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DCAs are proliferating, but maintaining compliance is insufficient – creating new ones is key

Kinne ‘18 – Associate professor of political science at the University of California, Davis whose research explores international networks in the areas of militarized conflict, intergovernmental organization, and bilateral cooperation (Brandon, International Organization, “Defense Cooperation Agreements and the Emergence of a Global Security Network”, August 15, 2018, https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/76662383DB9CA3D26BE4FA883E5C95A2/S0020818318000218a.pdf/defense-cooperation-agreements-and-the-emergence-of-a-global-security-network.pdf )//RG

Exogenously motivated demands for defense cooperation, though important, do not explain how states have managed to overcome the information asymmetries that plague cooperative efforts. While some powerful, wealthy governments may be willing to risk cooperation despite uncertainty, DCAs have proliferated far beyond the powerful and wealthy. Even former adversaries like Australia and Indonesia, Brazil and Argentina, and Ukraine and Russia have now signed DCAs. I argue that when states sign DCAs, they reveal information about their trustworthiness and design preferences to third-party observers, and those revelations in turn drive empirically observable network influences. As the density of the DCA network increases, network influences multiply. Information about the trustworthiness and institutional design preferences of prospective partners becomes more readily available, merely supplementary. Post-Cold War, they are in fact the primary determinants of new DCAs.

I thus operationalize DCAs as a global network, where a network is simply a collection of “nodes” (that is, countries) connected to one another via “edges” (that is, DCAs), and where the edges, though separable, are not independent of one another. The probability of a tie between a given i and j is then endogenous to the probability of a tie between i and k, or k and j, or k and l, and so on. Figure 4 illustrates the DCA network in Asia in 2010. As a network, the probability of any given edge is a function, in part, of other edges in the network, which defines the phenomenon of network influence. Conditional on the various exogenous influences discussed previously, the probability of a DCA between a given i and j depends on who else has signed DCAs.

In theorizing network influences, I focus on the capacity of DCA creation itself to signal information to observant third parties. I emphasize DCA creation—rather than compliance with DCAs over time—for three reasons. First, although DCAs often incorporate “trust-building” measures, ex ante trust remains a necessary condition. Second, even if compliance increases ex post trust, these effects may not be measurable. Some DCA activities—sharing of classified information, joint military research, defense policy coordination—are difficult to observe. Third, DCAs reveal information about scope, depth, and other institutional design issues immediately upon signature, regardless of compliance. Nonetheless, I later identify areas where ex post trust, generated by observed compliance, further strengthens network influences, particularly when mediators are involved.

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