Just the PERCEPTION of the plan undermining strategic stability and triggers use them or lose them fears
Johnson 20 [James Johnson, James has a PhD in Politics and International Relations from the University of Leicester. He is the author of The US-China Military & Defense Relationship During the Obama Presidency. He is also a Postdoctoral Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation. 4-16-2020, Taylor & Francis, "Artificial Intelligence, Drone Swarming and Escalation Risks in Future Warfare", https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2020.1752026?scroll=top&needAccess=true&journalCode=rusi20 mimou]
Significant advances in power, sensor technology and communications would be needed before these autonomous systems have a game-changing strategic impact on submarine reconnaissance. However, irrespective of the veracity of this emerging capability, the mere perception that nuclear capabilities face new strategic challenges would nonetheless elicit distrust between nuclear-armed adversaries, in particular where strategic force asymmetries exist. Autonomous capabilities – like the Defence Advanced Research Project Agency’s (DARPA) Sea Hunter – demonstrate how autonomous weapons could accelerate the completion of the iterative targeting cycle to support joint operations – thereby reducing the reliability and survivability of states’ nuclear second-strike capability, and potentially causing use-them-or-lose-them situations. In the near term, therefore, the most significant destabilising impact of AI on nuclear deterrence will likely be the synthesis of autonomy with a range of machine-learning-augmented sensors, potentially undermining states’ confidence in the survival of their second-strike capabilities, which could trigger a retaliatory first strike. Enhanced exponential growth in computing performance, together with advances in the machine-learning techniques that can rapidly process data in real time, will empower drone swarms to perform increasingly complex missions, such as hunting hitherto hidden nuclear deterrence forces. In short, the ability of future iterations of AI that are able to make predictions based on the fusion of expanded and dispersed datasets, and then locate, track and target strategic missiles in underground silos (especially mobile intercontinental ballistic missile launchers), onboard stealth aircraft, SSBNs and truck- or rail-mounted transporter erector launchers (TELs), is set to grow.