1NC---Ballot K
Radical care work is impossible within the paradigm of competition. Their call for the ballot individualizes and neoliberalizes care relationships, turning the case.
Laurence Simard-Gagnon 16, Department of Geography, Queen’s University, “Everyone is fed, bathed, asleep, and I have made it through another day: Problematizing accommodation, resilience, and care in the neoliberal academy,” April 2016, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/cag.12274
Following the principle of competition, if some are to succeed it is necessary that some fail. Neoliberalism entails letting die, smothering even, the casualties of marketization. It entails individualization of life circumstances, including needs and, importantly, struggles and failures that occur when needs come in the way of an individual’s capacity to compete. Neoliberalism entails exhaustion.
As I am making the final revisions on this paper, I have been experiencing partial deafness for over a year, related to an untreated inner ear infection which will now result in permanent hearing loss. I did not attend to it sooner—it was not urgent, and time and energy are so scarce. They have been made even more so this year as my son has not been attending school full-time: some weeks he won’t go for more than two or three half days. The recent neoliberal cuts to public services in the province of Québec—where I reside—have translated into losses here and there, from removal of school transportation services to cuts in hours of specialized education, effectively reducing the amount of time an autistic child can spend at school. It is now late at night, and I write these lines on an old and very slow netbook as my computer broke down: when I bought it I had very limited financial resources, so I got a cheap model with no guarantee. I could have had it fixed sooner, instead I was striving to pass my PhD comprehensive examination these last months. There is nothing extraordinary in these circumstances, no one trait that could be neatly identified and removed, no one issue that could be adjusted or fixed, so that I could at last perform as a competitive and unencumbered individual.
The liberal normative prescription of atomic independence, combined with the neoliberal imperative of competition, have debilitating [massive] implications for mental health, particularly for those who are, like me, struggling to meet their needs and those of the ones they care for. Their overlapping actions individualize and decontextualize not only our needs and the circumstances in which needs arise, but also our personal failures to meet both these needs and the demands of individuated functionality.
Academia, care, and resilience
One of the ways in which liberal and neoliberal versions of independence and needs are most debilitating is through the idea of resilience. Resilience is often used as a term to celebrate the ongoing efforts of those who continue to perform despite difficulties and struggles related to their particular circumstances (see Jackson et al. 2007). When thinking in terms of care, the idea of resilience is problematic because, as Cindy Katz points out, social reproduction, almost by definition, must be accomplished (Katz 2001). No matter how difficult our circumstances or how bare our resources get, we, and the persons we care for, need to eat, sleep, be clothed, warmed, and loved, at least at a minimal level, in order to go on. Thus people will go to great lengths (of resilience) to perform care. Resilience, therefore, cannot be taken as an indicator that people are thriving despite the obstacles they encounter, despite the inhumane and unjust expectations they face, particularly in this moment of increasingly harsh neoliberalism (Diprose 2015). Resilience is in fact incredibly stressful. Beyond the financial and logistical stress associated with both pursuing an academic path and caring for others, being resilient implies sustaining the ever underlying stress of feeling that one is never adequately filling their own needs and those of their dependents.
In this context, resilience implies a projection into the future perfect (see Povinelli 2011 for a discussion on tenses in late liberal capitalist economies). It is the idea that there will be a future moment when the unsustainability of (poor) caring practices will abate. “When this article is written, this presentation done, this chapter completed—these hardships that I am inflicting on myself and the ones I care for will be over, and it will all have been worth it.” Except that this moment never comes. Within an increasingly competitive academic context, demands are ever emerging and there is no final moment of grace. As I am writing these lines, everyone in my house is finally fed, bathed, asleep, and I have made it through another day. It is an exhausting victory, yet nothing has been achieved that will not have to be recommenced tomorrow. I have made it through another day, yet the days of ‘another day’ are endless.
As problematic as it is, however, there are not many alternatives to being resilient, to reconcile as well as we can the ever emerging needs of existence and caring with the expectations for independent and competitive accomplishments, while waiting for an ever elusive future perfect. Resilience is indeed fuelled by the fear of breaking down, or, of falling behind.
Centering our vision of productive contributions as engagements of atomic and individuated individuals fosters a logic of “if you can’t take the heat, you had better get out of the kitchen.” In that context, asking for help is complicated or hindered by the apprehension that responses, even from compassionate and concerned peers and superiors, will be grounded in that logic: “It might be better for you to stop or take a break at this point,” or “Maybe later when your circumstances are better…”. This, however, is not going to happen; these circumstances will not get better, because once again they are not a punctual and discrete appendage of a self—or a cohort—that can be circumscribed or cut out. They are embedded in one’s very subjectivity, relationships, and existence.
