Independence from NATO decks case solvency – intra-European conflicts would prevent interoperability and joint capability development
Hugo Meijer & Stephen G. Brooks 21, CNRS Research Fellow at Sciences Po, Center for International Studies, and the director of the European Initiative for Security Studies & professor of government at Dartmouth College, “Illusions of Autonomy: Why Europe Cannot Provide for Its Security If the United States Pulls Back”, Spring 2021, International Security 45(4), p. 7-43 /lg
An additional challenge is institutional. Europe’s strategic cacophony has prevented Europeans from developing an autonomous, military-planning, command and control (C2) structure.110 Indeed, a report by the European Parliamentary Research Service explains that one of the greatest challenges of European defense is “the lack of integration of the military structures of the Member States.”111 Although an effective and autonomous European defense would require the creation of a permanent planning and C2 infrastructure, the question of developing an autonomous Operational Headquarters (OHQ) has proven highly divisive.112 An OHQ was never established because of conºicting national interests and priorities among Europeans, in particular France, Germany and the UK. Whereas Paris has long supported the establishment of a military OHQ to bolster the EU’s strategic and operational planning structures and its contingency planning and C2 capacity, London has strongly resisted, seeing it as a duplication of NATO’s assets. Germany has stood somewhat in between, though closer to the UK, favoring a focus on civilian-military planning and C2, not least to avoid duplicating structures already existing at NATO.113 As a result, the EU remains entirely dependent on NATO or national assets for the planning and conduct of major executive operations, for which it has no autonomous military structures.114
If the United States were to pull back from Europe, it remains to be seen whether the Europeans could rely on a “Europeanized” NATO, in which the integrated structures would stay in place but without the United States.115 Military planning and C2 require a clear chain of command. When NATO was created, Europeans agreed to be under U.S. military command, rather than attempting the far more difªcult task of agreeing to be under the command of another European country or group of European states. More generally, as the hegemonic power in NATO, the United States has facilitated institutionalized cooperation among Europeans and helped partly contain Europe’s strategic cacophony.116 For decades, a U.S.-led NATO has been the overarching shaper of national defense policies and military transformation in Europe, helping overcome coordination and collective-action problems.117 In light of Europe’s deep-seated strategic divisions, a U.S. disengagement would amplify these coordination and collective action problems (assuming NATO survived) and would further hinder institutionalized, intra-European defense cooperation at all levels: strategies and doctrines; training; operational learning; interoperability; and joint capability development. Likewise, without the United States, the persistent and profound divergence of threat perceptions and strategic priorities among Europeans is likely to impede their capacity to agree on shared C2 structures for conducting operations, except for the lowest end of the spectrum of conºict (e.g., peace support operations).118
As a result of strategic cacophony, the EU has, in fact, struggled mightily to create even the most minimal C2 structure. As Luis Simón underscores, “It has taken nearly 20 years of allegedly signiªcant steps for the European Union to establish a ‘Military Planning and Conduct Capability’ composed of up to 25 staffers, devoted to assisting with the planning and conduct of so-called non-executive (i.e., training and assistance) missions,” with an advisory role only.119 Ultimately, given Europe’s deep-seated divergences, there is no basis for optimism that Europeans will be able to agree being under the permanent command of another European country for deterrence and defense or to consistently undertake effective institutionalized military cooperation without the enabling role played by the United States within NATO.