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Security Cooperation provides sufficient leverage

Tecott 21, PhD in Political Science @ MIT (Rachel, “The Cult of the Persuasive: The U.S. Military’s Aversion to Coercion in Security Assistance,” Proquest Dissertations)

Recipients are more likely to follow U.S. direction when the United States combines teaching and persuasion with bargaining and/or direct command. Bargaining is well suited to the context of SFA [Security Force Assistance]. Bargaining is in a sense a much simpler, less ambitious influence strategy than persuasion. This study argues that the United States has ample bargaining power in most cases of security assistance, and is therefore well-positioned to wield carrots and sticks to shape recipient decision-making. Bargaining power, in Glenn Snyder’s framework, varies as a function of the 54 two sides’ relative dependence, commitment, and interest in the object of bargaining.59 Lumpy (each variable could be further subdivided into many constituent pieces), subjective, and consequently hard to measure as those variables are, the argument that recipients of United States SFA, particularly in the context of severe internal threats, have more bargaining power than the United States, does not hold up to scrutiny. Recipients of SFA [Security Force Assistance] may not always depend for their survival on the United States, but they are almost always far more dependent on the United States than the United States is on them. With respect to relative commitment, SFA [Security Force Assistance] recipients often view the U.S. commitment to an SFA [Security Force Assistance] partnership, or to the leaders themselves, as fickle. In such cases, the United States’ relative lack of commitment should be a bargaining asset, because it should help increase the credibility of its threats to withdraw support or to replace the leadership. Moreover, SFA [Security Force Assistance] is as conducive to the establishment of credibility with respect to promises of carrots and threats of sticks as any international partnership can be. Providers need not rely on the nuclear threats of complete support or total abandonment. Rather, SFA [Security Force Assistance] relationships create myriad opportunities for the application of calibrated carrots ranging from the provision of additional ammunition to a particular unit, to a dramatic increase in the scale of U.S. assistance to the recipient military as a whole, and calibrated sticks ranging from the disbanding of a particular unit, to a dramatic decrease in assistance, to the ouster of the civilian leader. SFA [Security Force Assistance] relationships are also typically long-term, and involve iterated interactions between provider and recipient. There is, therefore, an extended shadow of the future,60 and opportunities for the United States to demonstrate the credibility of its promises and threats through consistent follow-through. These two features of SFA [Security Force Assistance] relationships—the opportunities for calibrated carrots and sticks, and the shadow of the future—should help to resolve the credibility problem that plagues, for instance, the challenge of extended nuclear deterrence. In the context of SFA, threats to decrease support to a unit or increase support to a unit, or even to support or oust a civilian leader, are far less difficult than the challenge the United States faced in its efforts to convince the Soviet Union that it would trade New York for Paris. SFA [Security Force Assistance] is the United States trying to convince brigade commanders that their interests are better served following U.S. direction to remove a corrupt battalion commander than ignoring that direction. It may not be an easy task, but the United States certainly has the carrots and sticks to do it, and the context of SFA [Security Force Assistance] is more conducive than most

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