Meanwhile the ways we care for one another within the context of academia are grounded in the dominant logic of independence and resilience. Our paths as academics are tightly woven in an institution fuelled by individualism and its correlate ideal of independence, and the ways in which we care for one another most often fail to radically challenge this, and to acknowledge the infinity and relationality of our needs. Caring others—people who care about struggling individuals, about inequalities in general—will attempt to facilitate academic paths, but often their actions are limited to more or less punctual accommodations, such as being a sympathetic listener, providing tissues in which to cry, and granting extensions. This entails, for the person receiving this type of support, the stress of navigating academic life through often last minute actions of generosity that are entirely dependent on the good will of others, and of knowing that this path of navigation is unsustainable. In my case it also entails a dissonant feeling of gratitude for this generosity and trust—it somehow entails being in the position where I am genuinely grateful for being allowed to continue maintaining my own existence and that of those who depend on me.
Punctual acts of generosity and trust are also costly for those who bestow them. Unsurprisingly in a liberal institution, and particularly in these neoliberal times, the burden of it rests on individuals. In addition to the logistical complications that supporting struggling individuals can entail, there is also the anxiety and dangers of venturing out of the current academic logic of individualism and competition. Watching struggling individuals struggle, and attempting to care for them, generates strain—I have seen it in the faces of compassionate peers and professors, I have felt it in my face when confronted by the needs of struggling peers. There again, future perfect is often our false and cold comfort: “I know it’s hard, but just get this thing done, give a good hard push this time around, and then it’ll be done”.
Caring, however, is necessary as a way to escape the debilitating effects of liberal and neoliberal paradigms of individualism and competition in the academy. On every university campus there are officially designated places of care. Although necessary, these services tend to respond to punctual and neatly delineated needs—such as discrete episodes of illness or mental distress. But the type of caring that truly facilitates my existence is one that does not seek out the independent and functional person within the grounded, slow, and encumbered mess that I am. Places of care are indeed those places that resist this sort of surgical violence.
In my institution one such place is found at a centre offering services for students who are older women and/or women with children. There, one can find a free meal, a bed to rest on, companionship, or silence. The centre is open everyday, to anyone, as the needs it addresses are understood to be universal, rather than punctual traits or shortcomings of a subjectivity that is dysfunctional in one (or a few) specific ways. Where needs are not failures, one does not have to identify as such. And so every moment spent in this place of care preserves for a little while longer the possibilities of my sustained presence in the academia—the possibilities of an alternative social project (see Povinelli 2011).
Although it may seem unsatisfactory and insufficient, maintaining possibilities in the face of exhaustion is critical—it is the basis of everything, including change (Katz 2001; Povinelli 2011). The type of caring that sustains my continued existence as an academic implies inserting a logic of relationality, responsibility, and inter-dependency within a structure grounded on individualism and independence—it implies inserting a transgressive current within an institution which doesn’t have the eyes to recognize it. Caring, then, is very much like Certeau’s perruque (Certeau 1991): a wig made from scrap material by a factory worker, who opportunistically appropriates glimpses of company resources to create something unseen and unforeseen by the power in place—to serve a subversive purpose. Like making a wig, caring within the academy is a creative diversion—of time, of attention, of affection, of academic positions designed to foster individual achievements and competition. It is a wink of recognition to other meanings within a totalizing space. It is an act of resistance.
The 1AC’s value stands on its own---responding to it with judgement and the ballot is a hollow validation that draws them into the oppressive gaze of the academy---vote Negative to decline affirmation.
Dr. Kendall R. Phillips 99, Professor of Communication at Central Missouri State University, PhD in Speech Communication from Pennsylvania State University, MA in Speech Communication from Central Missouri State University, BS in Psychology and Sociology from Southwest Baptist University, “Rhetoric, Resistance, and Criticism: A Response to Sloop and Ono”, Philosophy & Rhetoric, Volume 32, Number 1, p. 96-101
My concern with this movement centers around an issue that Sloop and Ono seem to take as a given, namely, the role of the critic. On one hand, calling for the systematic investigation of existing marginalized discourses is a natural extension both of critical rhetoric (see McKerrow 1989, 1991) and of the general ideological turn in criticism (see Wander 1983). On the other hand, the ease of transition from criticism in the service of resistance to criticism of resistance may obscure the need to address some fundamental issues regarding the general function of rhetorical criticism in an uncertain and contentious world. Beyond licensing the critic to engage in political struggle, Sloop and Ono advocate the pursuit of covert resistant discourses.
Such a move not only stretches our understanding of rhetoric and criticism, but also alters significantly the relationship between critic and out- law. Critical interrogation of dominant discursive practices in the service of political/cultural reform is supplanted in favor of positioning covert out- law communities as objects of investigation. Invited to seek out subversive discourses, the critic is positioned as the active agent of change and the out-law discourse becomes merely instrumental. Rather than academic criticism acting in service of everyday acts of resistance, everyday acts of resistance are put into the service of academic criticism.
