The aff revitalizes US “amendment culture”- overcomes Article V barriers
Ginsburg and Melton 14 (Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, Leo Spitz Professor of International Law, University of Chicago Law School; Lecturer in Comparative Politics, University College London, Does the Constitutional Amendment Rule Matter at All? Amendment Cultures and the Challenges of Measuring Amendment Difficulty, (Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 682, 2014), https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2348&context=law_and_economics )
IV. Results: Amendment Difficulty or Culture? How well do amendment culture and amendment institutions predict observed amendment rates?43 We answer this question by estimating a series of ordinary least squares regression models, in which the unit of analysis is the constitutional system. Table 3 presents the results. The dependent variable is the unweighted amendment rate in columns 1-4 and the weighted measure of amendment rate in columns 5-9. For each measure of the amendment rate, two models are estimated on two different samples, for a total of four regressions. The two samples are the full sample of countries and a smaller sample of democratic constitutions only, following the convention adopted by Lutz and Lorenz.44 For each dependent variable and sample, we estimate one model with covariates and one without. Recall that the measures of amendment difficulty are expected to have a negative, statistically significant effect on the measures of amendment rate, and amendment culture is expected to have a positive effect. --Table 3 here-- The results are intriguing and consistent with our expectations. The best predictor of constitutional amendment rates, it turns out, is what we have called an amendment culture, as measured by the frequency of amendment in the country’s previous constitution. This is particularly true of the first four models; in each, amendment culture has a large effect. When we use weighted amendment rate as the dependent variable, though, amendment culture is only significantly related to the amendment rate in democratic constitutions. Notably, the coefficient estimates are quite large for the amendment rate, indicating both their statistical and substantive significance. The institutional variables are never statistically significant, and often, they do not even have the sign one would expect. For instance, large vote thresholds are positively correlated with the amendment rate, suggesting that higher vote thresholds actually yield higher amendment rates. Similarly, requiring votes in multiple parliamentary sessions is associated with higher amendment rates. The only procedural variable with the correct sign is the one indicating the number of approving actors. More approvers decrease the amendment rate, but the magnitude of the coefficient is not large enough to achieve statistical significance. Some of the control variables in the model are also interesting. First, as expected, the length of the constitution is positively correlated with the amendment rate. Length is a significant predictor in model 3, where the unweighted amendment measure is used. In that model there is expected to be about 1 additional amendment every 10 years a constitution survives for every additional 1,000 words in the constitution. Scope is statistically significant in the same model. For an increase from minimum to maximum scope, the expected number of constitutional amendments is expected to decrease by 2.5 for each 10 years of a constitutions life span. The effect of judicial review is also interesting. Surprisingly, the presence of judicial review actually increases the amendment rate. Although the effect is only statistically significant in model 4, the sign of the variable is consistent across models. This suggests that de jure judicial review may not substitute for constitutional amendments, a finding that should be explored further in future research. From a constitutional design perspective, this result is a bit depressing. The results suggest, quite strongly, that constitutional designers have little influence over the observed flexibility of their product. V. Conclusion: Whither Amendment Culture? This article has spent a good deal of time on technical issues of measurement, showing that existing measures of amendment difficulty are poorly correlated and may not be valid. But even more critically, we have suggested that a perfectly valid measure may not matter at all in terms of constraining or facilitating amendment. Our argument is that institutions are not the primary determinant of amendment rates. At the end of the day, it is hard to disagree with Rasch, who summarizes the situation by noting that the “empirical relationship between rigidity and amendment is however not very robust.”46 Instead, we argue, attitudes about amendments matter. Our main claim is that something we are calling amendment culture exists and is important. There have been other efforts to tie particular constitutional amendments to cultural concerns, even concerns about the nature of writing and change.47 But to our knowledge no one has articulated the idea of an amendment culture at the level of a constitutional system.