Moving away from interoperability with NATO is impractical – too many European divisions on whether autonomy is desirable
Moritz Pieper & Martijn Lak 19, visiting Research Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs and Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Salford, UK & lecturer at Hague University of Applies Sciences and the Erasmus School of History, Culture and Communication, Rotterdam, “The End of Transatlanticism? EU Security and Defence Policies and the ‘Strategic Autonomy’ Debate from a Historical and Contemporary Perspective”, 2019, Studies in European Affairs 23(4), p. 23-44 /lg
In addition, the level of logistical entanglement serves to illustrate why a separation of EU defence structures from NATO structures would be a near-impossibility: NATO Prague Capabilities Commitments resemble the Helsinki Headline Goal, NATO’s ‘smart defence’ resembles the aim of “pooling and sharing” (Ghent Framework). Autonomy from the US is thus being made all the more diffi cult by an institutional copying that duplicates capacities in function and purpose.55 Ronja Kempin and Barbara Kunz thus argue that “[i]t thus makes little sense for U.S.-skeptic Europeanists to pit themselves against Atlanticists as if we were back in de Gaulle’s 1960s or the post-Cold War 1990s”.56
The notifi cation of November 2017 to formally launch PESCO recognizes as much. The Council states: “Enhanced defence capabilities of EU Member States will also benefit NATO. They will strengthen the European pillar within the Alliance and respond to repeated demands for stronger transatlantic burden sharing” (p. 1), and writes of the need to ensure “interoperability with NATO” (p. 5). The mechanism of Permanent Structured Cooperation, introduced by the Lisbon Treaty but never implemented, was launched on 23 June 2017. The ambition behind the realization of PESCO is to allow EU member states to work more closely together in the area of security and defence issues by providing “an ambitious, binding and inclusive European legal framework for investments in the security and defence of the EU’s territory and its citizens”, as the notifi cation reads.57 On a broader conceptual level, the Commission has also launched its own White Paper on the future of Europe.58 Member states willing to cooperate more on defence matters would be able to do so under the third scenario put forward in the Commission White Paper (“those who want more do more”). As the Commission puts this vision of a multi-speed Europe in security affairs: “This includes a strong common research and industrial base, joint procurement, more integrated capabilities and enhanced military readiness for joint missions abroad”.59 Interestingly, scenario 4 (“doing less more effi ciently”) talks of a “European defence Union” that would be able to speak with one voice on all foreign policy issues.60
The EU Council’s decision to upgrade the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) to 60 permanent staff in order to run Battlegroup-size executive military CSDP missions by the end of 2020 is an important step in this direction of ‘strategic autonomy’ (EEAS, 2018).61 The NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) would also need to defi ne what capabilities are required of European contributors, if Europeans want to contribute to Article 5 operations, non-Article 5 operations without the US and other non-EU Allies (Norway, Turkey, Canada), and to be in a position to conduct autonomous expeditionary operations. But to do that, the EU will have to commence a genuine strategic debate that would serve as a framework to channel its resurfaced defence ambitions in order to credibly embed CSDP within a wider understanding of what ‘strategic autonomy’ should entail across multiple policy domains. The 2016 EU Global Strategy takes up the term of ‘strategic autonomy’ and develops European policy responses to the multiple challenges that the EU is confronted with (EU Council 2016).62 The EU “will take responsibility foremost in Europe and its surrounding regions”, as the EUGS states.
