Strategic autonomy fails due to “strategic cacophony” and capacity shortfalls – best study
Hugo Meijer & Stephen G. Brooks 21, CNRS Research Fellow at Sciences Po, Center for International Studies, and the director of the European Initiative for Security Studies & professor of government at Dartmouth College, “Illusions of Autonomy: Why Europe Cannot Provide for Its Security If the United States Pulls Back”, Spring 2021, International Security 45(4), p. 7-43 /lg
Determining whether Europeans could achieve strategic autonomy anytime soon if the United States were to pull back from Europe requires an examination of the historical trajectory and the current and likely future state of European interests and defense capacity. Although existing studies have analyzed important elements of each, a more systematic analysis is needed.11 Regarding interests, this article provides the most comprehensive and thorough coding of national threat perceptions across all of Europe, showing where each country falls across a set of deªned categories of threat prioritization. Concerning defense capacity, it adds to existing understandings of Europe’s deªciency by providing novel longitudinal data on European conventional defense capabilities over the past three decades and by outlining a series of four interwoven challenges that would greatly complicate the pursuit of strategic autonomy.
Our analysis shows that European efforts to achieve strategic autonomy will be hampered by two major constraints: profound defense capacity shortfalls that will be hard to close, and “strategic cacophony,” that is, profound, continent-wide divergences across all the domains of national defense policies, most notably threat perceptions.12 These mutually reinforcing constraints impose a rigid limit on the capacity of Europeans to achieve strategic autonomy anytime soon. Consequently, if the United States were to fully withdraw, the continent would become signiªcantly more vulnerable to Russian meddling and aggression. Furthermore, if the U.S.-backed NATO were to disappear, this would undermine the only institutional framework that has fostered some degree of coordination in Europe (at the strategic, doctrinal, and capability levels) and partly contained Europe’s strategic cacophony. This, in turn, would make institutionalized, intra-European defense cooperation appreciably harder.
Ultimately, we conclude that the notion that Europeans would be able to achieve defense autonomy following a U.S. pullback is illusory.13 And if even the major shock of a complete U.S. pullback would be very unlikely to move Europe away from its current strategic cacophony and capability shortfalls, a partial U.S. pullback—a much more likely counterfactual—would be more unlikely to do so. The policy implication is straightforward: if the United States wants European stability, it needs to stay in Europe.