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DCAs are empirically better at promoting collective defense and cooperation – traditional alliances are inadequate

Kinne ‘18 – Associate professor of political science at the University of California, Davis whose research explores international networks in the areas of militarized conflict, intergovernmental organization, and bilateral cooperation (Brandon, International Organization, “Defense Cooperation Agreements and the Emergence of a Global Security Network”, August 15, 2018, https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/76662383DB9CA3D26BE4FA883E5C95A2/S0020818318000218a.pdf/defense-cooperation-agreements-and-the-emergence-of-a-global-security-network.pdf )//RG

Do DCAs matter? Related work explores DCAs as an independent variable.20 Here, I briefly presage those findings. Diplomatic correspondence reveals that states increasingly view traditional military alliances as inadequate to the current global security environment. Shortly after the election of Nicolas Sarkozy in 2007, US diplomats reported that the new French government considered its alliances with African governments to be “patently absurd and out of date.”21 France sought to “radically convert the present system of defense agreements,” which were mostly traditional postcolonial defense pacts, and focus instead on “combating illicit trafficking and terrorist acts,” while also encouraging “cooperation on defense and security, favoring the rise in strength of African capacities to carry out peacekeeping.”22 African leaders supported these shifts. Comoros, for example, argued for a “new military cooperation arrangement with France,” focusing not on traditional mutual defense issues, but on “training and exchange programs.”23

Leaders also frequently tout the material benefits of DCAs. For example, the 2011 annual plan between France and Estonia “lays down nearly twenty different activities,” varying from “training of Estonian air force ground intercept controllers” to “participation of French ships in the Baltops and Open Spirit exercises” to “admitting a French student to the Baltic Defense College.”24 Russia’s defense minister boasted that the 2016 annual plan with Belarus “stipulates over 130 events and measures.”25 According to Indonesia’s national news agency, Indonesia’s numerous DCAs have allowed it to obtain Sukhoi fighters and Mi-17 helicopters from Russia, platform dock ships and submarines from South Korea, and C-802 missiles from China.26 And a 2008 DCA between Latvia and Norway allowed Latvia to increase its peacekeeping presence in Afghanistan and coordinate with Norwegian command.27

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These historical anecdotes accord with statistical patterns. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between DCAs and a host of defense and security outcomes. The figure shows that after signing a DCA, dyads are more likely to jointly contribute to peacekeeping missions; more likely to collaborate in joint military exercises; more likely to collaborate on the same side of a militarized interstate dispute (MID); less likely to fight directly in an MID; more likely to engage in arms trade; and more likely to have cooperative interactions overall, as defined by the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS). Related work employs a battery of network selection and coevolution models to address potential omitted variables, reverse causation, statistical dependencies, and other threats to inference, and finds that the basic patterns shown in Figure 2 are extremely robust.28 In short, DCAs have a powerful impact on defense and security outcomes.

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