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Consulting AUKUS solves broader relations

Moroney 22 – Jennifer Moroney is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation and manages many of RAND's security cooperation–related projects for Department of Defense clients. (Jennifer, "Making AUKUS Work," 3-22-2022, https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/03/making-aukus-work.html, Accessed 7-2-2022, LASA-SC)

An unprecedented U.S. legislative framework would include not only information sharing agreements on nuclear propulsion, but also on much broader areas in key sectors. Such a framework could allow for innovation to flourish, particularly as AUKUS looks for opportunities in artificial intelligence, quantum, and other key defense technologies. The role of the private sector, and the complications therein, is an under analyzed aspect to AUKUS. For example, Lockheed Martin was going to provide Australia with the weapons systems for its recently terminated French submarine contract; now the company may well be the supplier of the weapons systems for newly planned Australian nuclear submarine. And yet, just two days after the announcement of AUKUS, BAE and Rolls Royce won the contract to design a new nuclear powered submarine for the UK, which may have implications for Australia's new submarine, and Lockheed, too. The involvement of defense industry will also raise issues regarding commercial data sensitivities and intellectual property issues—both of which should be studied, as they may require additional legislative attention.

AUKUS would need to be adequately resourced to take on these tasks, which would entail a distributed governance framework with shared responsibilities and committed staff and resources, including political and organizational support from Canberra, London, and Washington. In the U.S., for example, the Departments of Defense, State and Energy would have roles to play. It has been assumed that AUKUS is largely focused on the Indo-Pacific, thus drawing interests from U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. That said, given the broad technology interest in AUKUS, it also draws in the Defense Technology Security Agency and Cyber Command. The U.K. would see input from the Cabinet Office, the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the Royal Navy. In Canberra the primary interests will be from the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Royal Australian Navy and the Department of Defence. Two Australian cabinet officials have defence portfolios relevant to AUKUS, including the minister for defence as well as the minister for defence industry.

In launching AUKUS, a number of working groups have been established to study and flesh out the cooperative details. In order to be effective, these working groups could be empowered by strong leadership, informed by evidence-based analysis, and encouraged to convene regularly. They could go beyond admiring the problems to identifying solutions. The success of the working groups would also greatly depend on the active and continuous support of senior leadership from all three nations.

More specifically, the AUKUS working groups could have access to the requisite expertise. Senior leaders could also ensure that the working groups have access to experts, practitioners, and program implementers from Australia, the U.S., and the UK who would understand the breadth and depth of the existing barriers and the necessary workarounds. This could be challenging: in the process of developing the cooperative framework, AUKUS is likely to shine a bright light on the many barriers to collaboration—not only technical, but also bureaucratic, budgetary, cultural, regulatory, political, and strategic.

AUKUS could benefit from clear, measurable outcomes for each working group, developed from the outset. For example, successfully meeting working group deliverable dates is an obvious and essential metric, as is consistent maintenance of working group meeting schedules and speed of decision making. Progress in armaments cooperation is another metric, and includes changing processes that facilitate innovation and deepening of cooperation. The ability to resolve key bureaucratic barriers (such as routine overclassification of information) and regulatory challenges (such as technology transfer limitations) would be yet another hurdle to overcome. The three capitals might develop multi-year plans detailing proposed projects, anticipated costs, and timelines for delivery. Success on each of these projects could be reported annually.

The experiment of AUKUS clearly seems to offer significant opportunities for Canberra, London, and Washington. More than a repackaging of existing capabilities, AUKUS reimagines the way in which three capable allies could work together, more closely than ever before, in many respects. The potential success of AUKUS will rely upon the effective management of this mini-lateral arrangement, and each countries' willingness to adopt new policies and make legislative changes to allow for this close collaboration. Making such changes would require strong management, but even more so, it would require the recognition from all parties that such changes are necessary to make progress in addressing common, overriding strategic goals. What happens now will determine whether the U.S., Australia and the UK can compete more effectively against China and Russia, or whether AUKUS becomes an interesting footnote in the story of what could have been.

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