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The counterplan’s assessments guarantee compliance and prevent misuse of aid

Dalton et. Al 18 – Melissa Griffin Dalton, assistance secretary of defense for homeland defense and America’s security affairs in the Biden Administration, senior fellow and deputy director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, manager of the Nuclear Posture Review, M.A. in international relations from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, B.A. in foreign affairs from the University of Virginia (“The Protection of Civilians in U.S. Partnered Operations”, CSIS, 10/30/2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/protection-civilians-us-partnered-operations) FGY

TOOLS FOR INFLUENCING PARTNER BEHAVIOR The U.S. and other actors can use a range of tools to encourage changes in conduct by state and non-state partner forces: ▪ Conditioning Support. By setting antecedent conditions of compliance with human rights and international humanitarian law (such as implementation of the Leahy laws), the United States defines basic parameters for itself and its partners: a form of conditionality on security assistance. This approach establishes up-front expectations that certain activities—such as training for specific units or other types of assistance— will be discontinued if items are misused or diverted, or if partners otherwise fail to fulfill their legal obligations. But “ultimatum” conditionality, where the United States publicly or privately threatens to end all support due to partner conduct, seldom occurs for several reasons, including the possibility that U.S. policymakers view the partnership as too critical to U.S. interests. Attempts to use the threat of deprivation as leverage are often thwarted by the reality that the U.S. government is more invested in a partnership than the partner, or driven by fears of peer competition over economics or influence.6 The United States can, however, creatively augment existing conditionality by calibrating and sequencing assistance based on an honest and transparent assessment of risks and the capabilities realistically needed to maintain the relationship. This process might entail requirements for specific training based on past incidents or gaps that create vulnerabilities, adding or strengthening terms for arms transfers and purchases, limiting certain kinds of assistance or materiel, or setting clearer expectations through diplomatic engagement in response to patterns of behavior that result in civilian harm. However, conditionality may not be the most effective approach when issues primarily result from legitimate capacity gaps. In these cases, the United States could also place the sale of defense items, such as munitions or aircraft, within a sequence that requires pre-assessment; robust, upfront, and continuous training and technical assistance; and indirect operational oversight or access following the transfer to ensure appropriate use of the equipment.7 Follow through on unacceptable behavior—in the form of cutting off support to some security partners—may ultimately be necessary to prevent U.S. government liability for criminal conduct and to send a powerful political message to a capable but abusive security force

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