Their ev is wrong – Europe’s major powers underestimate Russia.
France, Germany, and the UK
Meijer and Brooks 21, professor of government at Dartmouth College; CNRS Research Fellow at Sciences Po and Center for International Studies, director of the European Initiative for Security Studies, 4-20-2021, (Hugo, Stephen, "Illusions of Autonomy: Why Europe Cannot Provide for Its Security If the United States Pulls Back," International Security, 45 (4), pp. 7–43, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00405, kav)
Russia is uninmportant or not a threat
Most smaller powers in Western and Southern Europe prioritize as their main sources of concern transnational terrorism, WMD proliferation, and instability across the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA) and the resulting flows of migrants (see table 1).46 By contrast, ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was perceived as the overarching conventional and nuclear threat during the Cold War, Russia has little, if any, significance in their national threat assessments.47 Indeed, some of these countries, such as Italy or Spain, have long advocated for sustained engagement with Moscow.48
Likewise, two countries that do not share the same level of anxiety held by most Central and Eastern European countries vis-à-vis Russia are Hungary and Bulgaria. Considering the threat of conventional war to be minimal, and given their strong ties with Moscow, they instead prioritize terrorism, migration flows, WMD proliferation, and cyberattacks.49
Russia is a threat, but other threats are more significant
Other countries also prioritize transnational terrorism, regional turmoil around Europe and the MENA, cyberattacks, and illegal migration, but display higher threat perceptions of Russia than do states in the first category (see table 1). They perceive Russia as a threat, but nonetheless see other threats as relatively higher sources of concern.50
Croatia's threat assessment, for instance, focuses largely on challenges such as terrorism, regional instability, migration, and the proliferation of WMD.51 Still, in a veiled yet clear reference to Russia's influence in the Western Balkans, Croatian policymakers put greater emphasis than the first group of countries on threats such as “non-conventional, asymmetric, and cyber actions” that are “planned, permanent and systematic activities supported by state bodies.”52
France is the only major power in this group. Its threat perceptions revolve, foremost, around transnational terrorism and regional instability in Europe's southern periphery. French policymakers consider jihadist terrorism as “the most immediate” threat,53 especially in light of the steep rise in the number of terrorist attacks on French soil since the mid-2010s.54 France is also concerned with the proliferation of conventional and WMD-related technology,55 as well as with regional instability in Northern Africa and the Middle East.56 The French government puts particular emphasis on sub-Saharan Africa, where, partly because of its postcolonial history, France retains “a direct security and economic interest” in the stability of the region.57 Accordingly, although France has displayed growing concerns vis-à-vis Russia's assertiveness after the Ukrainian crisis,58 other threats remain more significant.
Russia and other threats have roughly equal significance
The United Kingdom and Germany—together with less powerful Western European states (Belgium and the Netherlands) and Denmark—consider Russia and other security challenges to be equivalent threats (see table 1).
British policymakers include both Russia and terrorism in the UK's “Tier One“ category of risks (in terms of probability and impact).59 In light of Russia's increasingly assertive behavior, they assess that the ”risks from state-based threats have both grown and diversified,“60 which is why the UK ”cannot rule out the possibility that [Moscow] may feel tempted to act aggressively against NATO Allies.“61 According to a UK former senior defense official, the main areas of concerns vis-à-vis Moscow are (1) Russia's military modernization, including the development and deployment of weapon systems that can threaten the UK's NATO allies; (2) Russia's gray-zone activities (e.g., subversion, use of proxies, cyberattacks, use of military-grade nerve agents for targeted killings); and (3) Moscow's activities outside Europe, such as in parts of Africa, but, most notably, in the Middle East.62
Yet, at the same time, the UK sees transnational terrorism as an equally substantial threat. British policymakers have perceived a rising threat from terrorism since at least the 2005 London bombings and the subsequent wave of terrorist attacks that swept across Europe and the UK in the 2010s.63 In their eyes, “ISIL [the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant], Al Qa'ida, and affiliates remain committed to attacking UK and Western targets” and continue to be “the most direct and immediate threat” to the UK's “domestic security.”64 In 2015, the British government therefore decided to increase its counterterrorism spending by 30 percent, including £2 billion of new investment in the capabilities of UK special forces.65
