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Transition wars are violent -- the Britain to U.S. power shift was an exception

Schake 17 [Schake, Kori, Kori Schake is a senior fellow and the director of foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI)., “Safe Passage: The Transition from British to American Hegemony”, Chapter 12, pg. 271-292, Harvard University Press, https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674975071] AA

12 Lessons from a Peaceful Transition LooKiNg AcRoss A hundred years of America growing stronger and more assertive in the international order, the most striking element is how highly contingent a peaceful outcome was in the transition from British to American hegemony. This peacefulness hinged on a unique sense of political sameness, both domestically and in in- ternational practice, for the crucial years of America surpassing Britain that allowed the hegemon to diminish the importance of relative power between them. The sense of sameness dissipated soon after the transition, and America set sail on radically changing the international order to more closely reflect its domestic political compact. To the extent that the British to American transition is illustrative for future changes, it cautions deep skepticism—both that the transition can occur peacefully and that, even if it should occur peacefully, the international order that results will operate on terms the United States has set in its hegemony. This is especially true if the subsequent hegemon emerges not from within the American order but from the much more probable direction of China. 271 In stark terms, the lessons of the British to American case for future hegemonic transitions are four: (1) the prospects for a peaceful hegemonic transition are small even in the most conducive circum- stances; (2) differences in political culture and structure of government make an American to Chinese hegemonic transition much less likely to be peaceful; (3) America is making the same strategic choice with China that Great Britain did with a rising America, that it can be induced to comply with extant rules; and (4) America ought to expect that a hegemonic China will rewrite the rules to reflect its domestic political culture, just as America itself did. The Crossing of Courses TharetaGt Britain failed to maintain its dominance in the inter - national order is a simple fact; the United States grew richer, stronger, and more assertive. As a result, America demanded and received the ability to reset the rules by which states operated inter- nationally. Since the establishment of the state system, and even be- fore, hegemonic transitions have occurred by force. A rising power tests its mettle against the dominant power, succeeding or failing by force of arms. That was not the character of the transition from British to American dominance; it was uniquely peaceful. Why it was uniquely peaceful has been the subject of this book. Theories about state behavior necessarily look to explain the pre- ponderance of the data. As the only peaceful transition, the Anglo- American hegemonic transition is an outlier, so it is not surprising that prevailing theories provide imperfect explanations for its history. Yet it is an extremely important case, as the only transition achieved without cataclysmic violence. Understanding why it occurred without violence is essential to determining whether future hegemonic transitions can occur peacefully, and what the 272 nature of the international order will be once such transitions have occurred. A realpolitik explanation for what transpired between Great Britain and the United States from 1823 to 1922 would be that a rising power began probing the established hegemon, backed off when it amisnecter, easndt advanced when the hegemon was distracted or iostehuernwwilling to counter the challenge. Building on a repu- tation for twisting the lion’s tail, an upstart America cannily took credit for what Britain would need to do to prevent European colo- nization of the western hemisphere in 1823, was slapped down while attempting a steal of the Oregon Territory in 1853, managed to threaten just enough trouble for Britain in 1861–1863 to tip the scales against recognition of the Confederacy, burnished its strength win- ning the Indian Wars, and consolidated a continental economic platform. Ultimately the economic and military strength of the rising power were so compelling that, confronted with war during the 1895 Venezuelan debt crises, Great Britain instead conceded. Cooperation over Venezuela and during the Spanish-American War would illustrate a waning power buying goodwill with a new hagt eims,ojnu—mtping on the bandwagon. Being more con - cerned with a rising Germany than a fading Britain, the United States joined in the Great War on the Allied side and brokered a peace, both at Versailles and in the Washington Naval Treaties, that locked in its own superiority. All seems sensible enough in that telling. But the realpolitik story line cannot adequately account for several elements of the history, the most important elements in producing a peaceful transition: why Britain at the height of its powers offered cooperation to its rising rival in 1823; why Britain declined to press its advantage over Oregon in 1845; why Britain resisted an inexpensive opportunity to 273 deal a devastating blow before 1863 during the American Civil War; why the two countries developed such a vibrant sense of sameness during their introspective decades, unique for both countries from any other international relations; why Britain encouraged American expansion into the Pacific and enabled American success in the Smpearniciashn-WA ar; why the United States grew