Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Opening Word document…

Specificity in conditions is key to ensuring robust oversight, misuse of tech, and perception of US commitment to human rights

Mahanty 21 – Daniel Mahanty, director of the US Program for the Center for Civilians in Conflict, founder and former head of the Office of Security and Human Rights at the United States Department of State, adjunct professor at the Kansas University Center for Global and International Studies, non-resident Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, M.A. in national security policy from Georgetown University, B.A. in economics from George Mason University (“Human Rights and Civilian Harm in Security Cooperation: A Framework of Analysis”, 2/16/2021, https://www.e-ir.info/2021/02/16/human-rights-and-civilian-harm-in-security-cooperation-a-framework-of-analysis/ ) FGY

A Framework of Analysis for Civilian Harm and Human Rights Risks in Security Cooperation

To establish a more suitable approach to managing the different kinds of risks associated with different kinds of security cooperation, policymakers, program managers and those who evaluate government practices from the outside, might look toward a new framework of analysis that establishes the basis for designing programs with adequate controls and safeguards in place. A well-designed framework would 1) align with the emerging policy consensus about the necessary components of effective and sustainable security cooperation programs; 2) identify the variables within several categories of analysis (e.g. political, legal, and operational) that correspond with the risks most worthy of attention; 3) allow for customised application to a specific security cooperation activity; 4) consider the risks that derive both from the ‘partner’ as well as from the ‘acts of partnership’, and 5) lend itself to relatively clear policy prescriptions that flow from the diagnosis it presents.

Each category of risks in the framework that follows includes a sample of representative risk indicators, along with an associated claim about how any perceived or deal deficits may impair the government’s ability to achieve a desired end-state with its partner. Ideally, the government could use the framework to make policy decisions about the viability of partnership (e.g. as prerequisite conditions); to design and modify partnership activities; and to prioritise and integrate risk mitigation measures. Among options that may be considered in response to analysis conducted on the basis of this framework, policymakers or program managers might consider moderating or reducing any forms of assistance that materially enhance the lethality of security forces (Kleinfeld 2018, 283–285).  The government may also elect to sequence support or establish pre-requisite requirements (e.g. demonstrating a particular competency) prior to providing certain kinds of assistance or partaking in certain kinds of partnership activities; (Shiel and Mahanty 2017, 32), or to require more direct oversight (‘operational end-use monitoring’) (Lewis 2019, 28) of operations that benefit from support or assistance.

Sign in to recut, update, or save this card.