2NC --- A2: Mollow
The aff cannot solve – violence against the disabled is inevitable and attempting to reconcile creates more violence
Mollow, 15 [Anna Mollow, University of California, Berkeley; Ph.D. in English, Tufts University; B.A. in English & French, Minor in Women’s Studies, has written countless books in disability studies, Spring 2015, Berkeley, “The Disability Drive” -ekh- + jmk]
Afterword: Done with the Drive?
Four years into writing about the disability drive, and three days before this dissertation is due, I have a thought: maybe it’s time to be done with the drive. That thought, of course, contradicts everything I have written in this thesis: one does not get done with the drive, check it off a to-do list, and go on to do other things. The disability drive is unmasterable; it is a force that cannot be overcome. Much as one might want to be done with the drive, the drive, it seems, is never done undoing us. Worse (or perhaps better), although we may say that we want the disability drive to stop its self-rupturings, the very notion of “wanting” is fundamentally destabilized by the drive, a compulsion that pushes us beyond pleasure and beyond desire, forcing us to wonder exactly what those concepts mean. The drive goes, does, and undoes. Recall the words of Jacques Alain Miller: “The drive…always has its keys in hand.” This line stays with me; whenever I drop something (for example, my keys), it repeats in my mind.
Always with its keys in hand, the drive pushes this project to go further. Among the most pressing questions now driving my inquiry are Jewish ones. In the previous chapter, I critiqued the ways in which Freud‟s developmental model of sexuality, reliant upon the theory that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny, reinforces racialized social hierarchies. Yet we can’t label Freud as racist—or even dub him a “dead white European man”—and leave it at that. For in the context of the early twentieth century, Freud was not exactly European, and he was not exactly white. In the preface to the Hebrew translation of Totem and Taboo, Freud‟s anthropological analysis of people to whom he refers as “savages,” Freud distances himself from his Jewishness (noting his ignorance of “the language of holy writ” and his estrangement from “the religion of his fathers”) but nevertheless emphasizes that he “has yet never repudiated his people” (4, xxxi). Avowing that he “feels that he is in his essential nature a Jew,” Freud writes that he “has no desire to alter that nature” (xxxi). What is this essential nature? Freud cannot express the essence of Jewishness “clearly in words; but some day, no doubt, it will become accessible to the scientific mind” (xxxi).
Freud made these remarks in December of 1930, an era in which so-called scientific minds were attempting to pin down, and to eradicate, whatever that essence of being a Jew might be. Before the end of that decade, the Nazi invasion of Austria forced Freud to flee Vienna; he spent the final year of his life in London. Although Freud could not have known about the genocide to come, the threat of anti-Semitic violence forms a crucial part of the historical context in which he developed his concept of the death drive. “A Jew awaiting a pogrom”: that haunting line in Civilization and Its Discontents, a text published in 1933, is offered by Freud as an example of the impossibility of imagining what it is like to endure extreme suffering (62). The image is quickly left behind (“It seems to me unprofitable to pursue this aspect of the problem any further,” Freud writes), but it invokes questions that keep coming. Most saliently: why? “The Disability Drive” has perhaps taken us in the direction of this impossible question. My project’s central claim is that repressing the drive leads to violence. Hostility toward disabled people, women, fat people, racialized others, poor and working-class people, and queers has been the focus of my analysis. My future work will take these inquiries further, asking about the drive’s relation to systemic racial violence.
In doing so, I will ask: when the drive, as repressed, keeps returning, what does this do? As we saw in Chapter 1, Freud raised this question at the beginning of Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Why, he wondered, did traumatized soldiers repeatedly return to the scenes of violence that had made them ill? Building on Freud’s theorization of the drive as an aspect of the psyche that may help the organism sustain trauma, I will ask whether theorizing the disability drive as a way of living through, or with, trauma might lead to deeper understandings of lived experiences of, and social reactions to, mental and physical disabilities that are brought on by trauma.
What connections exist between trauma and tragedy? In Chapter 2, I argued that disability scholars might productively reclaim the trope of “the tragedy of disability.” This phrase, I suggested, calls up not only the colloquial signification of tragedy (as devastating loss or pointless suffering) but also the term‟s generic denotation. Further exploring the relation between the disability drive and the genre of tragedy will open up questions about the status of literature in cultural analyses of the disability drive. I have performed literary readings in this dissertation because the drive, an unrepresentable force, can come to us only by means of the figural. For this reason, literary texts provide particularly rich sources for theorizing the complexities and the obliquities of the drive. But at the same time, I have sought to destabilize binaries between literary and nonliterary texts. By highlighting Freud‟s linguistic choices in his medical case history Dora; by analyzing Charles Dickens‟s and Lee Edelman‟s respective portrayals of the character of Tiny Tim as both literary and political productions; and by juxtaposing Freud‟s model of sexual development, Jane Austen‟s depictions of fatness and eating, and contemporary US American culture‟s citations of the figure of the compulsive eater, I have drawn attention to the ways in which the literary and the ideological structure, and are structured by, each other. In doing so, my intention has not been to use the political to master the literary, or to employ the literary to exert control over the political; instead, I have hoped to provoke and sustain potentially jarring confrontations between the two.
