Hegemonic power transition to China won’t happen - its neighbors check naval expansion
Beckley 17 [Beckley, Michael, Michael Beckley is a leading expert on the balance of power between the United States and China. The author of two books and multiple award-winning articles, Michael is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Tufts University and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Previously, Michael was an International Security Fellow at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and worked for the U.S. Department of Defense, the RAND Corporation, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He continues to advise offices within the U.S. Intelligence Community and U.S. Department of Defense., “The Emerging Military Balance in East Asia: How China's Neighbors Can Check Chinese Naval Expansion”, https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/42/2/78/1843874/isec_a_00294.pdf] AA
China’s neighbors can check Chinese maritime expansion and will remain ca¬pable of doing so for the foreseeable future. Given this regional balance of power, the United States should adopt an “active denial” strategy to preserve the territorial status quo in East Asia. The strategy would aim to raise the costs of military aggression for China, without backing it into a corner, and would have three main elements. First, the United States would bolster the A2/AD capabilities of China’s neighbors by providing them with loans, arms, training, and intelligence. The goal would be to turn China’s neighbors into prickly “porcupines,” capable of denying territory to China but not of taking and holding terri¬tory themselves.168 Second, the United States would create buffers between U.S. and Chinese forces by stationing most U.S. forces in hardened bases scattered around the East Asian periphery, where they could be called upon in the event of war but otherwise kept beyond the reach of most of China’s forces.169 Decreasing the number of U.S. forces near China’s borders would reduce the likelihood of air and naval clashes, help reassure China that the United States does not intend to launch massive strikes on the Chinese mainland at the outset of a crisis, and increase the resilience of U.S. forces in the region by reducing their exposure to Chinese preemptive attacks. Third, the United States would backstop the local balance of power in war-time, but would plan to do so gradually. In minor conflicts, the United States would try to convince China to back down by using nonmilitary forms of coer-cion.170 The United States is uniquely empowered to impose financial sanc¬tions and embargoes on hostile countries (and to deny enemies the ability to respond in kind) because of its central role in global banking, plentiful energy resources, and unparalleled ability to disrupt international shipping and communications networks.171 In the initial stages of a conflict, therefore, the United States could use financial sanctions, embargoes, or cyber operations to try to achieve “victory without violence,” as it did in compelling Iran to ne¬gotiate curbs on its nuclear program and in deterring Russia from annexing eastern Ukraine.172 If the conflict escalated to war, the United States could initially “lead from behind,” supporting local forces with logistics, intelligence, and, if absolutely necessary, limited air and missile strikes on Chinese forces operating in the combat theater rather than those stationed on the Chinese mainland. These strikes could be conducted from submarines, stealth aircraft, or road-mobile shore-based missile batteries strung along the first island chain—all of which are far less vulnerable to Chinese A2/AD forces than surface ships and non-stealth aircraft. If the United States needed to ratchet up the pain, it could es-calate horizontally before doing so vertically—that is, by opening new geographic fronts (e.g., by blockading the Strait of Malacca) rather than pour-ing U.S. forces into the main combat theater. This strategy obviously sacrifices military effectiveness for the sake of en-hancing crisis stability. The U.S. military could gain a major advantage over the PLA if it simply unloaded on China’s bases, missile batteries, satellites, and radar installations at the outset of a conflict. The U.S. military generally favors this type of knock-out-punch strategy and for good reason: pinprick strikes and gradual escalation invite a grinding war of attrition. Why give the enemy a chance to fight back? Offensive doctrines make sense against weak states that do not have nuclear weapons. Against China, however, a military posture primed for rapid escala¬tion could be a recipe for disaster. For starters, an offensive posture risks turning minor disputes into major wars. China might be tempted to shoot first during a crisis, in a desperate at-tempt to stun the United States before the U.S. military wipes out the PLA’s offensive forces.173 The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and China’s interven-tion in the Korean War are just two examples of this “use it or lose it” logic in action. In the years ahead, many events can, and almost surely will, spark crises between the United States and China; the two countries have long¬standing disputes over freedom of navigation, North Korea, Taiwan, and human rights, among other issues. A sensible U.S. security policy, therefore, must balance the need to deter China with the need to prevent disputes from escalating. Second, an offensive U.S. posture vis-à-vis China risks turning conventional wars into nuclear wars.174 Some of the systems that support China’s conven¬tional military forces—missile batteries, radars, satellites, submarines—also support its nuclear arsenal, so Chinese leaders might mistake U.S. strikes on these systems as a preemptive attack on China’s nuclear deterrent. Moreover, some PLA officials have suggested that China would use nuclear weapons to retaliate against a conventional attack on its homeland. Perhaps these declara- tions are bluffs, but is it really so hard to imagine that, in the heat of battle and when facing the potential loss of its offensive forces, China might fire off a nu¬clear weapon in the hopes of shocking the United States into a cease-fire? If China were poised to overrun East Asia, then it might make sense for the United States to risk nuclear war to check Chinese expansion. Better to address the problem than repeat the mistakes of the interwar period and appease ag¬gressors. China, however, is incapable of going on an Imperial Japan–style rampage across East Asia, so the stakes for the United States in a war between China and its neighbors would be moderate, and the main danger would be in doing too much rather than too little.175 Instead of rushing into a war with China, therefore, the United States should pick its battles selectively, escalate gradually, and let local actors do most of the heavy lifting. Some scholars argue that the United States should simply pull U.S. forces out of East Asia and hand over all responsibility for balancing China to local actors.176 Retrenchment, however, not only would reduce U.S. influence in the region, but also degrade crisis stability by undermining deterrence. China might be emboldened by a U.S. withdrawal from East Asia and ramp up coer¬cive pressure on its demoralized neighbors. As Thomas Christensen has shown, successful security policy requires a balance of reassurance and deter-rence.177 Retrenchment is skewed too heavily toward the former. An active denial strategy, therefore, remains the United States’ best defense policy toward China. The strategy maintains deterrence, by reducing China’s ability to achieve a quick military victory, while enhancing crisis stability, by reassuring China that it will not be cold-cocked on the first day of a war. Compared to slaying the forces of fascism and communism, stabilizing East Asia is an admittedly underwhelming call to greatness. It is not a mission that Americans are any more eager to undertake than the great geopolitical cam¬paigns of the twentieth century. But it is just as virtuous and just as vital.