Chinese Launch on Warning causes accidental nuclear conflict
David Santoro 19, PhD, Director and Senior Fellow for Nuclear Policy, Pacific Forum International, 6/20/19, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic Security Review Commission, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Santoro_USCC%20Testimony_FINAL.pdf
Furthermore, Washington has been worried that China’s evolving nuclear capabilities will present Beijing with new, problematic strategic options and create significant command, control, and communication (C3) issues. For starters, the Chinese modernization program could lead Beijing to change its stance on nuclear counterattack: it could adopt a launch-on-warning (LOW) posture, abandoning its traditional stance to retaliate only after it has absorbed a nuclear strike. The improved mobility, readiness, and informatization of SAF assets and the PLA’s space-based early-warning system have increasingly made adoption of such a posture possible. The emerging nuclear roles of the PLAN and PLAAF will make it even easier because nuclear warheads have to be mated with delivery systems on sea and air platforms. Is an LOW posture compatible with an NFU policy, especially given that Beijing has often pointed to its de-mated posture as evidence that it abides by NFU principles? Another area of possible change concerns Chinese thinking about adopting a limited nuclear warfighting posture as a result of the increasing commingling and co-location of its nuclear and conventional assets, the diversification of its nuclear forces (notably its emerging nuclear triad), and its work to enhance “integrated strategic deterrence.” 21 Could these developments lead Beijing to endorse warfighting as an option for its nuclear forces? The consequences of Chinese modernization for C3 have also been worrisome to Washington. While the SAF was tasked to pursue “dual deterrence and dual operations,” i.e., wield both nuclear-and conventional-capable missiles, as early as in the mid-1980s, the modernization, diversification, and expansion of China’s conventional force has, as mentioned earlier, only begun to grow fast in recent years. Looking ahead, it is likely that the continued introduction of new dual-capable missiles, the increasing dispersal of land-mobile missiles, and the steady rise in the number of deployable nuclear weapons will, at the very least, complicate the C3 systems of China’s land-based nuclear delivery systems. What’s more, the emerging nuclear roles of the PLAN and PLAAF will add extra and probably major layers of complexity. The concern is that a human error or malfunction could increase instability or lead to inadvertent escalation. Many questions remain unanswered: Will C3 systems be modernized in a timely fashion, as nuclear modernization proceeds? Will the SAF be involved in PLAN and PLAAF nuclear missions? Will the PLAN and PLAAF develop nuclear-warhead management know-how and capability of their own? How do Beijing and the PLA intend to communicate with PLAN assets? Will they introduce pre-delegated authority to launch nuclear weapons?