NATO-led EDT policy requires substantial funding
1AC Jankowski '21 – Political Adviser and Head of the Political Section at the Permanent Delegation of the Republic of Poland to NATO [Dominik, " NATO and the Emerging and Disruptive Technologies Challenge” in NATO in the Era of Unpeace: Defending Against Known Unknowns, pp 99-102]
While the suggestion that EDTs will enable a new class of weapons that will modify the strategic landscape remains to be realised, a number of unresolved security puzzles underlying the emergence of these new technology areas have implications for NATO. As one looks to the future, new adversaries and new science and technology will emerge. The extent to which these EDTs may exacerbate or mitigate the global security and governance challenges that Russia currently poses to NATO Allies will remain an integral question as policy-makers navigate the complex global environment.
NATO is a natural forum for deliberations about EDTs, especially in a transatlantic context. It also has vast experience, going back to the Cold War, in working towards standardisation and interoperability among Allies. However, the results achieved have been mixed, which underscores the challenges the Alliance now faces – there are not only 30 Allies with disparate levels of capability, but also a backdrop of rapid technological advances where some of its competitors and adversaries may hold significant advantages.
In this context, NATO should concentrate on four core issues with regard to EDTs. First, as Andrea Gilli emphasizes, the Alliance should start a process on “NATO-mation.”29 In fact, the Alliance should serve as a primary transatlantic coordinating institution for information-sharing and cooperation between Allies on the security dimension of EDTs. NATO has an important role to play in the development of a common strategy based on an Alliance-wide EDTs threat assessment and an analysis of opportunities. Therefore, EDTs can serve as a unifying element for NATO’s work on future policies.
Second, NATO will need partners on its path towards achieving a comprehensive implementation strategy on EDTs. This will require connection with the private sector early and often, clearly communicating NATO’s priorities and requirements while providing accessible opportunities for industry, including non-traditional ones. Much of the innovative work being undertaken in the commercial sector is being carried out by companies that have never worked in the defence realm or have no wish to do so. Therefore, building new partnerships at NATO with the private sector will enable the Alliance to increase awareness, share data, and creatively tap into experiences and knowledge. Moreover, NATO and the EU should initiate a strategic dialogue to address fundamental issues of tech governance and data sharing in order to overcome the transatlantic tech policy divide.
Third, Allies should manage expectations and not overestimate the role of EDTs. EDTs are not a panacea to all of NATO’s problems, including the existing gaps in the still-needed conventional capabilities. Indeed, EDTs will not be a silver bullet to address NATO’s shortfalls. Therefore, Allies should first and foremost concentrate on two elements: overcoming the interoperability gap30 and revitalizing NATO’s once robust standardization programme.31
Fourth, Allies should consider using NATO as a body to coordinate efforts to find innovative ways to finance EDTs, including through an establishment of a NATO venture capital fund. A potential deep-tech investment in technologies with security and defence applications through a dedicated NATO structure could help Allies maintain their technological edge.