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Interdependence is key to Chinese deterrence.

Joseph S. Nye 20, University Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus, former Dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, B.A. cum laude from Princeton, Rhodes Scholarship winner to Oxford, Ph.D. in political science from Harvard, former US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council and a Deputy Under-Secretary of State, fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, fellow of the British Academy, fellow of the American Academy of Diplomacy, Foreign Policy’s 2011 top 100 Global Thinkers, recipient of the Order of the Rising Sun award, 3-19-2020, "Power and Interdependence with China The Washington Quarterly, 43:1, 7-21, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1734303, kav

Understanding power and interdependence in the US-China relationship depends on understanding strategic objectives. If the US relationship with China is zero sum and China’s long-term objective is to destroy it, much like the aspirations of Hitler’s Germany in the 1930s, then the less interdependence the better—though, as we have seen, some will be unavoidable. If, on the other hand, the relationship is more a mixed game or a cooperative rivalry in which coexistence is built into the environment, then US strategic objectives must include stability as well as competition, and interdependence can be used for both cooperative and rivalrous goals.

Deterrence is one example of when interdependence can be beneficial to enhance cooperative goals. Entanglement, or the existence of various interdependences, can mean that an attack would cause serious costs to both the attacker and target; it can mean that there are benefits to continuing the status quo. In other words, entanglement is an important means of making an actor perceive that the costs of an action will exceed the benefits, thus contributing to deterrence.

Entanglement is an important means of contributing to deterrence.

In 2009, for example, the People’s Liberation Army urged the Chinese government to sell some of China’s massive holdings of dollars to punish the United States for selling arms to Taiwan. China’s Central Bank pointed out, however, that doing so would impose large costs on China. As a result, the government was deterred from selling the holdings and ultimately sided with the Central Bank. Similarly, in scenarios that envisage a Chinese cyberattack on the US power grid imposing great costs on the US economy, the two countries’ economic interdependence would mean costly damage to China as well. Precision targeting of minor economic targets might not produce much direct blowback in the absence of retaliation, but the rising importance of the internet to economic growth increases general incentives for self-restraint. The legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party depends heavily upon economic growth, and Chinese economic growth increasingly depends upon the internet.11

Critics of unsophisticated claims that economic interdependence causes peace point to World War I as evidence that economic ties did not prevent catastrophic war among major trading partners. Such criticisms go too far, however, in dismissing any possibility that states will take interdependence into account and thus reduce the probability of conflict. Norman Angell and others were wrong to argue before World War I that economic interdependence had made war impossible, but they were not wrong that it had greatly increased war’s cost.12 The preceding examples of China’s behavior reveal that policymakers do take interdependence into account. Of course, conflict is always possible because of human miscalculation. Most European leaders in 1914 incorrectly envisaged a short war with limited costs, and it is doubtful that the kaiser, the czar, and the Austro-Hungarian emperor would have made the decision to go to war if they had foreseen the loss of their thrones and dismemberment of their empires. Miscalculation and accident can undercut any type of deterrence. Trade between the United States and Japan did not prevent the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Indeed, the attack was caused, in part, by the US embargo of exports to Japan. The embargo manipulated the asymmetrical US-Japan interdependence in a way that led the Japanese to fear that failing to take a risky alternative would lead to their strangulation.

An international deterrent relationship is an intricate set of repeated interactions between complex organizations that are not always unitary actors. These actors can adjust their perceptions in non-homogeneous ways over time, as has been the case in the US-China economic relationship. Deterrence rests on various means: punishment, denial, entanglement, and norms. As Robert Axelrod notes in his classic work on cooperation, iterative relationships can develop a long shadow of the future that can lead to cooperative restraint in prisoner’s dilemma games.13 In addition, some interdependence is systemic, in which a state has a general interest in not upsetting the status quo and may develop interests in systemic stability. Of course, interdependence is a two-edged sword, and entanglement is not the most important cause of deterrence, but it can be easy to overlook the fact that, if carefully wielded, it can also contribute to deterrence and stability.

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