China’s a purely defensive nuclear power---empirical record overwhelmingly goes affirmative.
Pan 18
(Major General Pan Zhenqiang (retired) is deputy chairman of the China Foundation for International Studies, senior adviser to the China Reform Forum and director of research at the Institute for Strategy and Management of the Central University of Finance and Economics in China. He is also a member of the Executive Committee of the Council of Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs., "A Study of China’s No-First-Use Policy on Nuclear Weapons," Journal For Peace And Nuclear Disarmament Volume 1, 2018 - Issue 1)
How should one understand China’s no-first-use nuclear policy? In its very first official statement on the no-first-use nuclear policy, the Chinese government purposefully chose powerful expressions, such as “at any time” and “under any circumstances,” to stress that this pledge is absolute, unconditional, and crystal clear. This fact has four implications. First, the unconditional no-first-use policy means that in China’s security calculation, nuclear weapons play only one role: to deter other states from attacking China with nuclear weapons. Simply put, if you do not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against China, then China’s nuclear arsenal is no threat to you. If you choose to launch nuclear attacks on China, you must anticipate nuclear retaliation, most likely in the form of counterattacks on several large cities that would demonstrate the “unbearable and disastrous consequences” that accompany the use of nuclear weapons. Following this logic, China hopes to achieve its objective of deterring any state from resorting to the nuclear option against China. In short, China’s nofirstuse commitment reflects the purely defensive nature of its nuclear policy. In this respect, China’s strategy that is aimed at deterring a nuclear attack differs fundamentally from the deterrence strategy pursued by the Western nuclear community. It aims strictly to prevent a nuclear war, whereas the deterrence strategy long maintained by other nuclear powers, particularly the United States and the USSR (now Russia), is based on preparing to win a nuclear war and is offensive in nature. This offensive strategy caused the US and the USSR to enter into a near-crazy nuclear arms race, escalating to a total of more than 70,000 warheads at the peak of the Cold War, far beyond any rational defensive needs. The US nuclear strategy has another striking feature: it is also applicable to non- nuclear-weapon states. Particularly with respect to those states considered unfriendly or disobedient, the US presents its nuclear weapons as a principal means of military threat and political blackmail, using its nuclear strategy as a powerful pillar to dominate the world. Intent on disassociating itself from Western deterrence theory, the Chinese government has little interest in going along with those Western defense analysts (as well as some nuclear theorists in China itself) who try to observe China’s nuclear strategy through the lens of the Western deterrence concept and who describe China’s nuclear doctrine with such labels as “limited deterrence” or “minimum deterrence” (Xu 1987, 366–369; Chen 1989, 214; Yang 1990, 407–411).3 China believes that these are specious interpretations that blur the clearly self-defensive nature of its nuclear strategy. Second, its unconditional nofirstuse policy implies that China has no need to engage in an arms race with other nuclear weapon states. No doubt, China must maintain a survivable nuclear force that can withstand the first wave of nuclear attacks with sufficient counterattack capability. However, China believes it is much more practical and sensible to keep its nuclear weapon development at that level than to pursue a strategy like that of the US and the USSR (Russia), which led inevitably to a nuclear arms race during the Cold War. Throughout those decades of rivalry, the two nuclear superpowers had to stand ready to strike first, thereby plunging themselves into a paranoid mindset. They never knew how much nuclear strike capability was sufficient, and they constantly worried about being overtaken by the other country. Each side, never sure when the other might launch the first bomb, remained constantly at the highest possible “launch on warning” alert; each exaggerating the other’s nuclear capabilities and proceeding with its own nuclear armament and readiness planning based on the worst-case scenario. From China’s perspective, a strategy containing these elements is the root cause of the escalating risk of a nuclear war. China has never been bothered by such over-anxiety or over-action in its nuclear thinking. China believes that to prevent a nuclear war from happening, it is sufficient to target just a few big cities for retaliation; thus it is not necessary to build a huge arsenal or develop massive offensive capabilities. Since acquiring its own nuclear capability in 1964, China has conducted the least number of nuclear tests among the five Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) nuclear weapon states, and it has maintained only a minimum number of warheads throughout that time. Also notably, China sees no need to develop non-strategic nuclear weapons, such as tactical nuclear weapons, which in China’s view are primarily for use on the battlefield; to develop so-called precision- strike nuclear war-fighting capabilities; or to deploy nuclear weapons on the soil of other countries. Furthermore, China considers it unnecessary to keep its nuclear forces at the launch-on-warning alert level, because it is prepared only to mount counter- attacks if attacked. Before any counterattack takes place, China must first determine whether the attack against China is of a nuclear nature and who the attacker is. Such investigation and verification will be time-consuming. In fact, China generally keeps its warheads away from intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers, installing them only when launching becomes necessary. This approach not only improves the survivability of its nuclear force but also, more importantly, tells the world that China’s nuclear posture is never offensive. All these are logical effects of the nofirstuse policy, which indeed determines China’s nuclear posture, including the mission, size, and structure of its nuclear weapons, as well as the doctrine governing them. For this reason, the common depiction of China’s nofirstuse policy as unverifiable rhetoric is demonstrably groundless. Currently, along with its technological and political development, China, like other nuclear weapon states, is also modernizing its array of nuclear armaments, particularly by enhancing the surety, reliability, and effectiveness of its ballistic