DCAs solve – they empirically lead to cooperation and reduce disputes.
Kinne ‘19 – Associate professor of political science at the University of California, Davis whose research explores international networks in the areas of militarized conflict, intergovernmental organization, and bilateral cooperation (Brandon, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, “The Defense Cooperation Agreement Dataset (DCAD)”, June 1, 2019, https://escholarship.org/content/qt9w01x2xp/qt9w01x2xp_noSplash_55bbf5575b57f411fe9f941715ebb307.pdf )//RG
Defense cooperation has long intrigued scholars of international relations. Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War is, perhaps most of all, a treatise on alliance politics. Like Thucydides, contemporary scholars have focused heavily on formal military alliances—and have produced a formidable literature.1 Yet, governments rarely sign new alliances, and the global alliance structure has remained relatively static for decades. While alliance-making experienced a resurgence in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, only a dozen new alliances have emerged since 9/11—most of them ententes or nonaggression pacts rather than mutual defense pacts (Gibler 2009).
When governments pursue cooperation in defense, military, and security issues, they increasingly turn not to alliances, but to a type of framework treaty known as a defense cooperation agreement, or DCA. Nearly always bilateral, DCAs establish broad legal umbrellas for the range of cooperative defense activities in which states might engage, from coordinating defense policies to conducting joint exercises to jointly producing weapons and technology. In short, DCAs facilitate the routine interactions that comprise day-to-day defense cooperation. Taken as a whole, these agreements provide insight into the pragmatic tools that governments have developed to address the complex threats, both interstate and nontraditional, that define the contemporary global security environment.
The distinctions between DCAs and other agreement types are apparent in their institutional characteristics. While alliances focus primarily on contingencies surrounding conflict, DCAs exclusively address cooperation. They contain no mutual defense or nonaggression commitments. Indeed, most DCA partners lack a formal alliance altogether. DCAs also fundamentally differ from status of forces agreements, strategic partnerships, and other commonly studied defense agreements. And unlike these other agreement types, DCAs have proliferated rapidly. DCAs are often extensive and ambitious in scope, implementing institutional frameworks for the entirety of their signatories’ cooperative defense relations. They also tend to be relatively symmetric in the commitments they impose on signatories, and they endure for periods of 5–10 years or longer.
Anecdotal evidence of DCAs’ significance abounds. After the loss of its Soviet sponsor in the early 1990s, Mongolia deployed a web of nearly three dozen DCAs to ensure access to defense-related training, education, materiel, weapons, and research.2 A historic 2014 DCA between Russia and Pakistan led to arms transfers, counterterror drills, joint antidrug exercises in the Arabian Sea, and even the participation of a Pakistani warship in Russia’s Navy Day parade.3 More generally, Kinne (2018) shows that DCAs increase the frequency of joint military exercises, contributions to peacekeeping missions and multilateral uses of force, arms trade, and overall cooperative bilateral events, while reducing the frequency of militarized disputes. In short, DCAs are now central to governments’ defense strategies.