US-China war causes extinction.
Brands 22 – Hal Brands is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. The Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, he is co-author, most recently, of "Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China" and a member of the State Department's Foreign Affairs Policy Board. (Hal Brands, "U.S. Isn’t Ready for Nuclear Rivalry With China and Russia," Bloomberg, 1-30-2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-01-30/u-s-isn-t-prepared-for-a-nuclear-war-with-russia-and-china, Accessed 7-2-2022, LASA-SC)
Then there is Beijing’s buildup. China may once have possessed a “minimal deterrent” — a small, relatively vulnerable arsenal, designed solely to deter nuclear attack on China itself — but that’s no longer the case. The Chinese test of a fractional orbital bombardment system (in essence, a nuclear-weapon delivery system that orbits the earth before plunging toward its target) is only part of a much larger endeavor.
China is now building a more secure and sophisticated “nuclear triad” — a combination of nuclear-capable bombers, ground-based intercontinental missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Its ICBM force is expanding rapidly. The Pentagon predicts that China will have more than 1,000 deliverable warheads by 2030 — an arsenal worthy of a superpower.
The return of great-power competition has brought with it the return of nuclear rivalry. Meanwhile, conventional weakness is making nuclear weapons even more important to U.S. strategy.
Over the past two decades, Russian and Chinese conventional buildups have dramatically altered the balance of power in Eastern Europe and the Western Pacific. Washington and its allies might struggle to defeat a determined Russian attack on Estonia or a Chinese assault against Taiwan. An old question is becoming newly relevant: Would the U.S. start a nuclear war to avoid losing a conventional one?
The likelihood of a great-power war going nuclear is significantly higher than most Americans probably realize. If China attacked Taiwan, it would probably use its conventional missiles to maul America’s air and naval assets in the Pacific. Within days, the U.S. might face a choice between seeing Taiwan defeated or using low-yield nuclear weapons against Chinese ports, airfields or invasion fleets.
Alternatively, if a U.S.-China war turned into a bloody stalemate, American leaders might be tempted to use nuclear threats or strikes to batter the Chinese into conceding defeat. Does this sound crazy? Washington repeatedly considered nuclear strikes against China the last time the two countries fought a stalemated war, in Korea.
China might also have incentives to go nuclear. Starting, and then losing, a war against the U.S. could be a fatal mistake for President Xi Jinping. If an invasion of Taiwan faltered, Beijing could try to turn the tide, or simply convince America to quit, by firing nuclear-tipped missiles at or near Guam or another important U.S. military facility in the region. Such coercive uses of nuclear weapons may be what China has in mind in enlarging its arsenal today.