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The pervasive hegemony theory asserts the sustainability of U.S. heg

Kovac 2/19/22 [2/19/2022, Kovac, Igor, Igor Kovac, a visiting researcher at The Center for Peace and Security Studies (cPASS), located at the University of California, San Diego (UCSD). He received my Ph.D. at the University of Cincinnati, and he currently serves as the Foreign Policy Advisor to the Slovenian Prime Minister. He has held a pre-doctoral fellow position at the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the George Washington University, and has obtained a M.A. in International Studies from The Vienna School of International Studies, M.S. in Sport Science, and a B.Sc. in International Relations, both from University of Ljubljana respectively., “Persistent Imbalance of Power – A Pervasive Hegemony Theory”, University of Cincinnati, https://etd.ohiolink.edu/apexprod/rws_etd/send_file/send?accession=ucin1649768025217516&disposition=inline]//AA

2. PERVASIVE HEGEMONY THEORY “In /a/ sense, money and languages have similar characteristics, and the US dollar is the lingua franca for today’s international monetary system.”58 The crux of the Pervasive Hegemony Theory is the ‘buy-in’ dynamic, by which the hegemon and non-hegemonic states both reinforce the hegemony. Since the latter is defined as a set of rules, norms, and principles of how the hegemon centers the world economy around it. This means that the hegemon and non-hegemonic states either display their commitment to existing economic rules or consensually embrace new ones. Hence, assuming that monetary relations are the most important aspect of economics, and that politics and economics are not independent, the rules composing a monetary system is at the core of hegemony, and its change is my dependent variable. Being interested in enduring hegemony, I want to observe how a hegemony endures even when it must change this quintessential dimension—the monetary system. I operationalize the International Monetary System (IMS) and its rules through the monetary trilemma59 and the manner of its functioning in terms of adjustment, liquidity, and confidence.60 Still, theoretically the more important question is why do non-hegemonic states and the hegemon alike ‘buy-in’? I argue that it is due to the hegemonic ownership of the central monetary unit. Thus, this is my independent variable, which is composed of two elements: first, the central position—referring to the most important node in a network;61 second, the ownership—meaning a control over the production of the monetary unit. Therefore, I operationalize this variable by measuring the network centrality of the hegemon’s monetary unit over time (e.g., reserves, transactions). As such, if the global centrality of the hegemon’s currency is stationary (mean and variance do not change through time)62 even in times of economic crises, and during a subsequent change in the IMS, we can talk about the presence of a ‘buy-in’ and this hegemony may be classified as a pervasive hegemony. Hence, the ownership of a central monetary unit creates a system where the non-hegemonic states can extract the benefits of using the hegemon’s currency only if they ‘buy- in’ first, i.e., reproduce the IMS. The latter sequence is necessary as the hegemon may not be willing to procure its currency, particularly in times of crisis. Moreover, the ownership of the central monetary unit plugs into the risk-aversion of non-hegemonic states, so they do not seek an alternative monetary unit, as existing monetary centrality sufficiently generates the framework for their fulfillment of autonomy and maximizing national interests. Instead of seeking alternatives, they reinforce the new rules of hegemony, i.e., of the monetary system. Subsequently, the hegemon does not roll back its currency, and the non-hegemonic states may continue to reap benefits from using the hegemon’s currency. The hegemon reaches the same conclusion through an opposite perspective. Namely, the hegemon realizes that it is through the provision of a central monetary currency that it can generate a new consensus on the rules, norms, and principles of the IMS that would reflect its own selfish interest better. Therefore, the hegemon is interested in securing such a new monetary system first, before making its currency available. Hence, both sides reinforce the hegemony, while at the same time both sides follow their selfish and rational national interests. US pervasive hegemony, is therefore, the story of US dollar centrality.63 Helleiner sums it up perfectly: “Washington has played little direct role in promoting dollarization abroad. Nevertheless, the United States has profited from this development.”64 For example, according to one estimate, the annual return on US investments overseas is 1.2% higher than its payments on overseas debt.65 However, the literature66 is divided along the fault line of US dollar persistence in its global dominance,67 and an evolution away from US dollar-based system towards multi- currency world.68 Furthermore, it is also skeptical about US benefits from its hegemony.69 Helleiner and Kirshner “argue that there are three distinct sets of /.../ assumptions that dominate the literature on the future of the dollar: those embodied in market-based, instrumental, and geopolitical approaches to the subject.”70 In all three of these approaches one finds scholars that support the decline of US hegemony and predict a bleak future for the US dollar, as well as those who predict the sustainable dominance of the US dollar and hence US hegemony.

The US has created a stable international order, that can be easily undone by diminishing hegemony.