more liberal as it grew more powerful; and why America in the time of its hegemony used its power to try and create a diffnertekind of international order. Menatsnoy feBlermitish strategy accounted for by realpolitik as a waning power accommodating a waxing power seem instead to be characteristics of British foreign policy across the whole of its dominance of the international order; to use Silicon Valley termi- nology, they are features, not bugs. Great Britain was a peculiar kind of hegemon. It never seemed to feel its own strength, perhaps because the strategy it employed across 150 years always required partner- ships to succeed. Balancing conflicting interests and quarrelsome partners for temporary gain was Great Britain’s genius. In contrast atodAumrinergicits hegemony, Britain seemed always intensely conscious of its vulnerabilities rather than exalting in its strengths. Hlseowtoeexplain Great Britain, ascendant in 1823, seeking out common cause with an America barely able to protect its own coast- line in order to prevent further European colonization in the western hemisphere? Great Britain had a genius for piecing together mosaics of mar- ginal contributors for tactical advantage. Governments from those of Earl of Liverpool to David Lloyd George were always temporizing, finding narrow bases for ephemeral collusion to specific purpose with a fluid collection of partners. It was a cost-efficient geostrategy that succeeded spectacularly until the international order calcified 274 into standing alliances. And when that more rigid international order emerged at the end of the nineteenth century, Britain had laid the trace lines for more stable cooperation with two of the three emergent great powers, Japan and the United States. It is unfair to British statesmen to conclude, as Paul Kennedy does, that they always accommodated their challengers.1 They did not, at least, always accommodate the United States, pushing back on both American territorial demands for Oregon and the revisionist legal claims for superiority in law of democratic governments. Presi- dent James Polk probably lost more in the 1845 confrontation over Oregon than he would have gained by playing a longer hand and letting the tide of American settlers make the case for the boundary location of British Columbia. The government of Henry John Temple, Third Viscount Palmerston was sorely tempted twice before 1863 to recognize the Confederate States during the American Civil War, considering it in Britain’s interests to do so. The British inclina- tion even in 1895 was to put America in its subordinate place and deride its claims for a sphere of influence in the Americas. British governments defined their interests expansively and threatened force effectively to constrain American challenges. Confrontation was a routine part of British-American interaction for much of the nine- teenth century. The theory that democracy produced a peaceful transition is only partly borne out in the Anglo-American transition. The difference in form of government between Great Britain and America did in- crease the likelihood of hegemonic confrontation between the two countries. British statesmen were appalled at the type of government on display in America. In part this was a reflection of class privilege in Britain, but leaders’ aversion to democracy was more than just prejudice. Speaking the same language, the British had a front row 275 seat for the demagoguery, recklessness, and corruption of electoral politics on display in America after the decorum of the founding fathers gave way to Jacksonian America. Theryewnot inaccurate in anticipating that democracy would produce a bellicose state un- willing to accept the established practices of great powers. A rising Aa mwaesriacn illiberal Amer ica in very many respects. Yet even democratic British leaders did not predict that a risen America would choose to reconstruct the international order in profoundly liberal ways. British leaders before 1867 feared how American influence could permeate their national boundary, a concern uniquely posed by America. The American experiment echoed through British debates on electoral reform; it was the only model of functioning democ- racy and therefore the basis for comparison of what Britain wanted and did not want in its own democratization. Before the electoral reforms, British governments worried about infection of American attitudes in the British body politic. They had a rich appreciation for the appeal of American ideals: George Canning championed James Monroe’s announcement in 1823 because it associated Britain with America’s international appeal. Robert Peel declined to push British advantage over James Polk’s 1845 exposure in Oregon when British reformers took up America’s case. In 1863 Palmerston was cautious not to expose his government to pressure for greater dateimzaotciorn by aligning with a Southern cause unpop ular with those least represented in British politics. ThespsrofcBritish adteimzaotciorn eventually brought the po litical cultures of the two countries together and gave them a sense of distinction from other states, all of which were differently constituted. Before electoral re- form in Britain, though, the democratic divide was cause for deep distrust between Britain and America. 