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A fourth body can easily regulate the executive power through binding rules, but requires independence from existing branches

Tushnet 5 [Mark Tushnet, Felix Frankfurter Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Controlling Executive Power in the War on Terrorism. Harvard Law Review, 2005. Hein Online]

I confess that I am not particularly creative in imagining alternative institutional designs that would ensure that power be exercised wisely under modern circumstances. Simply to illustrate what I have in mind, though, suppose we engaged in a detailed policy analysis and concluded that it would be helpful to have a new institution to supervise modern exercises of military power, an institution that drew on the different forms of expertise now lodged in Congress, the Executive, and the judiciary. Perhaps we would want to design an institution in which a group of judges, legislators, military officers, and civilians elected by the nation as a whole promulgated legally binding rules for the conduct of military engagements — without the intervention of Congress or the President — and could sometimes issue immediately binding orders to U.S. citizens, enforceable by contempt sanctions imposed by the new institution itself. The constitutional problems associated with such an institution jump off the page: the Incompatibility Clause, Article III, the nondelegation doctrine, and much more. These constitutional problems, of course, would be largely independent of any normative policy arguments regarding such a proposal.

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