Kagan 17 - Director, AI Governance Project, Strategic Technologies Program at CSIS [Robert. Ph.D. in American History from American University, M.P.P. in Government from Harvard University, B.A. in History from Yale University, Senior Fellow with the Project on International Order and Strategy in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, former State Department Policy Planner. Jan 24 “The twilight of the liberal world order” SM]

However, it is the two great powers, China and Russia, that pose the greatest challenge to the relatively peaceful and prosperous international order created and sustained by the United States. If they were to accomplish their aims of establishing hegemony in their desired spheres of influence, the world would return to the condition it was in at the end of the 19th century, with competing great powers clashing over inevitably intersecting and overlapping spheres of interest. These were the unsettled, disordered conditions that produced the fertile ground for the two destructive world wars of the first half of the 20th century. The collapse of the British-dominated world order on the oceans, the disruption of the uneasy balance of power on the European continent due to the rise of a powerful unified Germany, combined with the rise of Japanese power in East Asia all contributed to a highly competitive international environment in which dissatisfied great powers took the opportunity to pursue their ambitions in the absence of any power or group of powers to unite in checking them. The result was an unprecedented global calamity. It has been the great accomplishment of the U.S.-led world order in the 70 years since the end of the Second World War that this kind of competition has been held in check and great power conflicts have been avoided. The role of the United States, however, has been critical. Until recently, the dissatisfied great and medium-size powers have faced considerable and indeed almost insuperable obstacles to achieving their objectives. The chief obstacle has been the power and coherence of the order itself and of its principal promoter and defender. The American-led system of political and military alliances, especially in the two critical regions of Europe and East Asia, has presented China and Russia with what Dean Acheson once referred to as “situations of strength” in their regions that have required them to pursue their ambitions cautiously and in most respects to defer serious efforts to disrupt the international system. The system has served as a check on their ambitions in both positive and negative ways. They have been participants in and for the most part beneficiaries of the open international economic system the United States created and helped sustain and, so long as that system was functioning, have had more to gain by playing in it than by challenging and overturning it. The same cannot be said of the political and strategic aspects of the order, both of which have worked to their detriment. The growth and vibrancy of democratic government in the two decades following the collapse of Soviet communism have posed a continual threat to the ability of rulers in Beijing and Moscow to maintain control, and since the end of the Cold War they have regarded every advance of democratic institutions, including especially the geographical advance close to their borders, as an existential threat—and with reason. The continual threat to the basis of their rule posed by the U.S.-supported order has made them hostile both to the order and to the United States. However, it has also been a source of weakness and vulnerability. Chinese rulers in particular have had to worry about what an unsuccessful confrontation with the United States might do to their sources of legitimacy at home. And although Vladimir Putin has to some extent used a calculated foreign adventurism to maintain his hold on domestic power, he has taken a more cautious approach when met with determined U.S. and European opposition, as in the case of Ukraine, and pushed forward, as in Syria, only when invited to do so by U.S. and Western passivity. Autocratic rulers in a liberal democratic world have had to be careful. The greatest check on Chinese and Russian ambitions, however, has come from the combined military power of the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia. China, although increasingly powerful itself, has had to contemplate facing the combined military strength of the world’s superpower and some very formidable regional powers linked by alliance or common strategic interest, including Japan, India, and South Korea, as well as smaller but still potent nations like Vietnam and Australia. Russia has had to face the United States and its NATO allies. When united, these military powers present a daunting challenge to a revisionist power that can call on no allies of its own for assistance. Even were the Chinese to score an early victory in a conflict, they would have to contend over time with the combined industrial productive capacities of some of the world’s richest and most technologically advanced nations. A weaker Russia would face an even greater challenge. Faced with these obstacles, the two great powers, as well as the lesser dissatisfied powers, have had to hope for or if possible engineer a weakening of the U.S.-supported world order from within. This could come about either by separating the United States from its allies, raising doubts about the U.S. commitment to defend its allies militarily in the event of a conflict, or by various means wooing American allies out from within the liberal world order’s strategic structure. For most of the past decade, the reaction of American allies to greater aggressiveness on the part of China and Russia in their respective regions, and to Iran in the Middle East, has been to seek more reassurance from the United States. Russian actions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria; Chinese actions in the East and South China seas; Iranian actions in Syria, Iraq, and along the littoral of the Persian Gulf—all have led to calls by American allies and partners for a greater commitment. In this respect, the system has worked as it was supposed to. What the political scientist William Wohlforth once described as the inherent stability of the unipolar order reflected this dynamic—as dissatisfied regional powers sought to challenge the status quo, their alarmed neighbors turned to the distant American superpower to contain their ambitions. The system has depended, however, on will, capacity, and coherence at the heart of the liberal world order. The United States had to be willing and able to play its part as the principal guarantor of the order, especially in the military and strategic realm. The order’s ideological and economic core—the democracies of Europe and East Asia and the Pacific—had to remain relatively healthy and relatively confident. In such circumstances, the combined political, economic, and military power of the liberal world would be too great to be seriously challenged by the great powers, much less by the smaller dissatisfied powers.