276 aDteizmaoticorn was not the only threat Amer ica posed to British policy, however. Choices about America had a unique resonance because of immigration. British leaders had no trepidation about domestic repercussions of policy toward other countries; with Amer- aic, British leaders had to calculate the way anti- American policies would affect attitudes in Ireland, Scotland, and even within England. No other country could play a positive role in mobilizing public sentiment, reaching into domestic politics to affect foreign policy. Palmerston saw the dimensions of that challenge in 1863 and pulled back from recognizing the Confederacy. The foreign policy gain wasn’t worth the domestic policy cost of greater diffi- culty controlling Ireland and Scotland. Franklin Delano Roosevelt threatened revolt in Britain’s colonies if Britain made a separate peace with Japan in 1936. America’s ability to reach into other countries’ domestic policies, and the comparative difficulty of other countries being able to effect a more kaleidoscopic American body politic, provided a significant bargaining advantage in American foreign policy. Democracy and immigration affected foreign policy in one other aimntpowraty for Great Britain: Americans mobilizing against their own government’s policies considered too beneficial to Britain. American nationality initially defined itself in contrast to Britain, creating a natural antipathy. But even as that generalized effect abated, the specific effect of American immigrant constituencies grew to penalize British foreign policy because of British domestic policy. Robert Arthur Talbot Gascoyne-Cecil, Third Marquess of Salisbury got stung in Senate consideration of the arbitration treaty by the scorpion tail of Irish American resentment of Britain’s in- sensitivity during the Great Irish Famine. President Woodrow Wilson’s fury at “hyphenated Americans” denying the League of 277 Nations shows the Irish American retribution for Irish partition and German American resentment of ascribing all war guilt and severe reparations to Germany. Another significant advantage afforded a rising America was re- course to the public. Due to the American political system’s frequent elections being tied more tightly to public attitudes, presidents could reinforce their authority in foreign policy by appealing to public sen- timent. James Monroe, James Polk, Abraham Lincoln, and Grover Cleveland all played this card to great effect during foreign policy negotiations with Britain, capitalizing on the caricature of the masses as easily whipped into an uncontrollable frenzy. Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt were acknowledged to be swim- ming against strong currents of public opposition. Canning un- derstood Monroe was grandstanding with his 1823 proclamation and declined to even acknowledge it. Peel struck a deal over Oregon before America’s victory in Mexico out of concern that the public would then push Polk to greater intransigence. Palmerston gave Lin- coln leeway during the Trent affair, considering him hemmed in by public opinion. Salisbury changed tack on Venezuela after the roar of public support for Cleveland’s unexpectedly aggressive assertion of the Monroe Doctrine in 1895. Democracy was thus a structural advantage for a rising America as it engaged the established great power. That would not have been the case if Britain were not rdaetmizoincg; an authoritarian state would have had greater latitude in ignoring public attitudes. But theories that domestic politics are determinative of foreign policy also falter as explanation for British and American behavior in the transition. Britain did become more accommodating toward Aa monecriec both were democracies, and public sentiment did trend strongly in America’s favor. But Salisbury did not make the 278 strategic shift in response to public attitudes in 1895; if they were anllti,mthpeoSrtalisbury government would not have initially taken a strong stand on Venezuela. Salisbury made the shift because the Venezuelan crisis brought into focus a strategic problem Britain needed to solve: it was overextended and looking for power to un- derwrite British objectives. Public sentimentality about America en- abled a choice, but it did not dictate that choice. Aa mis etrhiec even more di fficult case to make for domestic pol- itics driving foreign policy. As loud and combative as the American public was, and careful as American presidents had to be in mar- shaling opinion to support of their policies, opinion factors much more in campaigning than governing. Public attitudes did not factor at all in President Monroe’s declaration. President Polk did not allow public enthusiasm for “Fiftyo-ufr forty or fight” to pre- vent compromise with Britain over the Oregon boundary. President Lincoln did not allow public outrage over the Trent affair drive a damaging choice during the Civil War. President Cleveland did not allow a restive public to force his hand on the annexation of Hawaii nor in Venezuela. President William McKinley was not stampeded to war with Spain with the sinking of the USS Maine. President The- oe dore Roos velt only expanded the Monroe Doctrine in 1902 re- sponding to the Arbitration Court’s decision, not public or business interests. Public attitudes did press on President Warren G. Harding in 1921 to find some means less destructive and costly than war for the United States to engage in the world, but perhaps that shows that hegemony gives American presidents the latitude—the margin for error—to indulge public attitudes. Aa’smvearuicnted morality, such a prominent part of its own de - scription of itself, proved limber between 1823 and 1923; it never im- pinged on the destruction of Indian tribes and their way of life. In 279 fact, an alternate morality in the form of Manifest Destiny was developed to rationalize westward expansion. The morality of colo- nialism was, to America’s credit, a major political issue from the 1870s onward as America began expanding its political control be- yond territory inhabited by Americans. But the issue was more ab- stract, as it did not affect Americans