The “ask perm” relies on persuasion, not explicit bargaining. That fails.
Tecott 21, PhD in Political Science @ MIT (Rachel, “The Cult of the Persuasive: The U.S. Military’s Aversion to Coercion in Security Assistance,” Proquest Dissertations)
This study offers a novel conceptualization of U.S. influence strategies in security assistance based on inductive analysis of U.S. security assistance projects since World War II. In conducting security assistance, the U.S. military has historically employed an influence strategy “ladder” comprised of four rungs: teaching, persuasion, bargaining, and direct command. Teaching refers to the transmission of information and expertise to recipient decision-makers. This didactic approach hinges on the assumption that recipients are actually interested in building stronger militaries, and only insufficient knowledge stands in their way. Persuasion, bargaining, and direct command each begin with recognition of interest misalignment between provider and recipient. Persuasion aims to reshape recipient preferences through a variety of mechanisms including inducements (no strings attached) designed to spur reciprocal concessions, conversation and argumentation to change minds, demonstration of “what right looks like” to inspire emulation, and the development of interpersonal relationships and rapport to motivate compliance on the basis of personal friendship. Bargaining, in contrast, refers to the use of conditionality—carrots and sticks tied to compliance or defiance—to overcome interest divergence. Finally, the U.S. may take direct command of partner militaries or military units, exercising influence directly by replacing partner decision-makers with Americans. In early examples of U.S. security assistance—to China during World War II, to Greece in the 1950s, and to South Korea in the 1940s and 1950s—the United States taught and persuaded, but it also escalated to bargaining and direct command to push partners to purge incompetent officers, root out corruption, follow the chain of command, and implement other professional military practices necessary for military effectiveness. In contemporary security assistance, however, persuasion has emerged the overwhelming rule. A review of U.S. security assistance doctrine reveals a strong emphasis on relationship building and argumentation as the preferred tools of influence in security assistance. Advisory efforts have been redefined as the absence of direct command, and bargaining is explicitly discouraged.14 Practice matches doctrine: in the post-9/11 period, U.S. military personnel frustrated with Afghan and Iraqi leaders for the politicization and corruption rotting the militaries they were trying to build nonetheless remained generally committed to persuasive tactics and eschewed conditionality or command. Building from the premise that the fundamental challenge of security assistance is influence, and observing the prevalence of persuasion in the contemporary period, this study asks and answers the following two questions: 1) How do different U.S. influence strategies in security assistance affect recipient military effectiveness? 2) What explains U.S. strategy selection? 1.2 Arguments This study proposes and tests two theories. The first theory examines the consequences of U.S. security assistance influence strategies for recipient military effectiveness. The second theory moves a link back in the causal chain and examines the causes of United States strategy selection. Causes of Influence Strategies Influence Strategies Consequences of Influence Strategies Influence Strategy Theory (Consequences) I argue that teaching and persuasion on their own will not suffice—the United States is more likely to influence partners to build better militaries when it employs the full escalation ladder. Teaching is unlikely to succeed because motivation, not lack of expertise, is almost always the reason recipient leaders make decisions that undermine the development of their militaries. Persuasion, bargaining, and direct command are all logical improvements over teaching because they begin from the more realistic premise that recipient decision-makers may not be interested in—and may actively oppose—the development of a more effective military. The persuasion strategy on its own, however, is ill-suited to the security assistance context, because the United States tends to provide the most assistance to states whose leaders are least likely to be receptive to normative or personal entreaties by U.S. personnel. Conversely, the ingredients necessary for successful bargaining—recipient dependence, iterated interactions, and the availability of calibrated carrots and sticks—are met in the context of security assistance. Direct command works because it removes the influence challenge altogether as American decision-makers replace partner decision-makers. United States influence strategies are by no means the only factor that affect security assistance outcomes. The United States might employ bargaining and direct command and still fail to build more effective partner militaries for a whole host of reasons. Though bargaining or direct command are not sufficient for effective security assistance in cases where interests between provider and recipient diverge (i.e. almost all cases of security assistance), I argue that they are necessary. I call this theory of influence strategy consequences “Influence Strategy Theory,” or, IST.