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The counterplan ensures sustained domestic political support for SC by minimizing justifications for aid-reduction

Dalton et. Al 18 – Melissa Griffin Dalton, assistance secretary of defense for homeland defense and America’s security affairs in the Biden Administration, senior fellow and deputy director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, manager of the Nuclear Posture Review, M.A. in international relations from the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, B.A. in foreign affairs from the University of Virginia (“The Protection of Civilians in U.S. Partnered Operations”, CSIS, 10/30/2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/protection-civilians-us-partnered-operations) FGY

The experience of policymakers and practitioners in security and humanitarian fields provide significant lessons about the best ways to mitigate harm and protect civilians in the context of security partnerships. The following are key emerging themes from select discussions facilitated by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), and InterAction about practitioner experiences.

Reconciling Geopolitical Dynamics

In the face of significant harm to civilians resulting from a partner’s conduct, the pursuit or continuation of the partnership may compromise the political viability of its operations and may affect U.S. credibility in relation to other states, in multilateral forums, and in the eyes of the civilian population where the United States pursues the partnership. For instance, individuals familiar with the Saudi military intervention in Yemen report that Yemeni citizens largely blame the United States and United Kingdom for civilian loss of life resulting from Saudi-led coalition airstrikes, given the U.S. and UK role in providing arms and logistical support for the campaign. Continuing a partnership despite harm to civilians can also erode domestic support, both in the U.S. Congress and the public. U.S. foreign policy choices often prioritize relationships or perceived security interests at the expense of ensuring that partners have the capacity and commitment to maximize the protection of civilians, or even to meet their obligations under international law. The pressure to contend with a threat, the political or economic urgency of cooperation, lack of professional partner capacity, or simply the status quo of arms deals and security partnerships can obscure or overwhelm other, real costs. When the United States believes that partner conduct can or will improve, or that the near-term benefits of partnership outweigh the short- and long-term costs, the United States may tolerate greater levels of harm to civilians—including possible patterns of human rights and international humanitarian law violations—arising from the conduct of partner countries. Similarly, the United States has pursued partnerships with non-state armed groups in the context of volatile and evolving armed conflicts, where the United States focuses on its near-term security objectives while giving minimal consideration to the longer-term implications of the partnership and the conduct of those partners towards civilian populations. Policymakers are ultimately responsible for placing the short-term costs and benefits of partnership within the broader context of strategic objectives and enduring interests. In order to accurately assess the correlation between a partnership and its strategic ends, policymakers must have a realistic and accurate understanding of the benefits and limitations of partnership. Current practice suggests that although policymakers may express concerns about the costs of specific partnerships, the policy options available to them—and U.S. capacities to encourage changes in partner behavior and policy—are not sufficient to address critical issues related to civilian harm. Many of the good practices highlighted in this report come from U.S. and NATO experience in Afghanistan. But recent partnered operations indicate that lessons from Afghanistan are not systematized across U.S. security partnerships and military operations and, indeed, have not been sustained in re-escalation in military operations in Afghanistan itself.

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