Germany, too, considers terrorism and Russia to be threats of roughly equal significance. German policymakers view terrorist attacks as “the most immediate challenge” to their country's domestic security.66 In 2018, Germany's minister of interior stated that the security situation concerning terrorism continued to be “very threatening.”67 For Germany, transnational terrorism is tied closely to regional stability in the MENA and to the existence of failing states in which terrorist organizations can thrive.68 Accordingly, it seeks to bolster cooperation with partners in Africa and the Middle East to train their security forces so as “to create a bulwark against international terrorism.”69
At the same time, Germany sees Russia as “openly calling the European peace order into question with its willingness to use force to advance its own interests and to unilaterally redraw borders guaranteed under international law, as it has done in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.”70 According to the ministry of defense, “this has far-reaching implications for security in Europe and thus for the security of Germany.”71 A comparison of Germany's 2006 White Paper and of the subsequent strategic documents (i.e., the 2011 Defense Policy Guidelines and the 2016 White Paper) highlights the enhanced focus of the German armed forces on territorial defense since the Russia-Georgia war and Moscow's landgrab in Crimea.72
Interviews with current and former German officials reveal that the foreign affairs, interior, and defense ministries have different threat assessments. Whereas the first two consider terrorism to be Germany's main security challenge, the latter prioritizes Russia as the main threat.73 Across the German government, terrorism and Russia ultimately emerge as being roughly equally significant threats.
Smaller Western European powers such as the Netherlands and Belgium similarly consider Russia and other threats to be largely equivalent.74 Likewise, in Northern Europe, Danish policymakers rank terrorism and regional instability in the MENA—which can provide fertile ground for terrorists—relatively higher than do their Nordic neighbors in their threat assessments.75 At the same time, Russia is seen as posing “a significant security challenge,”76 and its military buildup and increased military exercises in the region, as well as its use of gray-zone operations, are considered “a clear challenge” to Denmark.77 The Danish government thus sees Russia, terrorism, and regional instability in the MENA as equally significant threats.
Russia is the highest threat; other threats are also significant
Several Northern and Eastern European states have displayed mounting threat perceptions of Russia—which they see as their major threat—especially since the Russo-Georgian War and, increasingly, the Ukrainian crisis (see table 1). Yet, they continue to share security concerns vis-à-vis terrorism, regional instability in the MENA, and illegal migration.
In Northern Europe, Norway and Sweden emphasize both the “long belt of instability” to the south of Europe and terrorism as significant national security concerns.78 Yet, most notably since the 2010s, Russia has returned to the top of their national security concerns. In particular, they highlight the development of Russia's anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, its numerous military exercises in Northern Europe, and its activities in the Arctic as amplifying the risk of an accident or a crisis resulting in unintended escalation to war.79 The Norwegian government, for example, considers that “Russia's overall military capacity is the most significant security challenge for Norway and NATO.”80
Likewise, in Central and Eastern Europe, although the Czech Republic, Romania, and Slovakia also emphasize other security challenges (e.g., instability in the Southern Mediterranean and terrorism), their threat assessments prioritize Russia's assertiveness.81 While refraining from officially labeling Russia a threat, the Romanian government argues that Russia's naval buildup—and the ensuing “destabilization of the security situation in the Black Sea Extended Region”—“represent the most important factor of military risk against national security.”82
Russia is the dominant threat by far
The Baltic states, Finland, and Poland exhibit the highest threat perceptions of Russia in Europe. The former Soviet-controlled states in the Baltic region (i.e., Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) prioritize Russia's conventional and gray-zone military threats as their core national security concern.83 Likewise, given Finland's geographical proximity to Russia and their shared border, policymakers in Helsinki have viewed Russia as their dominant national security threat throughout the post–Cold War period.84 Finland considers that the “use or threat of military force against Finland cannot be excluded.”85
Given its history of recurrent invasion by foreign powers, Poland has also consistently put Russia at the center of its security concerns since the end of the Cold War.86 Moscow's “aggressive policy”—through which it aims to “destabilize the internal order of other states and to question their territorial integrity”—is seen as “a threat mainly for Poland and other countries in the region.”87