Amendments solve durable legal change -- they’re superior to legislation– our evidence is also comparative
Jackson 15 (Vicki, Thurgood Marshall Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School, The (myth of un)amendability of the US Constitution and the democratic component of constitutionalism, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 13, Issue 3, July 2015, Pages 575–605, https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mov050 )
3.2. Arguments in favor of amendments as response to judicial decisions I move now to arguments in favor of considering amendment as a response to judicial decisions that seem importantly wrong. While there are reasons to be concerned about too frequent amendment, so, too, are there reasons to be concerned about too infrequent use of the Article V amending power. There are some significant benefits of amendment, as compared to reliance on adjudication (or ordinary legislation), to respond to a perceived need for legal change. First, constitutional amendment focuses more political attention on the object of the amendment once it gains momentum. In its early phases, an amending process focuses proponents’ attention on identifying the constitutional principle at stake. As it moves forward, and positions are articulated, areas of consensus on possible legislative solutions may emerge; greater identification of sources of opposition will also emerge; and—at least in theory—a better deliberative process can result. This process is likely to be more costly than the process of adjudication, or of ordinary legislation. But precisely because of its more diffuse and iterative processes, constitutional change by virtue of the amendment process of Article V may be more likely to be treated as final by those opposed and more likely to endure than contested judicial decisions. 99 (For these reasons, some scholars have suggested that even though the initial decision costs of adjudication are lower than of amendment, over the longer run, amendment may end up being a more efficient way to assure enduring constitutional change. 100 ) To be sure, the more incremental processes of constitutional adjudication—what Heather Gerken refers to as “informal constitutional amendments”—have some countervailing advantages, including their open-ness to continued contestation about meaning. 101 But just as not everything needs to be resolved by an authoritative text, so too not everything needs to be as open-textured as adjudicated constitutionalism may tend to be. Second, amendment in response to judicial error is an important check on the judiciary, particularly given the unlimited tenure for the Article III judiciary and the absence of a mandatory retirement age. Retired Justice John Paul Stevens recently called for six different amendments, each to respond to six lines of judicial decisions he argues are in need of correction. 102 The role of amendment in maintaining the democratic roots of a constitution may be more important in a country like the United States, where great stability in judicial attitude can persist across multiple presidential elections, depending on contingencies of aging, than in countries with more regular turnover in their constitutional courts. And correction by amendment is, arguably, more consistent with the rule of law and with the legitimacy of courts than judicial overruling. 103 Opponents of amendment seem to assume that judicial overruling poses no threat to the rule of law; but I am not sure why this would be so: any authorized changes from existing rules—whether by amendment, statute, or new judicial decisions—holds some threat to stability and rule of law values. 104 Third, as Adrian Vermeule has argued, it is sometimes a benefit that broader ranges of people participate in determining fundamental legal constraints. 105 Legislators, themselves, are likely to be representative of a broader range of views than the nine justices who sit on the US Supreme Court, thereby providing more “public” involvement even in the proposal for amendment. 106 Moreover, the US amending process draws on a much wider range of the public than those who can participate in litigation, and offers different kinds of opportunities for participation than does participation in social movements. Moreover, the proposal of an amendment by Congress and subsequent responses in the states—even if not in the end sufficient to ratify—may influence jurisprudence in directions similar to those of the amendment itself. 107 Adjudicated results may be unstable unless supported by political mobilizations; thus, adjudicatory decisions are likely to work best when they harmonize with more broadly held views. Even unsuccessful amendment proposals can sometimes shift constitutional understandings: the unsuccessful fight for the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) (first introduced in 1923, but not sent out to the states by Congress until 1972), may have contributed to—or could be seen as of a piece with—social movements leading to changed understandings of gender that underlay the Court’s change in equal protection jurisprudence to provide a substantial part—though probably not the whole—of what the adoption of the ERA would have accomplished. 108 Reva Siegel has drawn attention to the way in which ERA proponents envisaged that the political mobilization for the amendment could have positive effects on adjudicated understandings of gender equality. 109 Thus, focusing only on the difficulty of formal amendment may understate the capacity of those amending procedures to influence constitutional development even when the formal requisites are not met. Finally, some use of the amending process would be consistent with recognizing the idea of constitutional imperfection and the roots of the Constitution in more active forms of democratic consent. 110 The amendment provisions of the Constitution represent an important reminder that instruments made by human beings are imperfect (as may be judicial decisions interpreting those provisions), and of the need for humility about quality of existing law. Thus, “absent flagrant disregard for constitutional language, some amendments will be required as defects become apparent, or changes are desired.” 111 Some use of the amending process should be possible without threatening public attachment or affection towards the Constitution as a whole. 112 Refreshing the Constitution, through resort to amendments to clarify and put into the basic law a fundamental public norm—possibly, for example, towards reducing the role of highly concentrated forms of wealth in elections—might even increase public attachment, especially as those amendments are announced and solemnized through appropriate formalities. 113 This is not to suggest that judicial development and change of constitutional law over time is illegitimate or anti-democratic. The legitimacy of judicial review is beyond question at this point in the United States—legally, morally, and sociologically. But judicial review is connected through much more indirect processes to developing public views about constitutional values, and long time lags may exist depending on accidents of the appointment process and medical histories and life spans of those appointed. And while the standard interpretive approaches of constitutional law have over time looked not only at text, original meaning, and precedent but also at developing values, historic practice, and pragmatic consequences, 114 the application of constitutional law is a place where tradition meets present needs; by virtue of its embeddedness in a common law system of adjudication judicial review is likely to proceed incrementally; the past can thus prevail over present understandings for long periods. It is not an indictment of judicial review to suggest that some direct use of the tools of political democracy—i.e., voting on proposed constitutional changes in Congress and in the states—is valuable in sustaining a healthy balance among institutions and processes in the authoritative articulation of constitutional law. 115 This conclusion is reinforced by considering more generally the elements of constitutional legitimacy.