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NATO and the EU are intertwined when it comes to security and defense – overlap, liaison offices, and formal agreements make cooperation frequent

Nele Marianne Ewers-Peters 5/26, Chair for International Security & Conflict Studies at Helmut-Schmidt-University/University of the Federal Armed Forces Hamburg and Non-Resident Research Fellow at the Global Europe Centre based at the University of Kent who was previously Lecturer and Research Fellow at Leuphana University Lüneburg, Germany and DAAD Postdoctoral Fellow in the Programme ‘The United States, Europe, and World Order’ at the Foreign Policy Institute of the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University, “Positioning member states in EU-NATO security cooperation: towards a typology”, 05/26/2022, European Security, https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2022.2076558 /lg

Increasing interactions and functional overlap depend, however, also on the distribution of power among the two organisations, which can either be symmetric or asymmetric. Traditionally, power is in the hands of states with autonomy over decision-making and it has been distinguished between “power over”, power exerted by one actor over another in a relationship, and “power to”, the ability to trigger change and shape certain outcomes (Ojanen 2018). In this context, power of an organisation denotes “its ability to retain, or expand, its capability to pursue its policies within the area of functional overlap”. Under an asymmetric power distribution, a so-called “sectoral specialisation” of the organisations is most likely to happen because the weaker organisation needs to withdraw its governance activities from the respective policy area (Gehring and Faude 2014, p. 479). In the case of a symmetric power distribution, both organisations need to coordinate their governance activities in the overlapping policy area. Herein, multiple members – those states that are members of more than one international organisation within the same interorganisational network – play a crucial role as they can negotiate the institutional arrangements within both organisations to avoid conflicts and malfunctions of the regulatory bodies. Under symmetrical power distribution, co-governance and a division of labour are more likely to occur than role specification (Gehring and Faude 2014). Accordingly, Gehring and Faude propose “that institutional adaptation gives rise to an institutionalised division of labour among the elemental institutions of an institutional complex” (2014, p. 482). Division of labour then results in enhanced cooperation and fostered exchanges. In the case of the EU and NATO, their functional overlaps have increased over time as both have actively collaborated, for example, in crisis management operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and off the Somali coast. As a result, they have become so-called interlocking institutions due to their increasing coordination and cooperation (Biermann 2009, Schleich 2014).

Interorganisational interactions are not a one-way street and can take different forms including exchanges of information and material resources, coordination of activities, joint activities and decision-making and the establishment of formal structures (cf. Biermann 2008, 2015). Interorganisational relations may also go a step further in which one organisation can influence and shape the other’s policies, procedures and institutions, leading to a process of socialisation and learning from the other organisation (Johnston 2001). While learning can be accelerated through the rotation and exchange of staff members, the so-called alumni effect (Koops 2017a, 2017b), it can also be prevented by communication problems, lack of implementation and shortage of resources.

Since interorganisational relations are a dynamic process of exchanges and coordination, they take place on different levels within the organisations. Building on Waltz (1959) distinction of three levels of analysis – international system, state and individual – interorganisational interactions occur within the network of IOs in the same policy area (international system level), are shaped by their member states as well as by individual key players within the organisations and their member states. Koops (2017a, 2017b) introduces two additional levels: the bureaucratic level and the inter-secretariat (also called inter-institutional) level. While the bureaucratic level refers to administrative structures within IOs, where decisions are taken and the day-to-day management occurs, the inter-secretariat level includes jointly created cooperation channels, such as working groups and steering committees that oversee the formal cooperation in an interorganisational relationship. Liaison committees and working groups in the case of EU-NATO cooperation have played particularly relevant roles. For example, the EU and NATO introduced and actively engaged via their liaison facilities since 2000 with a focus on capabilities which later resulted in the creation of the EU-NATO Capability Group in 2003 (Messervy-Whiting 2005). Besides these formal channels of cooperation, informal exchanges play a crucial role, especially in cases of organisational incompatibility or other institutional and legal barriers. This is particularly relevant for EU-NATO relations because of the so-called participation problem and the issue of limited sharing of classified information and intelligence despite the signing of the 2003 Security of Information Agreement (Lachmann 2010, Smith 2011, Græger 2017).

An interorganisational relationship emerges only under certain circumstances. In the regime complexity and organisation theory literatures, scholars have developed and compiled key components. These allow to identify and study EU-NATO cooperation as an interorganisational relationship and highlight the specifics of their relationship. For example, both Merrett and Aldrich (cited in Dijkstra 2017) identify four key dimensions of interorganisational interactions – formalisation, intensity, symmetry and standardisation – which have also been picked up by Gehring and Oberthür (2004, 2009). In addition to the levels of institutionalisation, the frequency and intensity of interactions, and the power relations (symmetry) among organisations, Gehring and Oberthür, emphasise the relevance of functional overlap and membership overlap. In this context, Young (1999) distinguishes between functional interplay and political interplay. Functional interplay occurs when at least two organisations deal with the same issue or problem and when these organisations are geophysically or socioeconomically linked. Political interplay implies an intentional interplay, i.e. created on purpose by the concerned organisations to set up links in pursuit of specific goals, which can either be collective or individual.

Regime complexity, network analysis and interorganisational relations, interestingly, cannot grasp the full scope of member states in the interactions between two organisations. Although they possess the explanatory power to depict the relevance of secretariats, member states still play a minor role. Due to their focus on the bureaucracies and secretariats, these approaches express little about how states can impact the evolution of interorganisational relations. As reality has shown, several member states have essentially affected EU-NATO relations, particularly France, Cyprus and Turkey, which needs to be accounted for in theorising interorganisational cooperation. After all, states are the key building blocks of organisations, possess the main decision-making power in security issues and make essential contributions of financial resources and capabilities (Abbott and Snidal 1998, Koch 2008). Member states have thus a decisive impact also on interorganisational cooperation because they can steer the direction of the organisation’s external relations, its partnerships and general orientation. Against this backdrop, member states shape interorganisational relations under certain conditions: They need to be the main decision-makers, particularly in cases of unanimity rule, and provide key resources for maintaining cooperation.

While the interactions between the EU and NATO are rooted in the security and defence realm and are based on several formal agreements and declarations such as the 2003 and 2016 Joint Declarations and the Security of Information Agreement, they also maintain liaison offices and frequently exchange information. Yet, what has become most prominent in their relationship are the overlaps in their functions and membership. Functional overlap indicates the overlap of policy areas and mandates that are covered by the IOs (Gehring and Oberthür 2009, Hofmann 2019). It is expected that more links and opportunities for dialogue and exchanges exist with more functional overlaps. This dimension also includes geographical scope, i.e. the geographical area covered by an international organisation regarding both membership and activity. Membership overlap is another defining component, which refers to the number of states that are members in more than one international security organisations. Here it is assumed that a higher level of membership overlap facilitates interactions and generally affects cooperation, either positively or negatively. Membership overlap is particularly defining for EU-NATO cooperation since twenty-one NATO states are also member of the EU, which means that issues discussed at NATO’s North Atlantic Council (NAC) are transferable to the EU’s Political and Security Committee (PSC) and vice versa. Although the high degree of membership overlap makes EU-NATO cooperation a specific case of interorganisational relations, the issue of membership has also provided much room for tensions and obstacles (cf. Koops 2017b).

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