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Europe doesn’t have a nuclear deterrent to fend off Russia.

Meijer and Brooks 21, professor of government at Dartmouth College; CNRS Research Fellow at Sciences Po and Center for International Studies, director of the European Initiative for Security Studies, 4-20-2021, (Hugo, Stephen, "Illusions of Autonomy: Why Europe Cannot Provide for Its Security If the United States Pulls Back," International Security, 45 (4), pp. 7–43, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00405, kav)

Nuclear deterrence. As a legacy of the Cold War, Russia maintains a formidable arsenal of approximately 6,400 nuclear weapons, which vastly overshadows the combined arsenals of France and the UK (290 and 195 nuclear weapons, respectively).159 In addition to Russia's numerical preponderance, it matters greatly that this force is wielded by a single actor, not a collective one. In contrast, strategic divergences and technological constraints are highly likely to hamper the emergence of a European nuclear deterrent either through the Europeanization of the French and/or British nuclear deterrents and/or through a German nuclear deterrent.

As Ulrich Kühn and Tristan Volpe explain, Germany would have to surmount major technical, political, and security obstacles before acquiring a nuclear deterrent.160 Not only would it face the domestic and international pressures fueled by reviving fears of German hegemony, but it would have “to either repurpose its nuclear energy infrastructure for weapons production or sprint to the bomb from new military facilities,”161 a prospect made even more unlikely given that Germany plans to shut down its entire nuclear fleet by 2022.162 Accordingly, “Germany does not have the required wherewithal for even a rudimentary program.”163

In turn, the Europeanization of nuclear sharing (or Euro-deterrent) based on the nuclear capabilities of France and/or the United Kingdom independent of the United States would also “face high hurdles and immense costs that might well prove prohibitive.”164 French nuclear experts note that there is “near-zero appetite in France for transferring its nuclear assets to Europe.”165 Likewise, Barbara Kunz observes that analysts across Europe agree that the Europeanization of the French bomb, however defined, is “unlikely and hardly feasible.”166

The prospects of a Franco-British nuclear deterrent are even less likely. For one, it is highly improbable that French or British policymakers would be willing to sacrifice London or Paris for Tallinn or Riga. Second, the UK has left the EU, so France and the UK would have to overcome their previously discussed divergent strategic priorities to create an integrated Franco-British military structure for nuclear planning outside the EU. Finally, the heavy dependence of the UK's nuclear deterrent on U.S. technology and on cooperation with the United States would further complicate such an endeavor.

Ultimately, the notion forwarded by restraint scholars that European countries can easily and quickly balance Russia is ungrounded. Balancing Russia would be extremely difficult, and such a buildup would necessarily take a very long time. Our interviews with European policymakers reveal that they clearly understand this problem. A former UK ministry of defense official stresses that the “temporal factor would be quite long. … These sort of capabilities take a long time to develop.”167 Likewise, as a former German official bluntly explains, “The whole defense and capability requirements would be so extreme that the upgrade that would be needed to fill the gap if the U.S. completely withdrew is totally off limits for the foreseeable future.”168

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