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Any future EU-led military operations will inevitably involve NATO jurisdiction

Dr. Peter van Ham 2k, professor of West European Politics at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies at Garmisch–Partenkirchen, Germany, “Europe’s New Defense Ambitions: Implications for NATO, the U.S., and Russia”, April 2000, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, https://www.marshallcenter.org/en/publications/marshall-center-papers/europes-new-defense-ambitions-implications-nato-us-and-russia/europes-new-defense-ambitions-implications-nato-us#toc-finding-a-new-transatlantic-military-balance /lg

Although the EU’s Helsinki communiqué stresses the need to avoid “unnecessary duplication” of the EU’s defense organization with that of NATO, it is clear that some duplication of capabilities and infrastructure is inevitable and, probably, even beneficial. It should not be overlooked that most of WEU already duplicates, in one way or another, NATO structures. The EU has, therefore, accepted that some duplication of effort and organization is foreseeable. If Europe’s new defense ambitions were to provide Europeans with more military capabilities (i.e., more strategic transport and intelligence capabilities), thereby duplicating what the United States already has available, this would be the type of replication all NATO allies could happily live with.

NATO’s Fading Centrality. Another issue which will have to be thrashed out is the future relationship between the “New EU” and NATO. Non-EU NATO members have made it clear that they want to be involved in the decision shaping process on European defense. The United States has tried to formalize the EU-NATO relationship on these issues, but France has blocked these efforts and claims that the Europeans first have to clarify their military ambitions among themselves. Paris also argues that, for the time being, WEU should be the institution of choice for debating defense issues with other European countries, as well as with Turkey and the United States. The EU has, however, decided to embark upon strengthening ties between the European Parliament (to include its working groups and committees) and NATO’s North Atlantic Assembly.

Another part of this debate is the vital question of whether NATO has to be consulted first, before any independent European military action will be undertaken. In the lead up to the Helsinki summit, Washington made it clear that before the EU decides to act on its own in a crisis situation - with or without the use of NATO assets - NATO should be given a first option, or a right of first refusal, to intervene. This problem of the order in which decisions are to be made, in short “sequencing,” is important, because at NATO’s Washington summit in April 1999 it was agreed that the EU would have a “presumed access” to Alliance assets should U.S. troops not become involved in a specific military operation. American officials also made it clear that “[e]ven if Washington decides not to send troops, we still want to be involved in the decision-making process from the beginning."15

Two goals are at odds - EU autonomy vs. letting non - EU states influence decisions.

In this respect, the Helsinki declaration is a cause for some concern for the United States, as it continues to stress the need for EU autonomy over the involvement of non-EU states in decision making. Although it argues that “NATO remains the foundation of the collective defense of its members and will continue to have an important role in crisis management,” this does not imply that NATO will endure as Europe’s pivotal security organization. In the future, Europe may well be capable of taking autonomous military action without recourse to NATO and even without first asking the United States to become involved. This is the scenario which Washington fears may provoke a transatlantic decoupling and, thus, spell the end of NATO as we know it - i.e., a NATO based on American supremacy. Although this would not necessarily be a serious disadvantage to Washington, in that a self-reliant EU would take some of the military weight off America’s shoulders, the long-term implications could be huge. The EU’s combined economic, political, and military influence would transform Europe into a serious rival to the United States on the world stage. EU foreign policy objectives would overlap, but would certainly not be identical to those of the United States. Europeans, for example, remain less fixated on China and on issues of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). They are more concerned with legitimizing their policies by international law and a UN Security Council mandate and less hostile to “rogue states” like Iran and Cuba. This implies that a stronger EU would not always have to be in full agreement with the United States on many important global political issues.

Plans for a new Euro-force remain modest and accomplish little more than enabling the EU to take military action without the United States.

For the time being, however, the likelihood of autonomous, EU-led military operations is remote. Although path-breaking, the Helsinki summit plans for a new Euro-force remain modest and would accomplish little more than to enable the EU to take military action if the United States does not want to be involved. For many years to come any European-led military operation will remain highly dependent upon NATO command structures as well as on U.S. intelligence and logistics, if not more. It is, therefore, difficult to foresee how the EU would mount any serious operation without at least the consent of the United States. But, it is the continuing uncertainty and vagueness of the operational details of the EU’s military structure and its future missions that cause concern across the Atlantic. In an effort to assuage American concerns, the EU has proposed to offer key NATO military representatives permanent seats, or observer status, in the EU’s PSC and MC. Another EU proposal offers NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) to participate, “as appropriate,” in the EU’s MC. In any case, of the 15 EU Member States, 11 plan to send the same representatives to the EU and NATO military committees, which should ensure both transparency and relatively smooth cooperation.

However, the higher mathematics of consultation mechanisms do not inform us what the “New EU” actually plans to do with its fresh military power. This remains unclear. For the time being, Europe’s CESDP is bound to have limited, regional ambitions. The EU debate focuses on Petersberg missions and not on territorial or collective defense and, therefore, does not touch upon Article V of WEU’s founding treaty (which offers a mutual assistance guarantee). Europe’s military strategic planning will, therefore, focus on regional concerns and will not, at least not yet, adopt a global scope. However, whereas London has coined the phrase that the EU will operate “in and around Europe,” Mr. Solana is already talking about an EU which might want to act in Africa as well as in East Timor,16 and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder has argued that “[t]he Europe of the future must be able to defend its interests and values effectively worldwide.”17 The European Commission’s Strategic Objectives report of February 2000 also argues that the EU should aim at a “Europe which can show genuine leadership on the world stage.”18

However, although retaining a regional focus might acquiesce to American demands, it also complicates an already grim transatlantic debate on NATO’s role in preventing the proliferation of WMD. In addition to the U.S. Senate’s rejection of the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, the Clinton administration also wants to tinker with the existing Anti–Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, proposing that the United States set up its own national missile shield. Many European states worry that this will not only set off another global arms race, but may also decouple the strategic interests within the Alliance, when the United States becomes less vulnerable to missile attacks. In any case, this global/regional dichotomy is bound to increase transatlantic tensions and to exacerbate U.S. concern over Europe’s defense ambitions.

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