directly. As with the influence of public attitudes, America’s morality in foreign policy correlates with the increase in its power. Like public opinion, indulging mo- rality in foreign policy may be a luxury of hegemony. Something important changed in interactions between Great Britain and America in 1895—or, more accurately, the 1895 Venezu- elan debt crises revealed changes that had been long accruing. Er- nest May, who considers domestic politics and morality the driving forces of American foreign policy across this time frame, even con- cedes that “Cleveland and Olney startled England and the United States into one another’s arms.”2 The 1870s had been introspective years for both Great Britain and the United States, with Britain adapting to the changes wrought by expansion of the voting fran- chise and America consolidating its hold over a continental expanse. The result of this was an America that in many important respects had become an empire and a Britain that had become a democracy. The result of the changes was to make the currency of power less iamntpionrthe British- American relationship than it was in other state relationships. Both of these changes were essential in the peaceful transition of hegemony. Great Britain would not have trusted that America out in the world would act as Britain did had America not eschewed its republican morality with the conquest of its Indian Wars. America would not have considered Britain its natural ally if Britain had not democratized. The transformations of both societies occurring simultaneously is an historical anomaly— serendipitous, but anoma- lous. If America had not come to act like a traditional great power rather than continuing to propound its ideology in foreign policy, Great Britain might well have countered rather than encouraged Aa’smreorliec in the world. If Great Britain had not become a re- lated government, the United States might well have forced foreign policy concessions from Britain as it did from other countries. The sense of sameness that pervades Anglo-American relations in the late nineteenth century allowed the British and American governments to view each other’s power in less threatening terms. Their shifting national perceptions, their ideas of each other and the international order, are hugely important in making the hege- monic transition peaceful. Britain did not lose the will to enforce its international order—something sorrowfully evident by the three million British casualties in World War I. What explains Great Britain not contesting America’s challenge to the established inter- national order is instead that Britain and the United States came to perceive each other’s power in uniquely unthreatening terms. This perspective was the basis for peaceful resolution to the 1895 Venezuelan debt crisis, British endorsement of Hawaii’s annexation in 1898, assistance to American arms during the Spanish-American War, encouragement for Cuba and the Philippines as American col- onies, America’s 1902 willingness to enforce commercial contracts in the western hemisphere, America’s lenient attitude toward Brit- ain’s World War I blockade and even its choice to join the allied war effort on land in 1917. During the crucial passage of dominance frreoamt BGritain to the United States, the two countries viewed their interests as indistinguishable, their military power as cumu- lative. They enabled and justified each other’s foreign policy choices, a collusion championed in Rudyard Kipling’s White Man’s Burden. 281 The glittering moment of Anglo-American sameness was remarkably short-lived. ThreeGat War undoubtedly had much to do with Aa mreecroiicling from a traditional great power role. America rititslkeinagndsodel manding so much in the a ftermath of the war would remind Britain of tiresome pre-rapprochement American grandstanding. America emerged from World War I as the interna- tional order’s strongest country by far. Neither its economy nor its military suffered losses of the kind or magnitude of Europe’s great powers, and its potential far outstripped its performance. The “war to end all wars” leftaAsmtaenrdicing tallest among contenders for dominance of the international order. What America chose to do with that power is what drove an end to the special intertwining of British and American interests. First at Versailles, and then even more adamantly in the Wash- ington Naval Treaties, a hegemonic United States attempted to build an international order of great power restraint. Limiting the means of war would remove the causes of war, prejudice governments toward domestic preoccupations, and allow mutually enriching eco- nomic competition. America mistook international politics to be a macrocosm of its domestic politics. aA’smterraincsformation—or perhaps reversion is more accurate, since many of the notions pervade American thinking about inter- national relations before 1890—alarmed the British government. Lord Salisbury, Joseph Chamberlain, and Arthur Balfour had built British strategy on a foundation of American might underwriting British interests; those interests were diverging from America’s. The ultimate achievement of that British strategy, American soldiers providing the winning margin of a European land war in reinforce- ment of Britain, would be the anagnorisisafotor Abrminegricabout a very diffnerteinternational order. 