Incentives create the perception of future benefits---creating instant buy-in.
J. Andrés Gannon (<3 BFHR 2022) & Daniel Kent 21. PhD Eisenhower Defence Fellow at the NATO Defence College in Rome, Italy. Previously, he was an International Security Program Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and a Hans J. Morgenthau Research Fellow at the Notre Dame International Security Center; Data scientist at Kaiser Permanente in San Francisco. Prior to Kaiser Permanente I completed a Ph.D. in Political Science at Ohio State, where I specialized in computational social science. “Keeping Your Friends Close, but Acquaintances Closer: Why Weakly Allied States Make Committed Coalition Partners.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 65, no. 5, May 2021, pp. 889–918, doi:10.1177/0022002720978800. //EM
Closer alignments may be valued inherently, for unspecified reasons, or to help the state acquire side payments or policy concessions on unrelated issues. Henke (2019a) argues that states contribute to coalition conflicts when the “pivotal state”— what we call the coalition leader—provides side payments as incentives to contribute. This highlights our broader logic about variation in club goods and public goods in alliances and coalitions.
States contribute to coalition warfare when there are benefits to contributing troops that fall outside the traditionally understood alliance mandates or security concerns. In US-led conflicts since the Korean War, Henke (2019a) find that future benefits offered by pivotal states can induce coalition participation. We extend upon this finding by arguing that states with unrealized alliance potential are most likely to be moved by that logic. Furthermore, they will go above and beyond in their coalition participation to try to secure future benefits— whether side payments or unrelated payments—that extend from a closer relationship with the coalition leader.