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And, that causes the U.S. to get frustrated and leave the project before the benefits happen --- the cp solves best

Lawrence et al ‘11

(Anthony Lawrence, and Tomas Jermalavičius, International Center for Defense and Security, “From the Cold War and Hot Peace to the Long War and Beyond: What Are Our Armed Forces (Good) For?,” https://abcd.icds.ee/2011-3/summary-2/)

“Smart defence” or more “pooling and sharing” and better burden sharing could provide a way to increase collective capabilities even while spending is declining. This is not an entirely new way of thinking if defined it as the sum of all cooperative efforts and initiatives within the EU and NATO, rather than just as common ownership of assets and capabilities. Initiatives such as cooperative capability, security cooperation, mutual development or multinational formations such as Eurocorps – all designed to increase the capacity of the military to work together – have existed for a long time. New initiatives such as NATO’s strategic airlift consortium further advance this thinking and practice. We are already witnessing the dividends of these approaches in operations in Afghanistan. Certainly, there are many areas where this must be taken further and produce more – all very well illustrated by capability gaps in operations in Libya: air-to-air refuelling, ISTAR, combat SAR, tactical airlift etc. It does not matter through what sort of arrangement or under which nation’s lead this is delivered, as long as it is actually delivered rather than producing the very modest results of many past initiatives (DCI, PCC etc.) or projects (e.g. helicopter initiative in NATO). Civilian capabilities will also have to be enhanced through cooperative efforts such as the Weimar initiative, since the management of many contemporary crises requires civilian inputs. Prompted by the crisis, we often talk about spending on new capabilities such as cyber, but this cannot become a substitute for investing in real capabilities (cyber would have been of little use in Libya or against the Taliban) and doing it in a collective, coordinated manner. New approaches are needed to obtain those capabilities, especially doing away with many duplicate programmes in Europe. In the United States, despite the inherent waste of a large defence organisation, the military manage to derive a greater value from their investments than the Europeans. If Europeans continue in their current approach of just shrinking their “total war” force instead of reconfiguring it properly for the age of “limited wars”, the Americans will simply turn away and leave. Their executive branch and the military realise very well that even the United States cannot achieve everything alone and must cooperate with its allies and partners in Europe, but this may not arrest the growing sentiment of giving up on Europe felt in the legislative branch. On the other hand, some of the fault for the capability gaps and the steep decline in conventional heavy capabilities in Europe rests with the United States: many Europeans wanted to shine in the “coalitions of the willing” led by the Americans and therefore developed capabilities which bought influence instead of producing military effectiveness. “Pooling and sharing” will work best if it comes in a “bottom up”, pragmatic fashion – much in the way of the recent UK-France defence cooperation agreements – and if they are linked with U.S. capabilities. Indeed, it is likely that most of the workable arrangements will be bilateral and multi-bilateral rather than genuinely multilateral. “Pooling and sharing” has its limits, some of which arise from the difficulties encountered in agreeing upon and then implementing decisions in a consensus-based decision-making culture in organisations such as NATO and the EU. More fundamentally, however, diverging strategic cultures in Europe mean that there is no common threat perception and no common understanding of why and in what circumstances the use of military force is necessary and appropriate, which may render “pooled and shared” assets and capabilities unusable. There are interventionist countries keen on using force to advance interests and values, and those who exercise extreme caution and would reserve the use of force for the defence of the Alliance‘s territory. (This was illustrated by the challenges of reaching a common position with regard to NATO’s intervention in Libya.)

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