Reaction to Citizens United proves amendments aren’t happening now because they’re seen as impossible- the aff reverses that and revitalizes them as a means of change
Jackson 15 (Vicki, Thurgood Marshall Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School, The (myth of un)amendability of the US Constitution and the democratic component of constitutionalism, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 13, Issue 3, July 2015, Pages 575–605, https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mov050 )
2.3. Predictions of failure and normative objections may both contribute to disuse of amendment What may increase the difficulty of formal amendment in the United States is a seemingly widespread view that constitutional change cannot , as a practical matter, be sought through amendment, and that as a normative matter amendments should not be the vehicle for legal change (but rather changes in judicial interpretation should be sought). Taking account of these aspects of political culture in assessing the effects of the different amendment procedures is consistent with some recent studies indicating that the formal rigidity of amending formula has, at best, limited value in predicting rates of amendment. 37 Although I cannot offer conclusive proof in this paper that empirical beliefs in impossibility and normative attitudes of constitutional veneration contribute to disuse of the Article V amendment process, the suggestion that they may be causal factors is consistent with emerging work on the significance of culture as a factor influencing amendment rates. 38 On the first of these—overstatements of the difficulty of using the amendment process—as already noted, Levinson entitled a chapter in his book, “The Impermeable Article V,” and refers to Article V as making it “practically impossible” to enact constitutional change. 39 He is by no means alone in doing so. Professor William Eskridge describes the failure of the Equal Rights Amendment as having apparently been the “death” of the Article V amendment process. 40 Joel Colón-Ríos describes Article V as “creat[ing] almost insuperable constraints on constitutional change.” 41 These statements are widely echoed in the scholarly literature. Predictions of impossibility often combine with asserted reverence for the Constitution, related normative resistance to proposing changes in its text, and, sometimes, fears that any resort to the amendment process will invite populist movements to amend in undesirable ways; these all may cause hesitation to resort to the amendment process even when it would seem a logical response. Consider the reactions from groups that disagreed with the Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n . 42 Public opinion polls after the decision indicated that public sentiment, among both Republican and Democratic voters, was running strongly against the decision. 43 One might have thought this was an opportune moment to go the people, through the amendment process, to obtain constitutional authorization for regulation of campaign expenditures and contributions. Yet some combination of reasons—which may include concerns for overriding the Supreme Court through amendment, reluctance to amend in any way the First Amendment, as well as a belief in the futility of the amendment process, and support for the decision by influential minorities—prevented any groundswell of support for a responsive amendment in the first years after the decision came down. Yet an immediate response through constitutional amendment (as occurred, for example, after Oregon v. Mitchell ) had some compelling reasons behind it, including the benefits of acting before spending and fundraising patterns adjusted to the new regime under Citizens United and expectations by politicians and corporations became entrenched. 44 A leading public interest group that opposed the Citizens United decision was the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law. The Brennan Center devoted considerable effort to developing strategies for responding to the decision, including hosting conferences and preparation of research/policy papers. The nature of the organization’s early response is illustrated by a paper, Renewing Democracy After Citizens United, which proposed three strategies toward renewing democracy: enacting legislation for small donor public financing; increasing voter registration; and developing new jurisprudence, that is, new doctrinal arguments to persuade future courts of a different view. 45 In 2011, the Brennan Center held a conference, Accountability After Citizens United , also on responses to Citizens United , that focused on statutory approaches through securities and corporate law; activating administrative agencies, like the Federal Election Commission (FEC), Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and Internal Revenue Service (IRS); and, again, developing new jurisprudence around the issue. 46 The Brennan Center’s failure in those responses to devote any attention to the possibility of an amendment as a form of “democratic renewal,” or “accountability,” speaks volumes about its belief in the possibility, and/or desirability, of amendment. Similarly, an issue analysis prepared for another public interest group, the American Constitution Society (ACS), soon after the Citizens United decision, addressed several issues. 47 They included the need to have better factual records for “strict scrutiny” review to support the claimed need for regulation; increasing disclosure requirements; addressing disclosures and expenditure issues through corporate law and requirements of shareholder approval; moving towards public funding of campaigns; modernizing voter registration; and appointing as Supreme Court justices those with a “voter-centric” view of the First Amendment. 48 Despite its thoughtfulness and seemingly comprehensive overview of possible responses (including the constitutional politics of appointments to the Court), this memo for ACS did not mention the possibility of constitutional amendment. 49 To be sure, some critics of Citizens United have tried, and with some success, to promote a constitutional amendment in response. At least fourteen proposals were introduced in Congress within two years of the decision; these range from amendments sweeping broadly to say that corporations do not hold rights under the Constitution, to those authorizing legislatures to regulate corporate, or all, campaign contributions and expenditures, to those excluding campaign expenditures from First Amendment protections, to those establishing a substantive rule, for example, banning corporate contributions or expenditures. 50 An organization called “Move to Amend” seeks petition signatures for a proposed amendment to “our Constitution to firmly establish that money is not speech, and that human beings, not corporations, are persons entitled to constitutional rights”; they reportedly had about 300,000 signatures in mid-2013. 51 Another organization, “Free Speech for People,” supports amendments to “(1) enable Congress and the states to limit campaign spending and (2) to make it clear that corporations do not have constitutional rights;” in 2013 it claimed to be “one-third” of the way to succeeding with a constitutional amendment. 52 In 2014, the “Democracy for All” amendment, Senate Joint Resolution 19, 113th Congress, did not receive the necessary two-thirds vote, notwithstanding majority support in the Senate. 53 Some well-established public interest groups, including People for the American Way, 54 and Public Citizen, 55 have supported amendment as an approach, as have some legal scholars. 56 But other influential non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and political actors who disagreed with the decision in Citizens United nonetheless ruled out seeking an amendment, either because they believed it is so unlikely to succeed and/or because they believe other approaches have normative advantages. It is possible that those groups that did not include amendment as a possible response to Citizens United did so because they believed a constitutional amendment is a bad idea for reasons other than its unlikelihood of enactment. 57 They might believe that an amendment would be too hard to craft to achieve its goals in the hands of an uncertain Supreme Court; or that entrenching provisions relating to the subject is a bad idea for democratic politics; or even that “progressives” who oppose Citizens United should not seek amendment lest it encourage “conservatives” to seek amendments that progressives disagree with. 58 But a significant part of the opposition to amendment—among those who would like to overturn the effects of Citizens United —has to do with a belief that it would be impossible. For example, Mark Schmitt, Senior Fellow of the Roosevelt Institute, advanced a series of arguments, which appear mostly bottomed on the unlikelihood of an amendment passing. 59 In one debate with proponents of amendment, he stated that proceeding with an amendment would imply to those working on other approaches that “we can’t do anything until we have a constitutional amendment,” and argued that “under the current circumstances, ‘We can’t do anything until we have a constitutional amendment’ is exactly the same as saying, ‘We can’t do anything.’” 60 Later remarks made clear he was not substantively opposed to amendment insofar as it related to campaign finances, and that he agreed that Citizens United was wrongly decided, 61 though he also raised questions about the capacity to draft an adequate amendment. 62 Thus evidence suggests that opposition to amendment is based in part on concerns that it would be impossible and in part on normative worries about amendment as opposed to other mechanisms of change.