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Strategic autonomy is inevitable but would be blocked by a lack of financial resources absent NATO involvement – Brexit threw everyone for a loop

Hidayet Çilkoparan 18, Master of Science in the Department of International Relations at the Graduate School of Social Sciences of the Middle East Technical University, “EUROPE’S SECURITY CHALLENGES AND TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS”, October 2018, Middle East Technical University, https://open.metu.edu.tr/bitstream/handle/11511/27654/index.pdf /lg

Since the very beginning of the European integration process after WWII, integration in the field of security and defence has not always been high on the agenda. Similarly, the progress achieved in the new century has remained limited. Mainly due to the closer linkage of these areas to national security and sovereignty, and perhaps even more importantly because of NATO’s presence, considerable integration under the EU roof in these areas has not been considered possible or likely. Since the end of the Cold War, especially from the 2000s onward, however, the EU has been gradually deepening its integration in security and defence. Security challenges like conflicts in the Balkans and other countries in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood, terrorism and irregular migration, as well as other new threats and challenges like cyber-security that have demonstrated that no country can counter and eliminate these threats alone have given momentum to the EU’s further integration in these areas. The rising strength of the RF in international politics, demonstrated by its aggressive interventions in its immediate neighbourhood and beyond under the leadership of President Putin has been another major factor. The recent rhetoric of the US leadership about disengagement from European security and NATO also appears to have encouraged the EU its efforts to quickly enhance its defence capabilities and accordingly new initiatives were undertaken.145

Academicians, thinkers, analysts, observers, politicians, so on, who have been observing the development of EU security and defence policy and trying to understand why Europe felt the need to develop its own defence capabilities, while a robust collective security organization like NATO existed. Some explained this need through the IR theory of structural realism. They argued that “instead of balance of power, balance of threat” need to be focussed on. Even though the EU did not perceive an immediate threat from the USA, its decades-long hegemony in Europe, sustained through NATO, has started becoming disturbing and Europeans decided to take steps to balance the US, so that they could enjoy a balanced partnership in transatlantic relations and affect US decisions on actions it may take with regard to international security and stability.146 

In this respect, the concepts of “balancing” and “bandwagoning” have also been referred to in explaining European instincts as to when to side with or counterbalance the USA. When there was a most serious threat to all like the Soviet Union and expansion of communism, Europeans clustered around the USA (bandwagoning) and felt safer. Once the major threat disappeared after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the European states began moving in a different direction to balance the USA, so that they can maintain a healthier and balanced relationship with this global hegemon.147

In fact, the USA’s attitude regarding the ESDP (CSDP) has remained unclear, because US decision-makers have been hesitant about how far the ESDP / CSDP should be developed and what level of duplication with NATO capabilities would not be considered “unnecessary duplication.” Indeed, the USA has been facing a dilemma since the end of the 1940s: it has been pushing European countries/the EU to become a stronger partner by enhancing their military capabilities, while it has been concerned about the possibility that a well-developed CSDP could duplicate NATO and weaken transatlantic ties. Issuance of the Saint Malo Declaration by France and the UK in December 1998 has only deepened the US concerns. Although the EU, at its Helsinki Summit in December 1999, reassured the USA by confirming that it would act and undertake operations only if and when "NATO as a whole is not engaged", even this confirmation could not fully eliminate US worries about potential rivalry of the EU to the NATO over time. The debate held among France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg on setting up “a separate EU operational planning headquarters in Tervuren/Belgium” provoked further concern in Washington. This initiative has been blocked by the UK and a potential source of further disagreement in transatlantic ties has been eliminated, at least until Brexit. Whether the separation of the UK from the EU may lead EU members to revisit this idea remains to be seen. On the other hand, as noted also under previous Chapter, acquisition of more reliable European defence capabilities by the EU enjoys strong support among the European public and governments. The EU’s efforts are likely going to be watched closely by not only the USA, but also other NATO allies that are not EU members, like Turkey and Norway. As the EU continues to develop its military and autonomous planning capabilities, it will be inevitable to have closer co-ordination between the EU, the USA and non-NATO European allies (and Canada), as three major components of the European security architecture. Within this framework, NATO would seem to be a potential forum for co-ordinating the interests and initiatives of these actors.148

Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009 and the Libya crisis in 2011, which once again exposed the EU’s inefficiency as an institution in the face of such a major crisis, the EU, on the one hand, has been trying to streamline its internal decision-making processes regarding security and defence and come up with a common vision of strategic interests, as prescribed in the 2016 EUGS. Even in the existence of improved procedures and conceptual framework, it remains unclear whether the EU and its major powers will be able to act decisively and effectively in the face of a new crisis. After the international intervention in Libya, the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria have also shown that the EU is slow and relatively inefficient if the USA does not contribute and even lead. The US announcement of a foreign policy adjustment shifting its focus to East/South Asia has to some extent worried the EU and encouraged it to take some new steps, but it appears that it will take many years for the EU to become a major power, which would be taken seriously by the RF in terms of military strength. Especially, if and when the RF is involved in a major crisis, the EU immediately turns to the USA for its involvement and leadership. In this regard, the development of the CSDP and strategic autonomy may not affect the nature of transatlantic relations, as far as major conflicts involving the RF are concerned.149

