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DCAs spill over – they facilitate trust and cooperation which creates favorable conditions for more DCAs

Kinne ‘19 – Associate professor of political science at the University of California, Davis whose research explores international networks in the areas of militarized conflict, intergovernmental organization, and bilateral cooperation (Brandon, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, “The Defense Cooperation Agreement Dataset (DCAD)”, June 1, 2019, https://escholarship.org/content/qt9w01x2xp/qt9w01x2xp_noSplash_55bbf5575b57f411fe9f941715ebb307.pdf )//RG

In developing a comprehensive theory of DCA formation, I synthesize cooperation theory with network-analytic insights.7 States cooperate in order to obtain joint gains.8 Exogenous macro-level shifts in the global security environment— including the collapse of the Soviet Union, the decline in interstate war, and the growth of nontraditional security threats—have increased the joint gains of defense cooperation and thus increased demand for DCAs. These systemwide trends translate into specific dyadic influences. Faced with an increasingly complex security environment, states use DCAs to (1) modernize their militaries and improve their defense capacities, (2) improve coordinated responses to common security threats, and (3) align themselves with communities of like-minded collaborators. At the dyadic level, demand for DCAs depends on whether potential partners can help one another meet these goals.

However, joint gains tell only part of the story. Even when demand for cooperation is high, information asymmetries may limit the supply of cooperative institutions. States often lack credible information about one another’s trustworthiness, or willingness to cooperate rather than exploit the cooperation of others for unilateral benefit.9 Because DCAs involve sensitive national security issues, including access to classified information, coordination of defense policies, and proliferation of sophisticated weapons technologies, they inherently involve issues of trust. States further may lack information about one another’s institutional design preferences, such as the preferred scope and precision of formal agreements, which leads to distributional conflicts.10 If states are unsure of others’ trustworthiness or unsure about the types of agreements others are willing to sign, the supply of DCAs will remain low.

The logic of joint gains thus does not explain how, despite persistent mistrust and distributional conflicts, states have managed to sharply increase their participation in DCAs. I argue that when governments create DCAs, they reveal information about their trustworthiness and their preferred institutional designs to third-party observers. This information subsequently ameliorates cooperation problems for others, creating favorable conditions for new DCAs. In short, DCAs involve network influence— relations between one pair of states affect relations between others. I consider two specific types of network influence: preferential attachment, where highly active states or “hubs” in the network endogenously attract new partners, and triadic closure, where states that share DCA ties with the same third parties or “friends of friends” are more likely to cooperate directly. These network influences are empirically observable reflections of the underlying informational value of the ties of others.11

While network influences have been documented previously in international relations,12 I extend those insights by focusing more directly on causal mechanisms. Placebo-like tests, combined with extensive assessment of testable implications, show that the influence of triadic closure and preferential attachment varies according to the quality of governments’ informational environment, which strongly suggests that network influences indeed depend on an informational mechanism. More generally, the empirical analysis indicates that, post-Cold War, network influences quickly became the driving force behind DCA proliferation. Out-of-sample predictions show that although exogenous dyadic factors and corresponding shifts in the global security environment are important determinants of defense cooperation, network influences dramatically improve our ability to predict who signs DCAs, and when. Exogenous influences may stimulate demand, but network influences ensure supply.

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