EU strategic autonomy is impossible – practical obstacles and inevitable reliance on NATO
Jolyon Howorth 17, Visiting Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at Yale University, Senior Research Fellow at the European Union’s Institute for Security Studies, Senior Research Associate at the IInstitut Français des Relations Internationales, and Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, “EU–NATO cooperation: the key to Europe’s security future”, 08/17/2017, European Security 26(3), p. 454-459 /lg
Nevertheless, at the strategic level, the EU–NATO relationship remains absolutely fundamental to the future of the European security and defence project for two interconnected and seemingly incompatible reasons. The first is the very existence of NATO, its history, its mythology and its political reality: an alliance that, unlike any other in history, has outlived the demise of the threat against which it was initially created. This has been in very large part due to US leadership and to the perceived usefulness of NATO to American global strategy. US leadership has had, as an inevitable corollary, European followership. Whatever the specifics of the constant tensions over burden-sharing, American leadership has generated a degree of demotivation on the part of Europeans, which US commentators have castigated as “free-riding”. At the same time, since the end of the Cold War, there have been growing demands, in Washington, for the EU to take over greater direct responsibility for the stabilisation of its volatile neighbourhood (the Balkans, the Maghreb and the Eastern borderlands). Europe, since 1989, has ceased to be central to the US strategic radar screen. This has given rise to the various projects for a European defence capacity, both from within NATO (the short-lived attempt, in the 1990s, to form a European Security and Defence Identity – ESDI) (Howorth and Keeler 2003), and outside of NATO (the 20-year quest for a Common Security and Defence Policy – CSDP) (Howorth 2014). However, so long as US policy suggests that Uncle Sam will always be on hand to ensure European security if a serious crisis develops, there will inevitably be clear limits to the ambition of the purely European project.
From this perspective, the “micro-cooperation” that forms the focus of some articles in this special issue (in particular, Smith et al. 2017, Graeger 2017), is only one part of the challenge. Arguably, as Duke and Gebhard (2017) suggest in this volume, and as the case studies of Fiott (2017), Lavallée (2017), Mayer (2017) conclude, of even greater long-term concern is the overall nature of the relationship between these two security actors. What is each of them for? Why does Europe need two such entities? Should ever greater cooperation lead to a formal division of labour or to a radically new balance of responsibilities and commitment as between the US and the Europeans?
When the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSDP) was first launched in December 1998, the key concept was “autonomous action”. The EU, it was asserted, would develop its own strategic vision. The European framework would allow the member states to generate serious military capacity, whereas in NATO they would simply free-ride. And CSDP would allow European forces to tackle regional security challenges the US did not wish to engage with. Alas, CSDP did none of those things. Almost two decades later, the EU Global Strategy asserted that the EU’s foreign and security policy goal remains “strategic autonomy”. If words have meaning, this suggests an ambition for Europe to become self-reliant in defence. The reality, as we have seen in Libya and Ukraine, and as it is lived by member states with a Russian border, is that Europe appears to be more dependent on NATO and the US than at any point since the 1980s. Yet Donald Trump has called NATO obsolete, thereby significantly intensifying the European drive for a new defence capacity (Trump 2016). And his view is by no means marginal in the US. Major International Relations scholars such as Barry Posen (2014), Andrew Bacevich (2016), John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt (2016) have recently called for the US progressively to withdraw from NATO and to hand it over, lock stock and barrel, to the Europeans. How likely is such a scenario and what are the alternatives?
In May 2017, Angela Merkel, deploring Trump’s berating of the European allies at the previous week’s NATO summit, famously declared that “the era in which we could fully rely on others is over to some extent” (Merkel 2017). The President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, even suggested that European integration itself could be re-kick-started via the drive for defence integration (Juncker 2017). And yet, all these voices continue to insist that cooperation between the EU and NATO is vital to this process. How can the aspiration for autonomy coexist with intensified cooperation? If the EU actually achieves strategic autonomy, what is NATO for? Conversely, if the EU does not achieve strategic autonomy, what is CSDP for? Europeans need to be totally realistic. There are huge obstacles standing in the way of “strategic autonomy”: persistent nationalist reflexes from member states; significant divergences in European strategic cultures; lack of consensus about the level of ambition in this policy area; challenges to defence budgets in a time of austerity; the sheer scale of the challenges facing Europe in its Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods; the absence of public awareness of and/or support for a more muscular or assertive Europe; and above all the parallel existence of NATO. I see three scenarios for the future of EU–NATO relations.