3 282 After World War I, republican messianism returned to American foreign policy, and a hegemonic America became ambitious to change the rules of order. As it had prohibited European coloniza- tion of the nascent nations of the western hemisphere in 1823, pro- claimed a superior right in law for representative governments in 1845, and renounced the right of states that abused their citizens in 1898, America would advance its republican principles. The reality of a hegemonic America was even more sweepingly ambitious than the Canadian representative of Britain’s empire had warned in 1921: Aa mwaesrincot satis fied being a law unto itself; it would bend the international order to make its law universal practice. The world America wanted was one in which Britain was not uniquely advantaged or influential over America, because the rest of the world made itself like America and Britain. And the United States moved quickly to try and establish that world. The schism was apparent in the 1916 American naval program that would over- take Britain’s navy, deplored by the British and American negotia- tors at Versailles, and made manifest in American proposals at the 1921 Washington Naval Conference. The resulting treaties estab- lished parity between the British and American navies and thus were importantly symbolic of America overtaking Britain as hegemon. Implementation of the treaties would further showcase the inno- vative dynamism of America and Britain’s other rising rival, Japan. It would take nineteen years of further Japanese dynamism to push Britain and the United States back into collusion, and the result of that war would redouble American belief that a state’s domestic po- lailticulture was determinative of its be havior in the interna- tional order. This cast Britain’s imperial policies after World War II in sharp and negative relief, making impossible the sustainment of Britain’s unique intertwining with the United States that had occurred during the war. It is easy to imagine different Anglo-American relationships that might have resulted if the special relationship did not cohere at the historical moment that it did. There are so many particularities to both countries and in the timing and manner of their collusion in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as America thrust outward and Britain became concerned about the burdens of its for- eign policies. Could the cultural similarities have trumped British concern about a genuinely republican foreign policy? If America had seemed likely to advance self-determination in ways that threatened Britain’s empire, or succeeded in fostering political change in coun- tries with important economic resources, Britain might well have used its military might to prevent an expansion of American power. Instead of assisting American efforts in the Spanish-American War, Britain might have thrown its weight behind the Spanish crown, to positive effect for its relationships with continental European powers. When Britain flirted with recognizing the Confederacy, the Amer- ican minister to St. Petersburg, Cassius Marcellus Clay, publicly questioned, “Is England so secure in the future against home revolt or foreign ambition as to venture, now in our need, to plant the seeds of revenge in all our future?”4 Might America have reached more aggressively in to British domestic politics, becoming an agent provocateur instead of a model for reform? That could have reig- nited a contest over Canada, which an America steaming out of its Civil War might have taken from British control (and thus perhaps wading into a quicksand of Canadian insurgency). A Fenian Army might have mobilized for Ireland itself, with overt American sup- port (beyond throwing money into Irish flags during St Patrick’s 284 Day parades) goading Britain’s sore. Or the American government could have agitated Britain’s workingmen and urban poor, threat- ening Britain with the revolution its elites so feared. American republicanism was probably too deeply in bone and anti-British sen- timent too sturdy a factor in American politics in the nineteenth century to have given the British much confidence of turning the eAompleeriacgaaninpst their government. But the transition from British to American hegemony reads more like a romance than a realpolitik primer. There is American yearning for the stature accorded by British attention; the courtship of con- vieennce; marriage proposals o ffered several times by Britain and always formally spurned by America, even as it tried to retain the affeacvtoirosnBartietafin was performing; development of tender regard for each other’s peculiarities; a relationship maturing into sober appreciation of common interests and mutually beneficial patterns; anxiety from both as fissures emerged over what future each wanted; the heartbreak of separation; and experience with others reuniting them in gratitude. Britain remains unique in its ability to understand and negotiate the corridors of American power, and more successful than any other state in harnessing American strength to advantage of its interests. It had the structural benefit of being the first mover, along with continuing advantages accruing from linguistic and cultural similarities. But these can be easily overstated. Britain’s connection with America is less organic than cultivated, as the resurgence of a special relationship in the run up to and during World War II dem- onstrates. British governments often feel they have too little influ- ence with American governments; all others wish they had what Britain has. It was, and is, in Britain’s interest to capitalize on Amer- ican power, and Britain is smart enough to do so shrewdly and 285 with a light enough touch that Americans hardly ever notice. It is difficult to imagine America replicating that feat with any poten- tially rising powers. The Same River Twice? A hundred years after the moment when America shook off Britain and strode forward to reshape the international order in its image come other claimants for global dominance, growing in strength and testing alternatives to the American equation for dominance of the international order. China, in particular, merits examination because of the momentousness of its great leap forward since the economic reforms of 1978. Its dynamism has lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, with an economic growth rate of e9r.8cepnt between 1978 and 2005. 