Brexit has the potential to expose the EU’s military weaknesses and inability to act to respond to major crises in its immediate neighbourhood and beyond. Its ambition to achieve strategic autonomy is going to be undermined as well. At minimum, it will take time, increased efforts and more funds to achieve it, because Brexit is going to take away up to a quarter of the EU’s defence capabilities. France may assume an increased role in this regard, however, it does not have the necessary financial resources and looks to Germany to provide much-needed funds to foster EU integration in the field of defence. Germany prefers to carry out projects aiming to enhance defence capabilities under the EU structural framework.150

Accordingly, the implementation of the CSDP, after Brexit, would be a lesser concern to the USA, as it will take time for the EU to achieve strategic autonomy and develop a balanced interaction as an equal partner in transatlantic relations. Given President Trump’s strong emphasis on the military might of the USA, the EU faces difficult times and stands at a crossroads whether to take tough decisions on whether to follow US political leadership as their strategic interests and approaches in international relations continue to gradually diverge. In this regard, if the CSDP turns out to be a success story by implementing its various projects and initiatives, the EU has the potential to become an increasingly disobedient ally of the USA pursuing its own interests. In fact, it is already possible to observe such differentiation in the approaches of the USA and the EU, by looking at their policies towards North Korea and Iran.151

At this point, in addition to what has already been considered above, it may be useful to take a closer look into the possible impact of Brexit on transatlantic relations.

5.4. Brexit’s Potential Impact on Transatlantic Defence Co-operation 

Under the previous chapter and section, I examined the possible impacts of Brexit on the security and defence projects and co-operation carried out under the EU’s CSDP. In this section, applying a strategic approach, I will try to analyse Brexit’s possible implications on transatlantic defence co-operation, including relations between the EU and NATO. 

The current major challenges to security in Europe underline the fact that geographical neighbours are interdependent on each other for ensuring their security from all kinds of threats and challenges. Even though the UK is leaving the EU, it is not going to move away from the EU. European security analysts find it important that the two sides are conscious of this reality and carry out Brexit negotiations accordingly, so that they do not weaken European and Euro-Atlantic defence arrangements.152

Security analysts consider the implications of Brexit on European security very important. It is mainly because, for the EU, the Brexit will result in the loss of one of its two major military powers.153 On the other hand, there is NATO to cushion the likely impacts of Brexit on European security. 

In fact, thanks to its advanced military capabilities, including nuclear weapons, the UK has been a major contributor to European security and defence, which has increased the EU’s weight and credibility in world politics. Some predict that that as a result of Brexit, the EU’s power will be reduced by up to 25 percent. In any rate, it is a significant loss. Therefore, in case Brexit negotiations are not conducted in a spirit of mutual compromise and in a tidy manner, it may reflect negatively on the strength and security of both sides. The EU can be expected to move ahead with its old plan to set up a European operational headquarters, which has thus far been obstructed by the UK, which has viewed NATO as the primary military security organization in Europe.154 

Furthermore, the UK, thanks to its special relations with the USA, has been a leading voice within the EU for the interests of Eastern European countries, so called New Europe. These countries have been looking to the UK for guidance on many issues. In the absence of the UK, the EU will be a significantly different environment for them. The UK has also functioned within the EU as a counterweight to Germany and France, which traditionally favour closer and deeper integration in all possible areas, and its departure therefore worries some Eastern European countries, as they won their independence not long ago after the collapse of the Soviet Union. One can argue that in the post-Brexit period, the UK may still be able to intervene in EU defence projects and initiatives through these countries.155 

With the UK’s departure from the EU, even though it will remain a NATO member and thereby committed to European security, France will be the only nuclear and significant conventional military power in the EU. In this regard, France has already started asking Germany to increase its financial contributions to the enhancement of Europe’s defence capabilities. New EU initiatives like EDF and PESCO got underway, however, it is not year clear how the USA will react to these new steps. In case Germany provides additional financial contributions to European projects but refrains from making a noticeable contribution within the NATO framework, it is possible that it could elicit further reaction from the USA. As long as the USA remains as a member, the issue of avoiding duplication, on which the USA is sensitive, has the potential to cause further EU-USA frictions, as the latter expects EU members to purchase major defence products from US companies.156 

Under the current European security architecture, NATO and the EU, even though they co-ordinate to some extent, undertake their own planning in the areas of defence, capability enhancement and operations. The separation of a major player like the UK from the EU may bear consequences on the modalities of cooperation between these two organizations. It might strengthen the relative position of NATO within those modalities. On the other hand, as discussed extensively above, it might also permit deeper integration among remaining EU member states that could in turn allow the EU to become a more credible interlocutor in the NATO-EU relationship. Therefore, as a final point under this section, it appears important to note the fact that the Brexit will further expand the “power asymmetry” between NATO and the EU. A most feasible solution for the EU may be to keep pursuing “strategic autonomy” from NATO, by including the UK to the extent possible, through creative arrangements under EUGS / CSDP.157

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