End of LIO makes every turn worse—robust empirics go aff
Fontaine, MA, 16
(Richard, , 11-30)
Successive presidents have used U.S. power to bolster the international order’s rules and punish transgressors. In the seven decades since the world shifted away from a spheres-of-influence order ruled by might alone, the liberal order has helped to preserve peace among the great powers, foster economic prosperity, and facilitate the spread of freedom. That’s why Republican and Democratic presidents alike have emphasized the importance of world order, while differing in key ways about how best to shape and bolster it. Democratic U.S. President Barack Obama’s 2015 national security strategy document, for instance, devotes an entire section to international order, stressing the United States’ obligation to reinforce and create “the rules, norms, and institutions that are the foundation for peace, security, prosperity,” and human rights. For Republican President George W. Bush, the goal was “to use our position of unparalleled strength and influence to build an atmosphere of international order and openness.” On the campaign trail, Trump articulated a very different view. Poorly negotiated trade pacts, he argued, have killed American jobs and sent them to lower-wage and currency-manipulating nations. U.S. taxpayers spend billions of dollars to uphold the country’s disproportionate responsibilities, while free riders grow prosperous off of the stability Washington provides. The United States takes on security responsibilities better left to locals, and the effort to fill vacuums and right wrongs on the world stage leads to misguided adventures such as the interventions in Iraq and Libya. Put this way, it’s clear why many Americans might reasonably conclude that the United States’ traditional role in global order is a raw deal and that a major course correction is needed—and soon. Indeed, a key lesson of the presidential election is that globalization and its current structures aren’t working for a major portion of the U.S. population. The traditional arguments used to defend globalization have fallen flat. If the global order, buttressed by U.S. power, purports to generate the blessings of security, prosperity, and freedom . . . well, a lot of Americans feel they’ve been missing out. They’re on to something. The international order so cherished by modern presidents has become increasingly frayed in recent years. Russia continues to challenge basic norms of sovereignty and self-determination in eastern Europe, and the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) has upended the notion of borders in the Middle East. China’s globally competitive state-owned enterprises have revealed gaps in global trade rules, and the United States has had little recourse to stopping its currency manipulation. Beijing’s claims over virtually the entire South China Sea and its attempts to limit freedom of navigation there pose a serious challenge to the traditional maritime order. North Korea and Iran have pursued nuclear programs in defiance of nonproliferation rules. Despite a formal embrace of universal human rights by the greater international community, freedom in the world continues a decade long decline. And just at the moment when the order needs bolstering, a number of the United States’ closest allies in Europe have embraced austerity and curtailed their spending on defense and foreign aid. In turn, they have looked, once again, to Washington to do the heavy lifting. It is clearly tempting for the United States to walk away. Yet to do so—or, more likely, to let the liberal order wither under neglect—would be profoundly dangerous. Its creation was a response to the destructive wars, economic depressions, and rise of dictatorships that marred the first half of the twentieth century. Since then, the world has seen the longest period of great-power peace in modern history, the largest number of people ever pulled up from poverty, and an unprecedented expansion of democracy. To paraphrase British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, the liberal order is the worst form of international organization—except for all the others.