The “strategic partners” in far-away places like Brazil, China, or India, by contrast, no longer play a discernible role. After its publication, additional policy papers were released that were indicative of an accelerated move towards greater defence cooperation, such as the European Security Compact (a joint Franco-German paper, Ayrault and Steinmeier, 2016), the Bratislava Road Map issued by the European Council on 16th September 2016, the EP’s vote on the European defence Union on 30th November 2016, the Commission’s European defence Action Plan, and its 2017 Refl ection paper on the future of European defence. Even the Commission, “traditionally reluctant to name the ‘D’ word”,63 was supportive, and has put forward the idea of a European Defence Fund (EDF) in June 2017. With this fund, €5.5 billion could be spent per year ‘to boost Europe’s defence capabilities’ in support of the implementation of the EU Global Strategy, as the Commission announcement reads.64 The momentum for new defence policies, however, is complicated by corporate and political factors. Defence companies follow their own industrial logic, no matter how hard political leadership tries to push things in a certain direction.65 Mutual reservations within the Eurofighter consortium illustrate the diffi culty of creating truly European (i.e. transnational) defence contractors.66
Moreover, while the rhetoric of the US president has generated a renewed drive towards advancing “strategic autonomy”, the latter is unlikely to move beyond its buzzword use for as long as the EU remains an institutional vessel for its member states to agree to disagree on what to use it for in security and defence matters. For example, it irritated the Baltic states and frustrated the French that a truly operational PESCO – beyond the PR merits of its declaration – was of secondary importance to the Germans,67 and Eastern European member states tend to place greater confi dence in bilateral US security guarantees than others. A realistic reformulation of a European security identity is therefore likely to be based on enhanced cooperation between groups of countries that want to do more (as the 2017 Commission White Paper puts it), not on an EU-wide consolidated effort. The introduction of Qualifi ed Majority Voting (QMV) in the Foreign Affairs Council would be a further step in that direction, but is unlikely to materialise in a Union of 27, as attempts to circumvent consensus requirements in foreign policy questions continue to be perceived as sovereignty losses. This makes swift changes to transatlantic defence arrangements less likely.
Conclusions
Tracing the evolution of EU security and defence policies, this article has illustrated how European defence developments have often been reactive to American positions and perceptions. European security was conditional on the transatlantic element, but also complicated by the nature of intergovernmentalism in security affairs, national divergences in security cultures, and an absence of an EU-wide consensus as to what level of ambition in this domain is desirable. The two key issues of West German rearmament and the role of the US in nascent European defence ambitions dominated the discussion in the late 1940s and early 1950s and have served to forge a transatlantic community as an “Empire by Invitation”: as Europe invited the US in, it stymied security divergences between European member states. The failure of the Pleven plan and the EDC were indicative of the diffi culty of bridging the divide between Atlanticists and those member states in favour of more European security and defence autonomy.
The second part of the paper showed how similar dividing lines quickly resurfaced after the end of the Cold War, when the debate surrounding the European Security and Defence Identity alluded to renewed ambitions to develop a distinct European voice in security affairs. We have argued that European consent to considerable US involvement in defence affairs has hampered the development of such autonomy as much as intra-European divergences on this policy domain have. The EU–US relationship has undergone cyclical disruptions during, but more so after the end of the Cold War, yet the election of a new US president in 2016 has called its underpinning logic into question more forcefully than ever at a level of offi cial policy discourse.
As an external trigger factor, Donald Trump’s election and his scathing critique of NATO and Europe’s budgetary contributions to its defence expenditures has therefore elevated the EU’s CSDP ambitions to a new level. With a rather astonishing pace, strategy papers have been published, the Commission put forward the idea of a European Defence Fund (EDF) in June 2017, and “Permanent Structured Cooperation” (PESCO), a mechanism for closer defence cooperation already foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty, was fi nally launched and activated in November 2017 (EU Council 2017) – even though the piecemeal streamlining of the operational, industrial, and political components of “strategic autonomy” leaves much to be desired.68
Finally, the state of CSDP and the public debate surrounding it needs to be put into a broader global context beyond transatlantic relations: The necessity for an overhaul of Europe’s global strategy was underlined against the background of the 2015 migration crisis, terrorist attacks in Europe and the inadequacy of European intelligence-sharing they exposed. A genuine strategic voice is not only needed in light of the often-discussed foreign policy re-orientations of actors like Russia and China, but also in light of the EU’s own passive response to crises in its own neighbourhood. It was this general state of alert that is refl ected in a German military study entitled “Strategic Perspective 2040”, which outlines different scenarios for the development of the international order. In the worst-case scenario, the study holds, “EU enlargement has been largely abandoned, other states have left the community, Europe has lost its global competitiveness”.69 The launch of PESCO in 2017 will not be the panacea for Europe’s search for a solution to the twin challenges of uncertainties in transatlantic relations and crises in the European neighbourhood and the Eurasian theatre, but can only be one element amongst many. ‘Strategic autonomy’ goes beyond CSDP. Yet, the brief historical overview of US-EU interaction on questions of institutional innovation presented in this paper has demonstrated that the transatlantic defence cooperation has been a crucial factor in enabling a margin of permissiveness for any European ‘strategic autonomy’ to develop.