5 Afterntaucry of humiliation, its success has fostered a swaggering nationalism. It is the world’s second largest economy, and even if it fails to maintain its galloping growth rate it may well surpass the United States. The Chinese government has a fundamentally different model of the relationship between the state and its people than does America: it is counting on prosperity preventing demands for po litical ireaoennpr, easrevtertsal of the dynamic that Amer ica asserts as the nalaoturdrer of politics. It has an increasingly combative military being primed with high-tech weaponry. And it envisions a mani- festly diffnerteregional order in Asia than does the United States. John Maynard Keynes famously quipped that “practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist.” Many of the practical men and women running American policy toward a rising China are unwittingly enslaved to the ideas of living political scientist Francis Fukuyama. Policy makers often deride Fukuyama’s 286 The End of History and the Last Man as though he were proclaiming that events would cease to occur, rather than ruminating on Hegel’s critique of traditional liberalism and advocacy of a state with lim- ited powers based on social consent.6hYoestetsame policy makers have also consistently across more than forty years supported an ap- proach to the world based on the Fukuyaman belief that sustained success is impossible for states that are undemocratic and that there can be no successful challenger to the Western model of market economies and representative governance. It is the lesson the West took from World War II and the collapse of the Soviet bloc. It is en- shrined in Robert Zoellick’s solemn invocation for China to be- come a “responsible stakeholder” in the international order. It is the rationalization for American businesses to invest in and shift man- ufacturing to China. What America means by “responsible stakeholder” is, of course, a China that accepts as given the rules of the international order Aa mhaesriecstablished. Amer ica supports a powerful and pros- perous China because it is wagering there cannot be a powerful and prosperous China unless it becomes democratic, that a demo- cratic China will dovetail into the same interests as America, that hshoasreiinngtetrests it will share the burden of upholding them, and that in upholding those interests China will conduct itself as Aa mcoenrdicucts itself. It is the strategic calculation Salisbury’s government made in 1895 about the United States. Salisbury’s reorientation of British policy was essential to a peaceful transition of hegemony between Great Britain and the United States. So, too, may a Fukuyaman orientation of American policy prove essential to a peaceful transition of hegemony between aAmanedriCc hina should it occur. If prevention of war is the metric, Salisbury’s policy is the right choice. But it merits recollecting that 287 Salisbury’s gamble ultimately proved wrong: the United States did not fully share Britain’s interests and did not uphold the rules Britain had established. A hegemonic America established its own rules, based on its domestic ideology. G. John Ikenberry has emphasized the importance of liberality in the American-led order.7 The rules are considered by participants— not just the dominant power—to be fair and fairly applied. This cul- ture invests other powers in helping uphold the order and utilizes legitimacy to drive down the cost to the United States of sustaining the order. The American-led order thus has a great capacity to accommodate fluctuations of strength—which is to say that rising powers need not change the rules in order to become dominant in the existing order. But China clearly does want to change the rules—even as it benefits from them. China has afforded the United States glimpses at least as numerous as nineteenth-century America did for Britain that the country’s reflexes are diffnertefrom those of the reigning hegemon. It does not embrace the philosophy that people have in- herent rights and loan them in limited ways to government. It cen- tralizes power beyond the constraint of laws or institutions. It does not hold the wielders of power accountable to the public by either election or journalism. It enforces a bias in favor of national corpo- rations, both overtly through access to Chinese markets and opaquely through theft of intellectual property. It appears to view the international order as a tribute system, with weak states forced into compliance and strong states lulled into accepting small changes by threat of consequences out of all proportion to the infraction. It would thereby destroy the alliance system that is the basis for American presence in the region and provision of defense for the weak states on China’s periphery. While China’s is currently 288 a regional strategy, there is little reason to believe it would not also constitute a global strategy if the nation is in the position to assert one. This suggests that China will pose a normative challenge as well as a power challenge to the American-led order.8 Salisbury, Chamberlain, and Balfour at least had the strong bases of common political culture and public affection between the two countries when they placed their bet on a rising America aligning so closely with Great Britain that both nations’ power could be har- nessed for Britain’s