language that can become unmoored from the more concrete work of investigating the mechanics of specific forms of lived justice. It is important to ask whether it is possible that well-meaning quests for justice can take forms that are idolatrous because they in fact excuse people from making real and costly concrete ventures to serve lived, actual justice. When Yong highlights ableism as idolatrous, he rightly draws attention to an important set of injustices, and in a way that makes common cause with people of all faiths and none who find ableism morally repugnant. The question I want to ask is whether saying something is idolatry (a theological description) is wholly equivalent to saying that it is a pernicious ‘ism’ (a linguistic and moral description). This distinction matters because one fights idolatry primarily by confession and repentance, whereas the common liberal understanding is that one fights bias and prejudice by education and institutional reform. Yong holds these two sorts of response together by marrying idolatry and ableism, but it may be that the list of aspects of ableism that he lists (‘discriminatory attitudes, negative stereotypes, and sociopolitical and economic structures and institutions’) are very differently understood if taken to be signs of worship of a false power rather than as institutional structures and mental attitudes which make life harder for some people than others. There may well be forms of being educated about discrimination which exacerbate the spiritual pride that assumes people do not really need to change. If so, it is important to ask what is lost if we simply equate the very different descriptive registers of idolatry and discrimination. These questions matter if the final aim of justice is effective social change. It is dangerous to assume that linguistic change alone can do this, a claim Yong would certainly reject. No one should doubt that we often find our way to real injustices by querying the behaviour of people who speak disparagingly of others, in this case, those with disabilities. Yet it is crucial not to lose the question of how successful or unsuccessful the work of rooting out discriminatory linguistic expressions has been in achieving changes to unjust practices on the ground. There are very practical differences in what it takes to combat ‘discriminatory attitudes and negative stereotypes’ in contrast to changing ‘sociopolitical and economic structures and institutions.’ If we call both sorts of work ‘combatting ableism’ we are lumping together very different sorts of activity, from the crafting of policy, to the analysis of cultural tropes to the revising of formulaic public speech to the investigation of people’s own identity structures. Distinguishing idolatry and discrimination Distinguishing between idolatry and discrimination matters because real change demands self-examination and repentance. It also demands personal investment in a very different sort of work, sociological research, policy formulation, legal clarification, engagement in the political process, forging alliances between different power blocks, and so on. It will always be tempting to reduce one’s investment in fighting injustice to the easiest of all these activities, the policing of language. What is dangerous about this narrowing of the quest for change to linguistic policing alone is that it can push some forms of injustice underground and so entrench them. It is fair to call the drift into linguistic policing alone intellectually lazy because it foregoes the hard and necessarily constant work of asking what is actually happening on the ground, what is the real injustice people are suffering right now, and what we might concretely do about it if we are serious about bringing about a genuinely more just society? The modern liberal quest to root out -isms can sometimes proceed in ways that make it difficult to see if these investigative questions are being seriously asked. Language policing undermines its own moral authority if this more concrete and fine-grained analysis is not obviously being pursued. For example, since the police killing of George Floyd in 2020 there has been an exponential rise in interest in rooting out racial bias among American white liberals. Yet despite this increase in intellectual comprehension of the implications of white privilege, those who think of themselves as white might still buy houses in places where they know racism gives them an unfair economic advantage, not challenge racism among family members and find reasons to resist sharing schools. Given the structural inequalities involved in racism and the personal costs of remaking these infrastructural barriers, crafting a ‘woke’ online profile and voting for progressive causes may seem like a reasonable and low-cost way of being an ally of victims of racial injustice while in fact being one of the more stable ways that racism is perpetuated. As early as 1965 Martin Luther King himself had highlighted this dynamic in the American populace. The ‘silence of friends’ he pointed out, is a longstanding feature of American racism, and is held in place as the majority of enlightened liberals denounce racism elsewhere but explain it away in their own back yards, where admitting it would demand costly change. As he put it in 1967: ‘most whites in America, including many of goodwill, proceed from the premise that equality is a loose expression for improvement. White America is not even psychologically organized to close the gap – essentially, it seeks only to make it less painful and less obvious but in most respects retain it.’ Stated philosophically: the danger of calling a concrete injustice, against disabled people, for instance, an ‘ism’ – in this case, ableism, is to insinuate that the basic motor of justice is our work of classifying new sets of language and thought as pernicious -isms. The illusion is that moral change in society is essentially driven by the reclassification of specific acts from being morally neutral, to being morally problematic. Once something has been labelled a problematic -ism it is then subsumed within a general class of illiberal -isms that those who want to achieve a just society must now fight to eradicate or defend themselves from accusations of being morally suspect. But as the case of racism makes clear, this linguistic reclassification can blind us to our own culpability if we are not able to name concrete ways in which we are participants in ableism. Those who have become content to denounce unjust -isms can often be spotted by the ease with which they compare and implicitly equate injustices. People who have developed the habit of verbally denouncing unjust -isms often find it hard to explain the details of concrete injustices. There is a symmetry between the equation of injustices and the superficiality of one’s emotional and intellectual engagement with them. For instance: are the indubitable injustices associated with the labels racism and ableism in fact morally or phenomenologically equivalent? There are a wide range of questions that would need to be asked here to even begin to answer the question of what it would mean to stamp out these two -isms. Is the racism of one society equivalent to that of all others? In a society that had chattel slavery in living memory, should we prioritise the fight to eradicate racism, or should we acknowledge that disabled people have been disparaged and mocked for most of human history, and so deserve to receive priority in formulating our campaigns for justice and our calls for better social policies? Should we even ask whether some injustices are more severe than others? If we cannot ask this question, how will we focus our efforts in fighting injustice? I am not taking a position on any of these questions, but raise them in order to highlight how the classing of all injustices under labels that appear to set injustices in a single conceptual cluster may produce false equivalences that make it difficult to investigate and admit morally important differences between disparaging language and actually enacted injustices.