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DCAs are comprehensive solutions to cooperation problems – they are diverse and taken seriously

Kinne ‘18 – Associate professor of political science at the University of California, Davis whose research explores international networks in the areas of militarized conflict, intergovernmental organization, and bilateral cooperation (Brandon, International Organization, “Defense Cooperation Agreements and the Emergence of a Global Security Network”, August 15, 2018, https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/76662383DB9CA3D26BE4FA883E5C95A2/S0020818318000218a.pdf/defense-cooperation-agreements-and-the-emergence-of-a-global-security-network.pdf )//RG

Defense cooperation agreements are an exciting new phenomenon. Nearly as many countries now participate in DCAs as in traditional military alliances. The shifting global security environment has generated demand for new forms of defense cooperation. However, states continue to face long-standing cooperation problems, such as informational asymmetries and distributional conflicts, which dampen willingness to cooperate and lead to an undersupply of defense agreements. A comprehensive approach to DCAs reinforces the important role of exogenous security influences while also emphasizing the importance of network influences. The DCA network helps to endogenously alleviate cooperation problems and encourage otherwise chary states to sign agreements. In-depth empirical analysis shows not only that these network effects are key drivers of defense cooperation, but that the network effects themselves likely derive from informational mechanisms. States respond to the ties of others precisely because those ties reveal strategically valuable information about trust, reliability, and institutional design preferences.

The study of DCAs promises fruitful insights on contemporary internatonal security. I consider three avenues of future research to be especially promising. First, the substantive impact of DCAs deserves consideration. Voluminous anecdotal evidence shows that governments take DCAs very seriously—an insight reinforced by the dramatic proliferation of DCAs over the past two decades. And DCAs often espouse ambitious goals, such as the coordination of the entirety of their respective signatories’ defense relations. Yet we know relatively little about how DCAs accomplish these goals. Figure 2 shows that the potential impact of DCAs is wide ranging, involving arms trade, defense spending, joint military exercises, training and exchange, and militarized conflicts.

Second, variation in the scope of DCAs raises questions of institutional design. In some cases, states assemble a single general defense framework. In other cases, states assemble multiple DCAs in piecemeal fashion. What explains the choice between these two options? Institutional design concerns permeate DCAs, including questions of treaty duration, ease of termination, prospects for renewal, and, of course, scope. Are these features a consequence of regime type, development, pre-existing legal commitments, or other influences? Might these design features themselves be potentially endogenous to the network? I have argued that network ties convey information on design preferences, which suggests that particular institutional features may diffuse throughout the network and, via this diffusion process, emerge as equilibrium design choices for states. That is, not only do pre-existing DCA ties encourage the formation of new DCAs; they might also encourage the formation of specific types of DCAs.

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