The only way to preserve liberalism is through American hegemony.

Kagan 21 [Robert. Ph.D. in American History from American University, M.P.P. in Government from Harvard University, B.A. in History from Yale University, Senior Fellow with the Project on International Order and Strategy in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, former State Department Policy Planner. March/April “A Superpower, Like It or Not: Why Americans Must Accept Their Global Role” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-02-16/superpower-it-or-not SM]

The messy truth is that in the real world, the only hope for preserving liberalism at home and abroad is the maintenance of a world order conducive to liberalism, and the only power capable of upholding such an order is the United States. This is not an expression of hubris but a reality rooted in international circumstances. And it is certainly a mixed blessing. In trying to preserve this order, the United States has wielded and will wield power, sometimes unwisely and ineffectively, with unpredictable costs and morally ambiguous consequences. That is what wielding power means. Americans have naturally sought to escape this burden. They have sought to divest themselves of responsibility, hiding sometimes behind dreamy internationalism, sometimes behind a determined resignation to accept the world "as it is," and always with the view that absent a clear and present danger, they can hang back in their imaginary fortress. The time has come to tell Americans that there is no escape from global responsibility, that they have to think beyond the protection of the homeland. They need to understand that the purpose of NATO and other alliances is to defend not against direct threats to U.S. interests but against a breakdown of the order that best serves those interests. They need to be told honestly that the task of maintaining a world order is unending and fraught with costs but preferable to the alternative. A failure to be square with the American people has led the country to its current predicament, with a confused and angry public convinced that its leaders are betraying American interests for their own nefarious, "globalist" purposes. The antidote to this is not scaring the hell out of them about China and other threats but trying to explain, again, why the world order they created still matters. This is a job for Joe Biden and his new administration.

American Isolationism breeds instability and a rise in revisionist powers.

Kagan 17 - Director, AI Governance Project, Strategic Technologies Program at CSIS [Robert. Ph.D. in American History from American University, M.P.P. in Government from Harvard University, B.A. in History from Yale University, Senior Fellow with the Project on International Order and Strategy in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, former State Department Policy Planner. Jan 24 “The twilight of the liberal world order” SM]

With the election of Donald Trump, a majority of Americans have signaled their unwillingness to continue upholding the world order. Trump was not the only candidate in 2016 to run on a platform suggesting a much narrower definition of American interests and a lessening of the burdens of American global leadership. “America First” is not just an empty phrase but a fairly coherent philosophy with a long lineage and many adherents in the American academy. It calls for viewing American interests through a narrow lens. It suggests no longer supporting an international alliance structure, no longer seeking to deny great powers their spheres of influence and regional hegemony, no longer attempting to uphold liberal norms in the international system, and no longer sacrificing short-term interests—in trade for instance—in the longer-term interest of preserving an open economic order. Coming as it does at a time of growing great power competition, this new approach in American foreign policy is likely to hasten a return to the instability and clashes of previous eras. These external challenges to the liberal world order and the continuing weakness and fracturing of the liberal world from within are likely to feed on each other. The weakness of the liberal core and the abdication by the United States of its global responsibilities will encourage more aggressive revisionism by the dissatisfied powers, which may in turn exacerbate the sense of weakness and helplessness and the loss of confidence of the liberal world, which will in turn increase the sense on the part of the great power autocracies that this is their opportunity to reorder the world to conform to their interests. History suggests that this is a downward spiral from which it will be difficult to recover absent a major conflict. It was in the 1920s, not the 1930s, that the most important and ultimately fatal decisions were made by the liberal powers. Above all, it was the American decision to remove itself from a position of global responsibility, to reject strategic involvement to preserve the peace in Europe, and neglect its naval strength in the Pacific to check the rise of Japan. The “return to normalcy” of the 1920 U.S. election seemed safe and innocent at the time, but the essentially selfish policies pursued by the world’s strongest power in the following decade helped set the stage for the calamities of the 1930s. By the time the crises began to erupt in that decade, it was already too late to avoid paying the high price of global conflict. One thing for the new administration to keep in mind: History tells us that revisionist great powers are not easy to satisfy short of complete capitulation. Their sphere of influence is never quite large enough to satisfy their pride or their expanding need for security. The “satiated” power that Bismarck spoke of is rare—even his Germany, in the end, could not be satiated. And of course, rising great powers always express some historical grievance. Every people, except perhaps for the fortunate Americans, have reason for resentment at ancient injustices, nurse grudges against old adversaries, seek to return to a glorious past that was stolen from them by military or political defeat. The world’s supply of grievances is inexhaustible.

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