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US and China are interdependent on international affairs, but are decoupling on everything else.

Joseph S. Nye 20, University Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus, former Dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, B.A. cum laude from Princeton, Rhodes Scholarship winner to Oxford, Ph.D. in political science from Harvard, former US Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council and a Deputy Under-Secretary of State, fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, fellow of the British Academy, fellow of the American Academy of Diplomacy, Foreign Policy’s 2011 top 100 Global Thinkers, recipient of the Order of the Rising Sun award, 3-19-2020, "Power and Interdependence with China The Washington Quarterly, 43:1, 7-21, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1734303, kav

Dimensions of US-China Interdependence There are many strands of interdependence in the US-China relationship, and the symmetry of vulnerability varies with each one. Former Australia Prime Minister Kevin Rudd recently summarized six different dimensions.9 Trade Over the past decade, the United States received 19 percent of China’s exports, while China represented only 8 percent of US total exports. China’s leadership knows that the United States can inflict more damage on China from trade than vice versa, but they also know that US consumers are dependent on a range of goods that cannot be readily replaced in the near-term. Thus, despite a two to one asymmetry, “America does not have all the cards in this game, and China knows it.”10 There are limits to the power that comes from asymmetrical interdependence. Foreign Direct Investment In 2019, the total stock of US FDI in China reached US$269 billion while Chinese FDI in the United States reached US$145 billion, but annual flow rates have been decreasing as distrust on both sides tightens policy constraints. Rudd concludes that decoupling is happening in this area more rapidly than expected. Technology China’s program “Made in China 2025” and the goal to be first in Artificial Intelligence by 2030 have led the American government and companies to be more wary about a high degree of technology interdependence with China. Rudd concludes that a significant degree of technological decoupling is underway and that it “began nearly two decades ago when China decided to embark on internet sovereignty to restrict the free flow of information to its citizens.” A significant degree of technology decoupling is underway. Capital Markets The overall financial relationship is over US$5 trillion, including nearly two trillion in Chinese listings on US stock exchanges and US$l.3 trillion in Chinese official holdings of US government bonds. Rudd argues that “whatever strategic difficulties these two governments may have with each other, it continues to be in each countries’ interests to maintain these arrangements.” In other words, little decoupling. Currency Markets While China would like to see the yuan play a larger role in world markets, it is unwilling to make the domestic reforms to create deep and flexible convertible currency markets and a rule of law needed for the yuan to become a major reserve currency. Only 2 percent of global reserves are held in yuan; 62 percent are held in US dollars. The status quo will persist for a time. Education, Research, and Talent Over three million Chinese students have been educated in American universities over the past 20 years, and over 350,000 Chinese students study in the US each year. Over the past two years, however, there was a decline in international enrollments in American universities, and policy changes have made various types of visas more difficult to obtain. Rudd concludes that there are early signs of decoupling in the area of talent. Military There are other dimensions of interdependence in addition to the economic ones surveyed by Rudd, and they include military and environmental interdependence. In military terms, both countries hold each other hostage in nuclear deterrence, and despite the aspirations for strategic missile defense technology, it is unlikely that this relationship can be decoupled (for one thing, there are many ways to deliver weapons of mass destruction). Moreover, both countries are positively interdependent in slowing the spread of such weapons. Previously a one-time proliferator, China has become a supporter of the international non-proliferation regime. Environmental In the case of the environment, scientific evidence shows that climate change can do great damage to both countries. For example, melting glaciers in the Himalayas as well as in Greenland could inflict serious costs. China has now surpassed the United States as the largest producer of greenhouse gases, and together, China and the United States produce 40 percent of the global total. Neither country can solve this problem alone, nor can either decouple from it. Climate change obeys the laws of physics, not politics. And the 2020 coronavirus reminds us that pandemics respond to the laws of biology. Although epidemiological interdependence is asymmetrical, using it as a strategic weapon instead of cooperating would run a high risk of unintended consequences with uncertain strategic gains. Overall, while some types of interdependence produce asymmetrical vulnerabilities that can be used as weapons, other types produce a mutual vulnerability that is difficult to escape without cooperative measures. If power is the ability to affect others to get the outcomes one wants, it is important to distinguish power over others from power with others. In some instances, such as climate change, power over interdependence can only be obtained with others. It is important to distinguish power over others from power with others.

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