US alliances and nuclear guarantees are the most effective way to ensure nonproliferation
Ford ‘21 [Christopher; Christopher Ford is an an American lawyer and former Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Non-Proliferation; 4-7-21; " Reassuring U.S. Allies and Preventing Nuclear Proliferation”; https://www.newparadigmsforum.com/reassuring-u-s-allies-and-preventing-nuclear-proliferation; New Paradigms Forum; accessed 7-5-2022; AH]
I. The Critical Importance of U.S. Alliances Let me begin, however, by pointing out the obvious. It is, I would argue, very clear that the United States’ alliance relationships – both in Europe, centered upon the NATO Alliance, and in the Indo-Pacific through multiple bilateral alliances – are extremely important to U.S. national security, and to international peace and security more broadly. Indeed, I would contend that alliance relationships are perhaps more important to America today than at any time since the end of the Cold War. The United States, after all, does not now stand astride the world as a global “hyperpower” in the way that it did a generation ago, and we cannot alone meet all the challenges we face from revisionist great power competitors who seek to diminish, destabilize, and supplant us – and whose increasingly aggressive agendas are proving ever more dangerous to the free and open international order upon which global peace and prosperity have depended for a very long time. To succeed against these challenges, it is necessary to work with others, and this requires careful attention to our alliances and partnerships. Our alliance relationships have been critical bulwarks of international peace and security for many decades. Established most fundamentally to deter aggression, the United States’ alliances have so far succeeded brilliantly in this task. Anchored in U.S. military power – in both our conventional strength and in the “extended” nuclear deterrence guarantees we have long offered military allies – these alliances faced down threats from the Soviet Empire in both Europe and Asia throughout the Cold War; they continue to deter belligerence by a resurgent Russia in more recent years; and they have protected East Asia from intimidation and aggression from the People’s Republic of China and from North Korea all the while. And U.S. alliances have done even more for international peace and security than just deter aggression by militarized authoritarian states. America’s alliances have also proven to be the world’s most effective and successful nonproliferation tools. They have not merely deterred would-be aggressors, but they have also provided reassurance to those who might otherwise fear being the victims of such aggression – thus reducing the incentives that such threatened states would otherwise have felt to pursue the development of nuclear weaponry. It is actually quite striking how many of the countries the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) once identified as being most likely to develop nuclear weapons in the postwar era ended up not doing so as a result of their relationships with the United States. Specifically, as I pointed out in a speech I gave in my previous job, the growth and institutionalization of America’s postwar alliance networks and other security relationships helped both persuade these countries that they did not need nuclear weaponry – because their existential security needs could be met through collective security, backed by U.S. conventional military power and nuclear weapons – and give Washington leverage over them that we used to insist that several nascent nuclear weapons development efforts be terminated. In fact, I’d be willing to wager that U.S. alliance and security relationships are actually responsible for shutting down more previously active nuclear weapons development programs even than was the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) itself. As declassified memoranda from the late 1960s have documented, even the Soviets eventually came to appreciate the nonproliferation benefit of U.S. alliances during the negotiation of the NPT, agreeing to accept an understanding of that Treaty that would permit NATO to continue with its arrangements for coordinating deployment of U.S.-controlled nuclear weapons as a means not only to deter the Warsaw Pact but also to prevent access by additional NATO allies to such devices. All in all, between deterring World War III and preventing a long-anticipated “cascade” of nuclear weaponization, we clearly have enormously compelling reasons to be grateful to U.S. alliance relationships.