Rhetorical resistance
That we are "caught within conflicting logics of justice that are culturally struggled over" (Sloop and Ono 1997, 50) and that rhetoric is employed in these struggles seems an uncontroversial statement. Despite the theoretical miasma surrounding judgment, Sloop and Ono accurately note, the material process of rendering judgments (and of disputing the logics of litigation) continues in the world of actually practiced discourse. In the materially contested world, rhetoric is utilized both by those seeking to secure the grounds of dominant judgment and by those seeking to undermine or supplant dominant cultural logics with some out-law notion of justice.
The distinction between these two cultural groups, "in-law" and out- law, however, deserves some consideration prior to any discussion of the role of the critic as implied in the out-law discourse project. The discourse of the dominant or those within the bounds of superordinate logics of litigation is reminiscent of Michel De Certeau's (1984) strategic discourse. For De Certeau, strategies are utilized by those who have authority by virtue of their proper position. Strategies exploit the institutionally guaranteed background consensus by which power relations (and litigations) are maintained and advanced. In contrast, tactics are utilized by those having no proper place of authority within the discursive economy who must seek opportunities whereby the discourse of the dominant might be undermined and contested. To extend Sloop and Ono's definition, out-law discourses are those that can (and, by their analysis, do) take advantage of situations (e.g., race riots) to disrupt the regularity of dominant cultural groups.
The ongoing struggle between strategically instituted cultural dominants and the "out-law always lurk[ing] in the distance" (66) is acknowledged, even celebrated, by Sloop and Ono. What their acknowledgment fails to provide, however, is a clear need for critical intervention. Indeed, quite the reverse is presented: It is the critic (particularly the left-leaning critic) who needs out-law discourse. While the struggles over justice, equality, and freedom have gone on, the left-leaning critics are those who have theoretically excluded themselves from the disputes. The study of out-law dis- courses, then, provides a means to reinvigorate the intellectual and re-institute (academic) leftist thinking into popular political struggles (53-54). Thus, Sloop and Ono's project incorporates three types of rhetoric: the rhetoric of the in-law, presumably the traditional object of critical attention; the rhetoric of the out-law, the study of which may transform our understanding of judgment as well as reinvigorate leftist democratic critiques; and the rhetoric of the critics who, having lost their political po- tency, can exploit the discourse of the out-law to promote ideological struggles. It is to this critical rhetoric that I now turn.
Resistance criticism
Sloop and Ono (1997) clearly state the relationship they envision between the rhetorical critic and out-law discourse: "Ultimately, we will argue that the role of critical rhetoricians is to produce 'materialist conceptions of judgment,' using out-law judgments to disrupt dominant logics of judgment" (54; emphasis added). Here the critic seeks out vernacular discourse (60), focuses on the methods and values embodied in these communities (62), listens to and evaluates the out-law community (62-63), and chooses appropriate discourses for the purpose of disrupting dominant practices (63). Essentially, it is the critic who seeks out marginalized discourses and returns them to the center for the purpose of provoking dominant cultural groups (63).
Despite acknowledging the efficacy of out-law discourses, Sloop and Ono assume that the critiques generated and presented by the out-law community have only minimal effect. The irony, and indeed arrogance, of this assumption is evident when they claim: "There are cases, however, when, without the prompting of academic critics, out-law discourses serve local purposes at times and at others resonate within dominant discourses, disrupting sedimented ways of thinking, transforming dominant forms of judgment" (60; emphasis added). Sloop and Ono seem to suggest that such locally generated critiques are the exception, whereas the political efficacy of the academic critic is the rule. This seems an odd claim, given that the justification for their out-law discourse project is the lack of politically viable academic critique and the perceived potency of out-law conceptions of judgment. Their suggestion that out-law communities are in need of the academic critic contradicts not only the already disruptive nature of existing out-law discourses (the grounds for using out-law discourse), but also the impotence of contemporary critical discourse (the warrant for studying out-law discourse).
By this I do not mean that the critiques and theories generated by academically instituted intellectuals have not been incorporated into subversive discourses. Just as out-law discourses inevitably mount critiques of dominant logics, so, too, the perspectives on rhetoric and criticism generated by academics are used in resistance movements. Feminist critiques of patriarchy, queer theories of homophobia, postcolonial interrogations of race have found their way into the service of resistant groups. The key distinction I wish to make is that the existence of criticism (academic or self-generated) in resistance does not necessitate Sloop and Ono's move to a criticism of resistance.
