US-led international liberal order is sustainable – economics and democracy
Deudney and Ikenberry 21 – Deudney is a Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University and Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, 11/26/21 (Daniel and John, “Getting Restraint Right: Liberal Internationalism and American Foreign Policy”, Survival, Volume 63 Issue 6, accessed 6/22/2022)//jd
Since the middle of the twentieth century, as American power and influence has expanded, so have its liberal accomplishments. Over seven decades under American auspices, the post-war liberal international order has lifted more boats in terms of economic growth and rising incomes than any other order in world history. It provided a framework for struggling industrial societies in Europe and elsewhere to transform themselves into modern social democracies. Japan and West Germany were integrated into a security community and were able to fashion distinctive national identities as peaceful great powers. Western Europe subdued old hatreds and launched a grand project of union. With American prodding, European colonial rule in Africa and Asia largely came to an end. The G7 system of cooperation among Japan, Europe and North America fostered growth and managed a sequence of trade and financial crises.61 Beginning in the 1980s, countries across East Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe opened up their political and economic systems and joined the broader order. As the United States experienced its greatest success as a world power with the peaceful end to the Cold War, countries around the globe wanted more, not less, US leadership. These monumental developments are rarely mentioned in indictments of American liberal internationalism.62 Modern liberal states are built around various values that are sometimes in tension with one another – liberty and equality, individualism and community, openness and social stability, hierarchy and sovereign equality. The Western system provided a framework within which liberal states could manage these trade-offs. The post-war system of ‘embedded liberalism’ provided mechanisms and capacities for these states to define the terms of economic openness. Governments were given tools to reconcile and balance the benefits of open trade with demands for economic stability and social protection. The alliance system facilitated sharing the costs of security protection. Alliances – along with the wider system of multilateral institutions – produced greater solidarity and community among Western and rising non-Western liberal democracies. The bargains and institutions behind the liberal-international order gave these states the ability to balance hierarchy and sovereign equality. The United States used its pre-eminent position to underwrite and lead the order, but its binding institutional ties with other liberal states produced a restraint on its power. The fostering of cooperation among the world’s democracies did not eliminate old-style power politics, which the United States and other liberal states continued to practise inside and outside the Western system. But the deep accomplishment of the post-war liberal order was the construction of a cooperative environment in which liberal democracies could provide tools and capacities to enable governments to navigate economic and security interdependence, balance their often conflicting values and principles, and secure rights and protections for their societies.63 This US-led order reflected liberal statecraft, rooted in republican and liberal theory. It was and remains a pragmatic and reform-oriented endeavour to strengthen the ability of liberal democracies to survive and flourish. In a world of rising interdependence and illiberal great-power challengers, liberal democracies will surely want to renew rather than abandon their distinctive, liberal-internationalist approach to order building.64