European crises have empirically inspired an increase in EU-NATO collaboration – proven by cybersecurity threats
Nina Graeger 17, Senior Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), where she was Head of Department from 2008 to 2013 and Associate Professor II in International Relations at the Norwegian University of Life Sciences since 2013, “Grasping the everyday and extraordinary in EU–NATO relations: the added value of practice approaches”, 08/17/2017, European Security 26(3), p. 340-358 /lg
Studying the EU–NATO relationship as practice enables the researcher to transcend the extraordinary-everyday dichotomy but also to overcome the arguably “hyped-up” focus on the extraordinary in security and strategic studies. While designed to provide a (rapid) response to an extraordinary situation or event, security production involves practices that are ordinary, day-to-day experiences and where social artefacts constitute an essential part. In the EU–NATO relationship, such artefacts include everything from meeting agendas, reports, and informal memos exchanged between EU and NATO staff and diplomats, informal briefings by EU commanders in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) or by NATO commanders in the EU Political and Security Committee (PSC), as well as mutual visits to EU and NATO vessels at sea in the anti-piracy or refugee operations (Græger 2016).7.
However, crises may also strengthen and expand the repertoire of everyday security practice. The Russian annexation of the Crimea in 2014 put the relevance of EU–NATO cooperation, also for territorial security, back on the political agenda.8 Both the EU High Representative for the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President of the European Commission and the NATO Secretary General have emphasised that a more uncertain and hostile European security environment is a challenge that their respective organisations should handle together (Mogherini 2014, NATO 2016a, 2016b). Since 2014, EU and NATO representatives have met informally on several occasions to exchange views, discuss common or coordinated responses, and convey joint messages to the external world.9
This is not an entirely new phenomenon, however. Crises, especially when Europe is expected to take a stand or a specific role, have facilitated EU–NATO communication and opened up meeting arenas that the “Cyprus issue” has otherwise rendered inaccessible. For instance, reciprocal informal cross-briefings and meetings between the ambassadors in the NAC and the PSC happened during “the Arab Spring” and the Libya operations during 2011, as well as when violence broke out on the ground in Kosovo in 2007 and in 2012 (Græger 2016). Although the frameworks for the coordination of defence, capability development, training of personnel etc. established as part of the Berlin Plus Agreement and Agreed Framework have been blocked since 2005, the member states of both organisations generally have turned a blind eye to practical cooperation as long as it generates results and is conducted discretely, sensitively, and without serious incidents (Smith 2011, p. 255).10 At the operational level, EU and NATO staff have found ways of working alongside each other or together both in crisis management operations, support missions (e.g. handling refugees), and anti-piracy operations.
Practice approaches are able to capture the essence of these informal encounters, which constitute the intersubjective understandings of security and how to handle them, whether as part of the everyday production of security or a response to major crises.
The perceived strategic uncertainty in Europe the past years surely has securitised EU–NATO cooperation, rendering an expansion of cooperation outside of Berlin Plus politically desirable and possible. New threats, such as “hybrid warfare” and cyberattacks, but also energy-security, capacity building in third countries, and illegal migration and refugee flows opened up new areas of practical cooperation. In responding to the refugee crisis from 2015, NATO and the EU signed an agreement in March 2016, emphasising that they had reached a “common understanding” on the modalities of the cooperation. In practical terms, it implied ensuring consistency and complementarity of the Frontex operation and NATO’s support activities (European Commission 2016). New initiatives regarding information sharing and incident response coordination between NATO and the EU have also been made within the cyber security domain (EEAS 2016). These agreements and coordination of activity are examples of everyday practice that originates in the extraordinary.