missiles. This includes, among others, building a nuclear triangle focusing on land- launching ICBMs complemented by bombers and submarines. China is also strengthening its capacity for rapid reaction, effective penetration, conventional precision strikes, damage infliction, and its own protection and survivability. All these actions are geared toward effectively handling future war threats and emergencies. And all these steps, as pointed out by China’s Defense White Paper, have been taken in line with the country’s pledge never to be the first to resort to nuclear weapons (Information Office of the State Council (China) 2013, 12). In short, the no-first-use policy keeps China out of an arms race with other states, and this healthy mindset allows China to proceed with its nuclear modernization programs at a more measured and unruffled pace, in conformity with its national defense needs and within the limits of its overall national strength. Third, the unconditional no-first-use policy also means that nuclear development is not considered a way of compensating for any shortage of conventional capabilities in China’s overall military planning. This is another important factor distinguishing China’s nuclear strategy from that of other nuclear powers. In the eyes of other nuclear powers, nuclear weapons, other than being more powerfully destructive, are not qualitatively different from conventional weapons; both are ready and available for use in the battlefield. In the early years of the Cold War, when the US enjoyed first a nuclear monopoly and later nuclear superiority over the USSR but lagged behind in terms of conventional forces, it waved nuclear bombers as a trump card in its massive retaliation plan. In those years, Washington planned that if war should erupt with the USSR, it would immediately use nuclear weapons to crush the enemy. But soon, the Soviets caught up with the US nuclear capability while maintaining a superior conventional posture relative to NATO’s deployment in Europe. By this time, the latter alliance was forced to abandon the idea of winning the war through massive nuclear attacks. But the US and NATO were still prepared to use nuclear weapons first as an effective firewall to stop an offensive by Warsaw Pact conventional forces. With the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Warsaw Pact, the confrontation persisted between the two factions, with the US and the NATO on one side, and Russia, which retained the legacy of the Soviet era, on the other side. But the two sides now seem to have swapped positions, with Russia on the weak side, particularly with regard to conventional weapons. It is, thus, now Russia’s turn to follow the same path that the Western bloc had adopted during the Cold War era, offsetting its conventional inferiority with its nuclear arsenal. Soon after the end of the Cold War, in November 1993, Russia announced that it was abandoning its pledge not to use nuclear weapons first, emphasizing that in a future major military conflict with the West, it would launch a first strike if deemed necessary – although many believe that the USSR was never serious about its no-first-use pledge during the Cold War. Britain and France, the two next-tier nuclear states, also cling to the position of willingness to use nuclear weapons first, even though as members of NATO they are already under the US nuclear umbrella at least theoretically. Their calculation seems to be that, if they were to give up this position, their status as global powers would be substantially undermined and their status within NATO greatly impaired. Another consideration behind these countries’ threat to use nuclear weapons first is the desire to maintain their traditional interests in specific regions of the world, such as the Middle East and Africa.4 China has taken an approach fundamentally different from the other NPT nuclear weapon states. Its no-first-use pledge demonstrates that China does not plan to offset its relatively weak conventional strength (vis-à-vis the US, for example) with its nuclear capabilities, nor would it consider resorting to nuclear weapons first in a conventional conflict. There are at least two reasons for this approach. One reason is that China deeply understands the huge, devastating consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, including the massive and inhumane damage that would be perpetrated on both sides, and especially on innocent people. Furthermore, China believes that a disconnection between nuclear and conventional forces may be in China’s best interests. The nofirst- use policy was formulated by the first-generation leaders of the newly founded republic in 1949; all these leaders had experienced long revolutionary wars and had little taste for engaging in another large-scale conventional war. In their vision of a next war involving China, there was no role for China as an invader; rather, China would be the invaded country, meaning that the war would be on China’s soil. Such a war was quite familiar to leaders like Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. They were confident that under the Communist Party’s leadership, and with its disciplined military force supported by the people, China could fight a prolonged people’s war, using inferior weapons to vanquish its technically superior enemies, who would eventually drown in “the sea of people’s war” (Sun 2006). This strategic thinking, passed down from the forefathers, continues to be deeply imprinted in the minds of their successors and serves as important guidance shaping the no-first-use policy regarding nuclear weapons. Finally, the unconditional no-first-use policy indicates that China does not intend to employ nuclear weapons as a foreign-policy tool to advance its national interests. This view arises from China’s socialist system, which has consistently supported a non-allied, independent foreign policy of peaceful coexistence. In sharp contrast, the US acted in exactly the opposite way. By providing “extended nuclear deterrence” to its allies, the US sought from the onset to control these countries and prevent them from developing indigenous nuclear weapons, keeping them dependent on a global security system dominated by Washington. Such arrangements may have worked for some time, but whether they could work permanently is a big question. Many of these allies have never become fully reconciled to putting their fate in US hands and have desired to break away from the US control from time to time, giving rise to complicated frictions in the alliances. China has no such problems. It stands firm, not forming a military alliance with any other state nor using nuclear weapons as a means to control or influence another state’s policy. This position is consistent with its no-first-use pledge.