Such confrontations can produce experiences of epistemological disablement, rendering readers of cultural texts uncertain as to what counts as literature, what counts as politics, and to what extent such divides can be upheld. As we discussed in Chapter 1, epistemological disablement can be an effect of coming into contact with the disability drive. Stimulating uncertainties and doubts, the disability drive may disable us all; yet this ubiquitous psychic disablement also specifically evokes particular aspects of many disabled people‟s lived experiences. Disabled people live ongoing contradictions between our embodied realities and the structure of overcoming narratives, stories that are presented to us not as fictions but as normative prescriptions. We feel the effects of the drive when we suffer the breakages and breakdowns that occur when bodymind and overcoming narrative (the weight loss diet, the getting better with exercise and meditation, or even the claiming of a proud disability consciousness) clash and contradict—and when, for worse or for better, some parts of our selves like these crashes. In Chapter 2, I said that sometimes, despite our selves, we do like the disability toward which we are driven. But when it comes to the drive, perhaps it does not matter much whether we do, or don‟t, think that we like it. Either way, the drive is not done undoing us.
It undoes us through pity, we saw in Chapter 3. That affect that self-respecting crips are supposed to shun, I argued, could instead be conceived as a feeling that we might wish to solicit. If pity is regarded as a feminizing emotion, and if the abjection of pity has been effected through the culture‟s use of Tiny Tim as a trope not only for disability‟s pitiability but also, obliquely, for the clitoris as sign for an intrinsic feminine disability, then perhaps we should reconsider the impetus to take Tiny Tim out of the cultural text. We could take our analysis of pity further by asking whether primary pity—which I defined as a concept that lies on the threshold between, on the one hand, the complete erasure of the concepts of “self” and “other” that characterizes primary narcissism and, on the other hand, the solidification of the self in which secondary narcissism is grounded—could be conceived as a quintessentially queercrip concept. My concept of primary pity is construable as “queer” because its unsettling of the categories of self and other poses a threat to identity formations. At the same time, the concept is readable as “crip” because, insofar as it maintains an attachment to the construction of the self, it is indebted to the disability rights movement‟s claiming of “crip” as a politically subversive identity. My queer cripping (or crip queering) of primary pity will thus draw on the interventions in queer theory and disability studies that I made in Chapter 1: it will depart from queer theory‟s strategy of claiming postidentitarianism as a transcendent solution to the disabling effects of claiming, and being claimed by, culturally minoritized identities; and it will simultaneously challenge disability studies‟ positing of proud, nonsuffering crip identities as foundational to political activism.
Questions about activism press us further, too. In using the lenses of psychoanalysis and literary theory to delineate aspects of the cultural politics of disability, I have not laid out a guideline or program for resisting ableist social structures. I have sought instead to show how developing an understanding of the disability drive—and, in particular, attending to the violences that result from individuals‟ and cultures‟ misrecognitions of the drive—may facilitate transformations in how we conceive of our subjectivities. Such transformations, deeply indebted to the feminist maxim that the personal is political, are not individual solutions akin to the overcoming narrative. Rather, by changing how we understand our “insides,” we may contribute to changing the ways that, “outside,” on the level of the social, we relate to each other. As we saw in Chapter 4, something as seemingly personal as an individual‟s “relationship to food” can raise vexing questions that, when we deny that within ourselves that drives these questions, become the basis of damaging social structures of fatphobia, racism, classism, misogyny, and anti-queer prejudice.
If the drive won’t stop doing us, is it possible that we can allow it to do us differently? In the last paragraph of this dissertation, on the day that it is due, I feel as if I should leave you with a message to take home: perhaps a user‟s guide to the drive, a method for learning to love this thing that won‟t leave us. If I were a queer antisocial theorist, I might propose that we shout out, loud and proud, something like this: “We‟re here! We‟re queer! We are the drive! And you‟ll never get used to us!” But such a call, we saw in Chapter 1, performs a fantasy of overcoming the drive by identifying with it (if you can‟t beat it, join it); and the drive is not a force that can be overcome. Were I to articulate my own version of a saying evoking the feeling of the drive, it would go more like this: “Come on; we‟re late; let‟s go—oh no, where are my keys!?” To be clear, I am the last person who should offer advice about handling the loss of one‟s keys. I know the recommendations—stay calm; breathe; retrace your steps—but rarely do I heed them. For me, it‟s closer to: Panic! Berate self! Look for someone to blame! I have no guide for getting over this set of reactions, but I do want to say this: “The Disability Drive” has been an invitation to think collectively about the ways that, when we feel we cannot bear the psychic or social equivalents of losing our keys (keys potentially serving as metaphors for other objects, the loss of which might be more devastating), the impetus to blame someone else can harden into a fixed idea, a truth that one refuses to relinquish. We have analyzed multiple examples of this process: fat people stigmatized as “compulsive eaters,” feminists caricatured as anti-sex identitarians, and chronically ill people dismissed as “hysterical.” If this dissertation has a moral, it is this: the intolerable feeling that arises when we lose keys, control, or other objects that we think we need in order to believe in our selves, originates not from outside us but from within. This is the drive: it always has its keys in hand. We are not done with the drive.