What Sloop and Ono fail to offer is an adequate argument for "taking public speaking out of the streets and studying it in the classroom, for treating it less as an expression of protest" (Wander 1983, 3) and more as an object for analysis and reproduction within the political economy of the academy. Philip Wander made a similar charge against Herbert Wicheln's early critical project, and this concern should remain at the forefront of any discussion aimed at expanding the scope and function of criticism. Sloop and Ono offer numerous directives for the critic without addressing whether the critic should be examining out-law discourses in the first place. While it is too early to suggest any definitive answer to the question of criticism of resistance, some preliminary arguments as to why critics should not pursue out-law discourses can be offered:
(1) Hidden out-law discourses may have good reasons to stay hidden. Sloop and Ono specifically instruct us that "the logic of the out-law must constantly be searched for, brought forth" (66) and used to disrupt dominant practices. But are we to believe that all out-law discourses are prepared to mount such a challenge to the dominant cultural logic? Or, indeed, that the members of out-law communities are prepared to be brought into the arena of public surveillance in the service of reconstituting logics of litigation? It seems highly unlikely that all divergent cultural groups have developed equally, or that all members of these groups share Sloop and Ono's "imperial impulse" (51) to promote their conceptions and practices of justice.
(2) Academic critical discourse is not transparent. Here I allude to the overall problem of translation (see Foucault 1994; Lyotard 1988; Lyotard and Thebaud 1985; Zabus 1995) as an extension of the previous concern. Critical discourse cannot become the medium of commensurability for divergent language games. Are we to believe that the "use" of out-law dis- course by critics to disrupt dominant practices can fail to do violence to these diverse/divergent logics? Are out-law discourses merely tools to be exploited and discarded in the pursuit of returning leftist academic dis- course to the center?
(3) Perhaps the academic translation of out-law discourse could be true to the internal logic of the out-law community. And, perhaps the re-presentation of out-law logic within the academic community will bestow a degree of legitimacy on the out-law community. Nonetheless, the effect of legitimizing out-law discourse is unknown and potentially destructive. In an effort to siphon the political energy of out-law discourse into academic practice, we may ultimately destroy the dissatisfaction that serves as a cathexis for these out-law discourses. It seems possible that academic recognition might take the place of struggle for material opportunities (see Fraser 1997). But, will academic legitimation create any material changes in the conditions of out-law communities? I mean to suggest, not that it is better to allow the out-law community to suffer for its cause, but rather that incorporating the struggle into an (admittedly) impotent academic critique does not offer a prima facie alternative.
(4) Criticism of resistance denies the practical and theoretical importance of opportunity. Returning to De Certeau's notion of tactics, the crucial element of these discursive moves is their use of opportunity to disrupt the proper authority of the dominant. The kairos of intervention provides the key to undermining "in-law" discourses. But when is the "right moment in time" for the academic reproduction of out-law discourse? Mapping the points of resistance (ala Foucault and Biesecker) entails interrogating "in-law" discourses for their incongruities and contradictions, not turning the academic gaze upon those communities waiting for an opportunity. Out-laws do not lurk in the forefront (66), hoping to be exposed by academic critics; they wait for the right moment for their disruption. Rhetoricians can provide rhetorical instructions for seeking opportunities and for exploiting these opportunities (literally making the culturally weaker argument the stronger), but this does not justify interrogating (intervening in) the cultural logics of the marginalized.
The concerns raised here are not designed to dismiss Sloop and Ono's provocative essay. The divergent critical logic they outline deserves careful consideration within the critical community, and it is my hope that the concerns I raise may help to further problematize the relationship between
resistance and rhetorical criticism.
Rhetorical criticism
As I have suggested, my purpose is to use the provocative nature of Sloop and Ono's project to extend disputes regarding the ends of rhetorical criticism. Diverging perspectives on the ends of criticism have been categorized by Barbara Warnick (1992) as falling along four general lines: artist, analyst, audience, and advocate. Leah Ceccarelli (1997) discerns similar categories around the aesthetic, epistemic, and political ends of rhetorical criticism.
The out-law discourse project presents clear ties to the notion of critic as advocate. For Sloop and Ono, the critic is an interested party, discerning (and at times disputing) the underlying values and forces contained within a discourse. Additionally, however, the out-law discourse critic is an analyst focusing on the hidden, aberrant texts of the out-law and "rendering] an incoherent or esoteric text comprehensible" (Warnick 1992, 233). Now, I am not suggesting that a critic must serve only one function or that the roles of advocate and analyst are mutually exclusive; rather, these entanglings of power (political ends) and knowledge (epistemic ends) are inevitable. My concern is that we not neglect the complexity of these entanglements. Turning covert out-law discourses into objects of our analyses runs the risk of subjecting them both to the gaze of the dominant and to the power relations of the academy. As the works of Michel Foucault (especially 1979, 1980) aptly illustrate, practices presented as extending such noble goals as emancipation and humanity may endow institutions of confinement and objectification. Any justification for studying out-law dis- course because doing so may extend our political usefulness in the pursuit of emancipatory goals must not obscure the already existing power relations authorizing such studies. Our attempts to extend our domains of knowledge and expertise (authority) must not be pursued unreflexively.