Bargaining is effective, even with countries who aren’t currently aligned with US interests – furthers their economic and political stability
Sullivan et. Al 11 – Patricia L. Sullivan, associate professor in the Department of Public Policy and the Curriculum in Peace, War, and Defense at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, director of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies, Ph.D. in political science from the University of California, Davis with a concentration in international relations, comparative politics, and research methodology (“US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation”, Foreign Policy Analysis, July 2011, Vol. 7, No. 3, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24909798) FGY
According to this model, a powerful state can use military assistance as leverage to compel recipient state cooperation. In this straightforward model, military aid is a source of bargaining power because donors can link benefits to desired behavior by recipients. This theory builds on early work on asymmetrical influence. Keohane and Nye. (1977) argue, for example, that dominant states can influence the foreign policy of dependent states using aid allocations to reward or punish past behavior and to act as an incentive that encourages future compliance. More recently, Palmer, Wohlander, and Clifton Morgan (2002) contend that "Foreign aid, at the most general level, is a tool of influence—states give it because they believe it encourages recipients to take desired actions". Similarly, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007) propose a model in which donors give foreign aid to purchase policy support from recipients. States are most likely to give aid to "countries whose leaders do not inherently support the policies of a prospective donor but are willing to back those policies in exchange for aid sufficient to improve their political and economic welfare" (254). If military aid gives the US bargaining power, recipient states that receive larger amounts of aid and those that have a greater need for assistance should be more willing to accommodate their foreign policy to US preferences. While Derouen and Heo (2004) suggest that aid is more often used as an ex post reward than as an ex ante inducement, we suspect that the relationship is circular; a state's level of cooperation with the United States influences the amount of aid it receives and the amount of aid a state receives influences subsequent levels of cooperation with the United States. The example of US military aid to Georgia is consistent with the expectations of the Arms for Influence model. US military aid to Georgia spiked from an average of $2.76 million per year from 1991-2001 to $92 million in 2002 and then aver aged $13.9 million per year between 2003 and 2006 (USAJD 2006). Most aid was directed toward the 2002-2003 Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) (Shan ker 2002). As part of GTEP, about 2,000 Georgian soldiers were trained by US military personnel and equipped with American weapons and technology in order to better prepare Georgia to help the United States counter global terrorism (United States Department of Defense 2002). One year after the initiation of the GTEP, Georgia was a dedicated member of the "coalition of the willing" that sup ported the US war in Iraq. In the years after the Rose Revolution of 2003, new President Mikheil Saakashvili sent a total of 2,000 soldiers to support US opera tions in Iraq, making it the third largest contributor of forces by 2007. Aiding the United States in Iraq was part of a larger pattern of cooperative behavior by Geor gia; our events data indicate that Georgia's overall level of cooperation with the United States more than tripled after 2002 (King and Lowe 2003a,b)