interests. The United States is making the same bet on much shakier grounds with China. To be sure, America has hedged its bets with China. It maintains alliance relationships that support America’s military reach and in- tensify when China behaves threateningly. It is attempting a major trade pact that will set the rules for Asia’s economies. It is purport- edly “rebalancing” its attention to Asia. Its military forces are reen- gaged on the challenge of a great power war and the defense spending for adequate preparation. Few defense specialists believe China’s military could defeat America’s, but the Pentagon watches with anx- iety at China’s ability to develop asymmetric capabilities that might render moot America’s military advantages. Few defense specialists in 1895 would have agreed that America’s military could defeat Britain’s, and yet Salisbury fundamentally changed the course of British strategy to cede American objectives rather than persist in the rules of order Britain had set and previ- ously enforced. Might not America cede China even more rather than fight a war that could collapse American power in the Pacific? Another element of the challenge is that military power is a de- rivative index; it relies in large measure on a country’s economic base. America’s consolation thus far with China’s meteoric rise is that China’s economy is merely a cheap manufacturing base that 289 has yet to prove it can navigate the middle-income trap, whereas Aa’smwereiaclth is driven by innovation. This, too, is Fukuyama’s long shadow: belief that only free societies can foster the intellec- tual creativity to sustain dynamism. It is a complacency that Ger- many’s rise in the prewar years ought to have shattered. Freedom is not the only motivator for innovation. Authoritarian capitalism in China is proving itself as creative and unrestrained as its American counterpart. Prosperity is the main allure of the authoritarian model, espe- cially when capitalism’s champions lag.9 Nationalism, too, is a puol wfoerrcfe. Moreover, the outsize disputatiousness and risk tol - erance of Americans may itself be a national characteristic rather than a universal human attribute. Most Europeans choose forms of governance and economy less tumultuous than those of Ameri- cans; public acceptance of retrograde motion in democratizing iseosciiseto ften a function of exhaustion with the enervation of po- lailtiacnd economic change. Theopple of China could well choose a government less free but more predictable than America’s—and prosper in the choice. Aa mnaetruicrally believes such a system is unsustainable. Not only would China have to impose it by force on free societies, but it is susceptible to corrosion from within. This is often mentioned in conjunction with the fact that nearly 150,000 Chinese students study at American universities each year. In Fukuyaman terms, education offers a path to China becoming part of the American order. Amer- ican policy encourages the practice in the belief that while Chinese may not return home hoping their teenage daughters behave as American teenagers do, they surely want a government they can hold accountable. And if a government is accountable, then it will become liberal. But if the Chinese dream proves magnetic, America will have educated the political, economic, and military leaders that occasion its demise. American government during the country’s rise to prominence was not liberal. The government became liberal in conjunction with prosperity and power, and it could be argued that America’s liber- ality was practiced to a greater extent in its foreign policy than in remaining true to its creed at home. The Fukuyaman mind-set takes as causality the increased liberalism of America; it may have simply been correlation. The Lockean liberal ethos is so fully embedded in American he- gemony, though, that it is difficult to imagine the United States re- fusing admission to Chinese students. Indeed, liberalism may so far pervade American political culture that courts would deny gov- ernment the ability to proscribe university admissions on national security grounds. While conservatives bemoan the preoccupations of liberal societies, they are the defiennint gofeltehme American brand and the seemingly inescapable basis for American foreign policy in the time of its hegemony. The American order will succeed or fail along Fukuyaman lines: either the United States will prove reigeht that people and free markets are the sole basis for sustain- able prosperity and political power, and China will either fail to continue rising or become indistinguishable from other states in the American order, or China will prove resistant to the attractions of liberalism and overtake America as hegemon. If the Chinese model sustains itself, then a dominant China is likely to recast the rules in ways that extrapolate to the international order its domestic political ideology, just as America did. Hegemony with Chinese characteristics would be a very different international order from the one America has fostered in its hegemony. It would encourage and support other authoritarian governments politically, financially, and socially. It would penalize states for interfering in the internal practices of repressive governments. It would offer priv- ileged access to state-associated commercial concerns. It would prevent market forces levying penalties that make markets efficient and reliable allocators of capital. China lacks an ideology likely to appeal to America in the seductive way America’s ideology appealed within Britain and beyond. Without such an ideology, any hegemonic transition will require imposition by force.

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