The plan causes drawn-out negotiations that delay the plan’s benefits and increase costs
OTA ‘90
(U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment,“Arming Our Allies: Cooperation and Competition in Defense Technology,” May 1990 OTA-ISC-449 NTIS order #PB90-254160 pg online @ //um-ef)
European and American defense analysts have traditionally agreed about the desirability of increased cooperation in defense technology. The current disarray in the Warsaw Pact leads to a sharply reduced threat perception, while concurrently Western governments are under pressure to provide increased economic assistance to Eastern Europe. Both factors will tend to accelerate the decrease in Western defense spending. Yet, at the same time, the increasing sophistication of weapons systems demands ever higher investments in research and development. The resultant high per unit cost of weapons systems and consequently decreased ability of NATO governments to purchase sufficient numbers to meet projected forces requirements, risks so-called ‘‘structural disarmament. Collaboration provides one answer to this dilemma in theory by reducing duplicative R&D and achieving economies of scale through longer production runs. It also provides for a more robust and cost-effective Alliance defense through standardization and improved interoperability. This, of course, presents the argument in a somewhat idealized form. NATO collaborative projects have generally required lengthy negotiations and complex management systems, which increase costs in relation to the number of participating countries. While there is no established, accurate method of matching collaborative costs against savings resulting from elimination of duplication of weapons systems, the assumption that cooperation provides the greater overall benefit has rarely been challenged.